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1.1. Main questions, claims, and contributions 
This is a thesis in metaontology. Ontology involves philosophical discussions 
that are or at least appear to be about what there is, what exists or what is real, 
or about whether Fs are there, exist, or are real. The typical Fs in question 
include abstract objects, such as numbers and sets; fictional characters, such as 
Sherlock Holmes and Pegasus; arbitrary sums of existing objects, such as the 
sum of my nose and Jupiter; ordinary objects, such as chairs, tables, sticks, and 
stones; (merely) possible worlds and things, such as a world in which donkeys 
can talk or the talking donkey itself; impossible worlds and things, such as the 
world in which squares are round or the round square itself; and social kinds, 
such as races and genders. Metaontology asks questions about those discus-
sions: what the discussions are really about or what the participants are really 
doing (the interpretation question), whether the discussions are worthwhile (the 
evaluation question), and whether they should proceed as they currently do, be 
modified, or end altogether (the recommendation question). My focus is on the 
interpretation question. 
As I look into the metaontological interpretation question, I specifically 
focus on the interpretation of revisionary ontology: discussions in which philo-
sophers at least appear to be arguing that certain kinds or entities that are 
ordinarily thought to exist do not in fact exist or that certain entities or kinds 
that are ordinarily thought not to exist do in fact exist. Standard examples of 
revisionary ontology include van Inwagen (1990) and Merricks (2001), who 
argue that there are no non-organic macrophysical objects, such as chairs and 
tables; Horgan and Potrč (2008), who argue that there are also no persons and 
no subatomic particles and that there is indeed only one thing, the universe (or 
the “blobject”, as they call it); and Lewis (1986) who, on the contrary, argues 
for a baroque ontology that includes concrete (as opposed to abstract), real 
possible worlds. In addition to such examples of “mainstream” revisionary 
ontology, which most of my thesis is concerned with, I will also interpret 
certain revisionary proposals in what is sometimes called the “feminist meta-
physics of gender”. This includes, for example, Haslanger’s (2000) and Sveins-
dóttir’s (2013) constructivist accounts of “woman”. Haslanger and Sveinsdóttir 
do not make revisionary claims of the form “Fs exist” or “Fs do not exist”, but 
they propose revisionary (constructivist) accounts of who women are. Or that, 
in any case, is how their claims are sometimes interpreted – as metaphysical 
claims about the nature of women (Barnes 2014, 2017, Mikkola 2015). I will 
argue, however, that such feminist revisionary proposals about gender belong to 
a project that is importantly discontinuous with and independent from main-
stream revisionary ontology. Although I will focus on the interpretation of 
“mainstream” revisionary ontology, I will also take feminist metaphysics into 
consideration because it will help show how my approach is useful for tackling 
a wide variety of examples that diverge in their methodological assumptions. 
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My general answer to the interpretation question, for both mainstream and 
feminist revisionary ontology, is that many of these revisionary proposals are 
best understood as proposals about how to revise the ordinary concepts that we 
use to form beliefs about the world. “Concepts”, on this account, are understood 
in accordance with what Machery calls the psychologists’ notion of “concept”: 
“A concept of x is a body of knowledge about x that is stored in long-term 
memory and that is used by default in the processes underlying most, if not all, 
higher cognitive competences when these processes result in judgments about 
x” (Machery 2009, 12). (I will further elaborate on this in 3.4.3.) Concepts and 
conceptual schemes may have other roles as well, besides their role in belief 
formation. For example, shared concepts plausibly play a role in enabling com-
munication. However, the central role of concepts that is relevant for revisio-
nary ontology, I will suppose, is their role as the building blocks of beliefs. 
This insight concerning the interpretation question helps us address the re-
commendation question. Again, the recommendation question is whether onto-
logical discussions should take place at all, and if they should, then how. The 
“how” part concerns the methodology of ontology. Are the questions of revisio-
nary ontology best addressed as they are currently addressed, namely, by appeal 
to intuitive judgments and theoretical virtues; or should these methods be 
replaced, for example, with conceptual analysis or deference to the natural 
sciences? Tahko writes: “A central, perhaps the central question of meta-
metaphysics is: How do we acquire metaphysical knowledge?” (Tahko 2015, 
3). I take him to be referring to what I call the “how” aspect of the recom-
mendation question. The “whether” aspect, which seems likewise important in 
metametaphysics, could be expressed with the question: can we acquire 
metaphysical knowledge at all? Or, more broadly: should we do metaphysics? 
In order to make any progress with either of the recommendation questions (the 
“how” question or the “whether” question), however, we must address the 
question of what metaphysical knowledge is supposed to be knowledge about. 
And that is the interpretation question. 
How then does my answer to the interpretation question help us make 
progress with the recommendation question? My answer to the interpretation 
question, again, is that certain ontological discussions are about which concepts 
we should use in belief formation. If the answer is correct, then this points 
towards a fundamental question that the revisionary ontologists must address, in 
order to rationally address the questions at stake in their discussions and in 
order to understand the import of the answers. That fundamental question is: 
what kind of beliefs should we have? Or in other words, what are beliefs 
supposed to do; what is their role in our lives; what are good beliefs like? The 
revisionary ontologists need to address this question, in order to properly 
understand and address the question of what concepts we should employ in 
belief formation. 
More precisely, a fundamental question that needs to be asked is: should our 
beliefs help us achieve our practical, non-cognitive aims or should we design 
our beliefs so as to achieve epistemic excellence for its own sake? One way of 
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understanding the goal of “epistemic excellence for its own sake” is that our 
beliefs should reflect the world as it is, or “carve at the joints in nature”. As I 
will argue, drawing on Sider (2011), it makes sense to interpret mainstream 
revisionary ontologists as seeking the most theoretically virtuous conceptual 
scheme, in order to find the scheme that best reflects the objective structure, or 
the “natural joints” of the world. It is possible, however, that many or even most 
of our beliefs are not supposed to reflect the objective structure of the world 
(where this is understood as a way of achieving epistemic excellence for its own 
sake). Perhaps most of our beliefs are supposed to help us achieve ultimately 
non-cognitive aims. On that assumption about the aim of our beliefs, replacing 
the ordinary conceptual scheme with a more joint-carving one might not 
improve our beliefs. In other words, the conceptual revision might not make our 
beliefs better at what beliefs are supposed to do. Further, it is not just a 
possibility, but a plausible assumption that most of the time, we indeed form 
beliefs to achieve practical, non-cognitive aims. For example, we form beliefs 
about the dangerous or potentially enjoyable features of our surroundings, in 
order to react appropriately in light of those beliefs. Joint-carving concepts 
might not be the best concepts to use for forming such practically oriented 
beliefs; for instance, they might be inferior in terms of cognitive processing 
efficiency. 
However, mainstream revisionary ontologists can still reasonably aim to 
improve beliefs, I will argue, by making the ordinary conceptual scheme more 
joint-carving. The ontologists can explicitly target the concepts that we use 
when we form theoretically oriented beliefs: beliefs that are formed merely for 
the sake of the intrinsically valuable achievement of excelling as an epistemic 
agent. I will call such beliefs “theoretical beliefs”. When we are choosing 
concepts for forming theoretical beliefs, it is sensible to focus on the deside-
ratum of joint-carvingness and to ignore potentially conflicting desiderata, such 
as cognitive processing efficiency. 
I will draw a distinction, then, between the more mundane, practically 
oriented beliefs and the special class of theoretically oriented beliefs. This 
distinction is not supposed to be a sharp one, such that all beliefs fall into 
exactly one of the two kinds; and it is also not supposed to be distinction 
concerning the ultimate metaphysics of mind. Much about the taxonomy and 
metaphysics of beliefs is left open when I draw this rough distinction. However, 
rough as it is, the distinction contributes to a better understanding of revisionary 
ontology as a project of improving concepts to improve beliefs. First, the 
distinction between the two kinds of beliefs allows us to identify the proper 
ambitions of mainstream revisionary ontology – to identify the kind of 
significance it can and cannot claim for itself. In particular, once we draw the 
distinction between practically oriented beliefs and theoretically oriented 
beliefs, it is reasonable for mainstream revisionary ontologists to maintain that 
their project can improve their audience’s theoretical beliefs, but not their 
audience’s practical beliefs. The ontologists can claim this, as long as their 
audience acknowledges that they (the audience) are in the business of forming 
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theoretical beliefs as well as practical beliefs and that it is consequently good 
for them to have good theoretical beliefs as well good practical beliefs. 
Secondly, the distinction between theoretical and practical beliefs helps us 
understand what is peculiar about the feminist revisionary ontology of gender, 
in comparison with mainstream revisionary ontology. I will argue that the 
feminist revisionary ontology of gender is primarily about which gender 
concepts, if any, we should use in forming practically oriented beliefs, whereas 
mainstream revisionary ontology, again, is about improving the concepts that 
we use to form theoretical beliefs. 
The general aim of my thesis is thus to address the metaontological inter-
pretation question by defending an account of revisionary ontology as a project 
of improving concepts to improve beliefs. In fleshing out this account, I will 
draw the aforementioned distinction between theoretical and practical beliefs. 
As explained above, this distinction helps us understand the (limited) epistemic 
significance of mainstream revisionary ontology and how the feminist revisio-
nary ontology of gender relates to mainstream revisionary ontology. 
To sum up, the main claims that I will seek to establish in this thesis are the 
following. 
 
(1) Many central discussions in both “mainstream” and “feminist” revisio-
nary ontology are about how to improve the concepts used in belief 
formation. 
(2) Given this account of revisionary ontology, our understanding of the 
project(s) would benefit from inquiry into the roles and kinds of beliefs. 
(3) A relevant distinction that should be drawn is that between theoretically 
and practically oriented beliefs (“theoretical beliefs” and “practical 
beliefs”, for short). 
(4) Mainstream revisionary ontology is about how to improve the concepts 
that are used in forming theoretical beliefs. 
(5) Given (4), mainstream revisionary ontology has limited epistemic 
significance: it can claim to improve the audience’s theoretical beliefs, 
but not their practical beliefs. 
(6) Feminist revisionary ontology of gender is primarily about how to 
improve the concepts that are used in forming practical beliefs. 
(7) Given (4) and (6), mainstream and feminist revisionary ontology are 
importantly independent of one another. 
 
I take the most important contributions of this thesis to be (1) the systematic 
defence of an account of revisionary ontology as a project of improving 
concepts to improve beliefs; (2) a novel proposal about the epistemic signifi-
cance of revisionary ontology (or in other words, a novel proposal about how 
the project can improve our beliefs); and (3) a new and potentially illuminating 
proposal about the relationship between feminist and mainstream metaphysics 
(or some parts thereof).  
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1.2. Motivation 
Why do we need to interpret revisionary ontology? One reason to engage in 
metametaphysical projects such as this one is to justify one’s pre-existing 
evaluative attitudes towards metaphysics or some part of it: “Just as with any 
kind of attitude, if you hold a metametaphysical attitude you ought to be able to 
justify why it is that you hold it” (Tahko 2015, 1). This is not quite the moti-
vation that guides the current work, since the thesis is not aimed at justifying a 
particular evaluative attitude about revisionary ontology. Nevertheless, this 
work could be useful for those who have views about the value of revisionary 
ontology and wish to defend those views. The metaontological interpretation 
question, which this thesis focuses upon, is the natural starting point for any 
attempt to answer the evaluation question, that is, any defence or criticism of 
revisionary ontology. Although I do not answer the evaluation question in the 
thesis, I answer the interpretation question in a way that leaves certain avenues 
for debating the value of revisionary ontology open and closes others. 
For example, when one accepts the interpretive account of mainstream 
revisionary ontology proposed in this thesis, one could further argue that main-
stream revisionary ontology is an impossible enterprise, since it relies on the 
false idea that conceptual schemes can reflect the structure of reality to a lesser 
or greater extent. (Of course, one would then also need to show that this idea 
about conceptual schemes is indeed false – I do not argue for this in the thesis.) 
This is an example of an avenue for criticising of revisionary ontology that 
remains open here. On the other hand, my answer to the interpretation question 
closes the door to certain deflationist accounts, such as those that take onto-
logists to be disputing endlessly over questions that should be resolved by 
drawing simple inferences that are warranted by linguistic competence. (Such a 
deflationary account is most prominently defended by Thomasson (2015).) This 
thesis, then, is not itself the justification of an evaluative attitude towards 
revisionary ontology; but it does have implications for how one can defend or 
criticize revisionary ontology. The aim of the thesis, again, is not to justify a 
pre-existing evaluative attitude towards ontology, but instead to prepare the way 
for the work of settling upon such an attitude. The inquiry into the interpretation 
question is to some extent motivated by an interest in the evaluation question, 
but the thesis does not reach a definite answer to the evaluation question itself. 
Further, the inquiry into the interpretation question is also motivated by an 
interest in the recommendation question: the question of whether and how 
revisionary ontology should proceed. The “whether” part of the recommen-
dation question again hangs on the further work that is also required to answer 
the evaluation question – work that is not done in this thesis. For example, the 
question of whether the project of mainstream revisionary ontology should 
proceed at all depends on whether human concepts are even the kinds of things 
that can reflect the objective structure of reality and whether there even is an 
objective structure of reality. The contribution of the thesis toward answering 
the “whether” part of the recommendation question is its identification of more 
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specific questions on which the answer depends, leaving those specific ques-
tions themselves unaddressed. Regarding the “how” part of the recommendation 
question, the thesis does have some more direct implications. For one, main-
stream revisionary ontology should revise its self-conception, to the extent that 
it is not in line with the account defended here. This would allow us to proceed 
with the discussions within and about revisionary ontology in a more en-
lightened way, without supposing, for example, that mainstream revisionary 
ontology can aspire to revise ordinary practical beliefs about what there is. 
Further, if I am right in arguing that mainstream and feminist revisionary 
ontology are distinct projects of conceptual engineering (targeting different 
kinds of beliefs), then this implies that we should keep the distinct characters of 
these projects in mind and allow both sides to ignore certain kinds of 
challenges. 
In general terms, then, the motivation for pursuing the metaontological 




My overall method is to look for an interpretation that best meets the adequacy 
criteria that obtain in a particular interpretive situation. The “interpretive 
situation” is defined by the interpreter’s interests, commitments, and the data 
available. I hold that there are various relevant interpretive situations to con-
sider, when we ask the interpretation question about revisionary ontology. The 
interpretation question, again, is: what are the discussions in revisionary onto-
logy about? The question can also be posed as follows: what are revisionary 
ontologists doing? This question calls for an interpretive account, an explana-
tory story on what revisionary ontology is about or what the revisionary onto-
logists are doing. The more specific requirements for this account, however, 
depend on the interpretive situation. 
I will consider three interpretive situations, that is, I will interpret revisionary 
ontology from three points of view. First, I will take up the “quizzical ob-
server’s” point of view; then, the point of view of mainstream revisionary onto-
logists themselves, as they explain the nature and value of their project to their 
audience; and finally, the point of view of feminist revisionary ontologists of 
gender, as they try to understand the nature of their project in relation to 
mainstream revisionary ontology. These are all important points of view from 
which the interpretation, evaluation, and recommendation questions arise. 
The “quizzical observer” is a fellow philosopher who has a good level of 
familiarity with the ontological disputes in question (disputes that appear to be 
about whether certain revisionary theses about ontology are true), but still feels 
a sense of pointlessness upon observing or thinking about these disputes. Such 
an observer wants an account that would help her understand why the disputes 
between her peers, whose relevant capacities can be presumed to be roughly 
equal to hers, give rise to this sense of pointlessness and what to think about the 
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value and the prospects of the disputes in this light. The quizzical observer 
might understandably worry that if there is something deeply wrong with the 
project of revisionary ontology, as her quizzical phenomenology suggests, then 
limited intellectual and material resources should not be spent on this project. 
The mainstream revisionary ontologists themselves might have a similar 
worry, seeing that their audience, while puzzled and to an extent drawn in by 
the arguments, is nevertheless systematically uncompelled to revise the beliefs 
that the arguments seem to challenge (such as the belief that there are tables). 
Furthermore, the audience not only fails to revise the beliefs, but the audience 
apparently even continues to feel entitled to these beliefs, in spite of the argu-
ments. For the ontologists, the worry, in this situation, is not that somebody else 
might be wasting resources, but that they themselves need to figure out whether 
and how they can explain and justify the project of revisionary ontology to their 
audience. 
Finally, the feminist philosophers putting forth revisionary theses about 
gender are motivated by different concerns once again. They find themselves 
pursuing a project that has at least superficial similarity to mainstream revi-
sionary ontology, but it is unclear whether this similarity is deceptive or not. In 
this case, there are no looming suspicions that feminist revisionary ontology 
might be a waste of resources – its social significance is thought to be evident 
enough. The motivation for tackling the interpretation question, here, is rather 
the “how” aspect of the recommendation question (and not the “whether” aspect 
of the recommendation question, or the evaluation question). More specifically, 
the question is about whether and how feminist revisionary ontologists (and/or 
mainstream revisionary ontologists) should revise their self-conception or their 
approach to their questions, in light of reflection upon the relationship between 
feminist and mainstream revisionary ontology. 
So then, different interests guide the inquiry in each interpretive situation. 
The quizzical observer is interested in why disputes between her presumed 
epistemic peers (i.e. mainstream revisionary ontologists) give rise to a peculiar 
sense of pointlessness, and whether that sense of pointlessness indicates that 
there is indeed something deeply wrong with the disputes. Mainstream revi-
sionary ontologists themselves are interested in explaining the nature and signi-
ficance of their project to others, especially in light of the limited capacity of 
their arguments to change their audience’s minds about the relevant matters 
(e.g. about whether there are tables). Feminist revisionary ontologists are inte-
rested in interpreting their project in relation to mainstream revisionary 
ontology; for example, whether they ought to think of themselves as prospective 
allies, competitors or as simply engaged in different projects. These different 
interests lead to somewhat different adequacy conditions for a satisfactory 
account. My strategy is to establish the central adequacy conditions for each 
interpretive situation and in that light to assess the competing interpretive 
hypotheses that are already present in the literature, combining and building on 
these hypotheses, as needed. 
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A peculiarity of my method, then, is that I address the interpretation question 
from particular points of view: the points of view of interpreters with particular 
explanatory needs to meet and data to account for. However, I do not think that 
this peculiarity is, in fact, so peculiar. After all, whenever we interpret some 
exchange, we do so from a particular point of view, guided by particular inte-
rests. The interpretation question appears to be incomplete and ambiguous, until 
we specify some such interpretive situation. Perhaps an “interpretation from 
nowhere” is possible for some exchanges and perhaps even for those engaged in 
revisionary ontology, but I would not know how to go about seeking such an 
interpretation from nowhere. The three interpretive situations that I consider – 
the quizzical observer trying to explain her sense of pointlessness; the main-
stream ontologists trying to explain themselves to their audience; and the 
feminist ontologists trying to understand the relationship between their project 
and that of mainstream revisionary ontology – are salient in the current meta-
ontological discussion. Further, these points of view are salient for a good 
reason: they reflect important interests that motivate addressing the 
interpretation question. 
There might be other points of view, where still other desiderata are relevant. 
For example, a perspective that I am not considering here is that of someone 
who is not motivated by an interest in actual discussions within revisionary 
ontology, but instead by a more general interest in whether there could be any 
interesting philosophical discussions about existence questions, and what such 
possible discussions would then really be about. E.g. Eklund (2016, 179) 
distinguishes between the question of (1) whether the actual disputes between 
nihilists and commonsensists about ordinary objects are merely verbal and the 
question of (2) whether most or all possible disputes on this subject matter are 
merely verbal. Eklund seems to consider the second question an especially 
important one for metaontology; but I am limiting my attention to the 
interpretation of actual discussions within revisionary ontology and discussions 
that are relevantly similar, in terms of the discussants’ understanding both of 
their subject matter and of the proper way of addressing that subject matter. The 
answer to the broader interpretive question about all or most possible 
philosophical discussions on existence questions need not have all that much to 
do with what is going on in current, actual discussions. I will further justify my 
focus on the narrower interpretive question in chapter 2, where I elaborate on 
what I take to be the relevant object of interpretation. Here, it should suffice to 
say that I do not claim that all or most possible discussions (or even all or most 
possible discussions between philosophers) that appear to be, for example, 
about whether chairs exist are really about how to improve concepts in order to 
improve beliefs. I am limiting myself to the three interpretive situations that I 
consider and I remain silent on what is the best account of revisionary ontology 
in other interpretive situations, where the object of interpretation or the 
desiderata for the account might be differently specified. 
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1.4. Contextualization 
1.4.1. Sub-disciplinary contextualization 
In order to understand where this thesis is located in the philosophical landscape 
and what falls in and out of its scope, some further clarification of the terms 
“metaphysics”, “metametaphysics”, “ontology” and “metaontology” is in order. 
When a distinction is made between ontology and metaphysics, then “onto-
logy” is generally taken to be the inquiry into what exists or what there is, 
whereas “metaphysics” is taken to be the inquiry into reality more generally. 
For example, Berto and Plebani (2015, 4) give such a narrower characterization 
of ontology: “What we want from ontology is a list of all there is, and ontology 
gets the list right insofar as it misses nothing that is there, and includes nothing 
that isn’t there” (Berto and Plebani 2015, 1). Let us call this the “Quinean” 
notion of ontology, as Berto and Plebani do. When a distinction is made 
between ontology, in this Quinean sense, and metaphysics more broadly, then 
the field of metaphysics is thought to contain ontology and also something else 
besides it. Those who make the distinction between metaphysics and the sub-
discipline of ontology hold that for a full description of reality, it is not enough 
to say just what there is. One reason to think that it is not enough to say just 
what there is, is that reality might not be “flat”, but structured. In order to 
understand structured reality, we need to know how the existents relate to one 
another – what grounds what – and not just what there is (Schaffer 2009). By 
contrast, those who equate metaphysics with ontology, in the Quinean sense, 
tend to think that the complete list of existents (fully described, perhaps 
including certain relations to other existents in the description) would amount to 
a full description of reality. 
I will assume, as a matter of stipulation, that ontology is the sub-discipline of 
metaphysics that is concerned with (or at least appears to be concerned with) 
existence or existents in one way or another; but I do not assume anything about 
whether this subject matter, properly conceived, exhausts the subject matter of 
metaphysics. Further, I do not fully subscribe to the Quinean characterization of 
ontology given above, i.e. the view that ontology seeks a list of everything that 
there is. First, this view excludes the ontologists who argue that there are 
different “ways” or “modes” of being or existence – as opposed to kinds of 
beings or existents – and who think that studying such ways or modes is an 
issue in ontology; for example, McDaniel (2009). Second, not every ontological 
proposal aims to give a complete list of what there is. For example, philo-
sophers may discuss whether there are numbers or whether Sherlock Holmes 
exists and call these “ontological” disputes. In fact, much of contemporary 
metaontological criticism is directed at disputes that do not appear to be about 
which list of all existents is the correct one, but rather about whether some Fs 
exist or not. These are indeed the sorts of discussions that I will be interpreting 
in the thesis. One might respond, on behalf of the Quinean characterization of 
ontology, that these discussions that appear to be about whether there are Fs are 
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all contributions to the general project of putting together the complete list of 
existents. However, this is to assume too much about the motivations of those 
involved in the discussions. For example, those who work on the ontology of 
race and gender would presumably not say that their aim is to contribute to the 
compiling of the inventory of things (or people or kinds) that exist. Likewise, 
philosophers of mathematics might be interested in whether there are numbers, 
not because they want to do their share in completing the list of all existents, but 
because they are worried about the status of mathematics, in so far as mathe-
matics seems to presuppose that there are numbers. More generally, philo-
sophers can and do pursue questions about whether there are Fs, not as a 
contribution to the list of existents, but because they are interested in whether 
there are Fs, for independent reasons. 
One might also suggest that ontology aims to identify the most fundamental 
constituents of reality. This is much too restrictive, for my purposes at least. I 
am interested in a broader range of discussions, not just those where it is 
common ground that the interest is in the fundamental constituents of reality. 
For example, feminist revisionary ontologists would not agree that they are 
studying the fundamental constituents of reality. For another example, the 
debate on whether tables exist should not be understood as a debate on whether 
tables are fundamental, since all parties would presumably agree that they are 
not.1 
Again, I focus on philosophical discussions that are “ontological” in the 
sense that they at least appear to be about whether Fs exist, whether they are 
real or they are there. I will have more to say about the kinds of discussions that 
I have in mind when I pose the interpretation question, in chapter 2. In any case, 
in relation to how I understand “ontology”, an important matter to note is that I 
do not assume that all discussions between philosophers that appear to be about 
whether there are Fs really form or should form a sub-discipline, characterized 
by shared methods and assumptions. In fact, I will argue that there are at least 
two importantly different projects within ontology, thus understood: the 
“mainstream” and the “feminist” project. 
For brevity, I have so far said that “ontological” discussions appear to be 
about whether Fs exist or are there, and these are indeed the kinds of discus-
sions that most of my thesis concerns. However, in the chapter of feminist 
revisionary ontology, I will also take up discussions that may well appear to be 
                                                 
1 Relatedly, one might propose that ontology is about identifying constituents of reality that 
are “fundamental” in the sense of being irreducible to more fundamental constituents. While 
everyone agrees (I suppose) that tables and genders are not the most basic layer of reality, 
there might be meaningful debate on whether tables and genders are reducible to atoms, for 
example. However, then another problem arises: it is difficult to make sense of how the 
typical arguments brought up in ontological debates are supposed to support or undermine 
the conclusion that Fs are reducible (as opposed to the conclusion that there are no Fs). 
Many of the arguments, on the face of it at least, do not seem to pertain to reducibility. I will 
return to this point later on in the thesis, when I have introduced the typical arguments in 
question. 
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about the nature of Fs, namely the nature of women: what (who) women are, or 
what the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a woman are. It is often 
difficult to clearly set apart discussions on whether Fs exist and discussions on 
what Fs are. This is because the discussions that appear to be about whether Fs 
exist can often be re-described as discussions about what Fs are, and vice versa. 
As Berto and Plebani notice (and I agree), “ontological issues … naturally tend 
to shade into metaphysical ones” (Berto and Plebani 2015, 4). They describe the 
following frequently occurring situation: philosophers disagree on the nature of 
some kind that they both take to exist. For example, the philosophers agree that 
there are possible worlds, but disagree on whether they are concrete physical 
entities just like the actual world or abstract objects. We can re-cast this 
disagreement on the nature of possible worlds as a disagreement on whether 
certain kinds of things exist: the philosophers disagree on whether possible 
worlds qua concrete physical entities exist and on whether possible worlds qua 
abstract objects exist. Likewise, we can re-cast a discussion on whether being a 
woman depends on social designation or self-identification or both, as a 
discussion on whether those who are women in virtue of social designation 
(could) exist or whether those who are women in virtue of self-identification 
(could) exist or both. 
This issue, of the relationship between “existence questions” and “nature 
questions”, is apparently not very relevant for the discussion on ordinary objects 
(in contrast with its relevance for the discussions on possible worlds or gender). 
Hofweber’s (2016b, 183) typical-enough characterization of ordinary objects is 
that they are “the midsize objects that we commonly interact with like rocks, 
houses, bottles, people, and so on”; ordinary objects “have a location, they are 
reasonably large, but not too large, and they have parts which together 
somehow make up the object”. Most philosophers seem to agree that if there are 
ordinary objects, then they are physical visible things ultimately made of very 
small, physical, but non-visible things. The central philosophical discussions 
about the existence of ordinary objects, it seems, cannot be re-cast as discus-
sions about the nature of ordinary objects. 
With numbers as well, there seems to be a consensus about what they would 
be if they existed; namely, abstract objects. However, there are also differences 
of opinion here. Schaffer (2009, 360), for example, suggests (as an alternative 
way of interpreting eliminativist proposals like that of Field’s (1980)) that 
numbers might be concrete things or grounded in concrete things. This would 
also be a proposal in revisionary ontology, in my view: not because of the claim 
that numbers exist (this is something that I consider to be neither obviously in 
opposition to folk belief, nor obviously consistent with it), but because of the 
claim that numbers qua (ultimately) concrete things exist. 
Although existence questions do not always blur into questions about the 
natures of things (for example, there seems to be no such blurring in the case of 
the central debates on ordinary objects), there is nevertheless an intimate 
connection between discussions on the nature of Fs and discussions on whether 
Fs exist, as illustrated above. Therefore, I include discussions on the nature of 
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Fs in “ontology” along with discussions on whether Fs exist. If there are any 
other remaining philosophical discussions about reality, then these are not 
included in “ontology” and belong to the rest of metaphysics; but I do not take a 
stand on whether there are any such remaining discussions. My focus, in any 
case, is on ontology, so defined. 
However, I will be concerned with the general term “metaphysics”, to some 
extent, since the question arises whether the feminist variety of revisionary 
ontology, interpreted as a project of conceptual engineering, is properly thought 
of as metaphysics. The term “metaphysics” has recently become subject to a 
somewhat political debate. Authors like Barnes (2014) and Mikkola (2015) 
have objected to characterizations of metaphysics, provided by Sider (2011), 
Schaffer (2009) and others, that allegedly exclude feminist metaphysics or more 
generally the metaphysics of social kinds and institutions. Sider and Schaffer 
have since then responded (Sider 2017, Schaffer 2017). I will discuss this 
controversy regarding “metaphysics” towards the end of my thesis, in the 
chapter on feminist metaphysics. I take the least controversial idea about 
“metaphysics” to be that a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for a 
project to be “metaphysics” is that the project centrally aims at investigating 
reality. On this basis, I am inclined to deny the label “metaphysics” to the kind 
of feminist revisionary ontology of gender that I focus on. On my interpretation 
of the feminist project, its central aim is not to investigate reality (as it is), but to 
transform it. 
I have explained what I mean by “ontology” and (to some extent) “meta-
physics”. What happens if we add “meta-” to “ontology” or “metaphysics”? 
Tahko defines metametaphysics as “the study of the foundations and metho-
dology of metaphysics” (Tahko 2015, 5). One might object, however, that this 
does not quite capture the real motivation and central aspirations of metameta-
physics or metaontology. The aim, typically, is not to describe the methodology 
and assumptions characteristic of the philosophical subdiscipline, but to justify 
some pro-attitude or contra-attitude towards metaphysics and to determine 
whether metaphysical discussions, in their current form, should continue or not. 
Metametaphysical discussions take place in the context of suspicions that there 
is something terribly problematic or misguided about metaphysics and the 
denials of and responses to those suspicions. This context should not be ignored 
when we explain what metametaphysics is. In other words, a proper characte-
rization of metametaphysics would emphasize the role of the evaluation and 
recommendation questions as motivating the metametaphysical inquiry. 
Eklund, in contrast to Tahko, does emphasize the evaluative focus of meta-
ontology: “the contemporary metaontological debate mainly concerns the 
question of whether ontological questions, questions about what there is, are 
genuine questions deep enough to be worthy of philosophical attention” 
(Eklund 2013, 229). Eklund’s concern, it must be noted, is with metaontology, 
which is arguably a subfield of metametaphysics; but the broader field likewise 
seems to be motivated by the evaluation question. Further, the evaluation 
question seems to be largely motivated by the recommendation question: the 
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interest in continuing, reforming or ending the relevant discussions, as may be 
required. I would rather define “metaontology”, then, as the study of the 
interpretation, evaluation, and recommendation questions as applied to 
ontological discussions, that is motivated by an interest in the evaluation and 
recommendation questions. Again, ontological discussions include both those 
philosophical discussions that appear to be about whether Fs exist, are real, or 
are there, and those philosophical discussions that appear to be about what Fs 
are. 
In Eklund’s characterization of metaontology (quoted above) the objects of 
evaluation, in metaontology, are ontological questions. I prefer to talk about 
ontological “discussions”, instead of “questions”, as the objects of interpreta-
tion, evaluation, and recommendation in metaontology. This formulation better 
captures the main object of concern in contemporary metaontology. The 
concern is not (for the most part) with the meaning of questions of the form “Do 
Fs exist?” (and other relevant forms), but with actual discussions between 
actual philosophers. Many of these discussions are disputes, in the sense that the 
exchanges appear to express disagreements about the matters at hand. I do not 
limit my attention solely to disputes, however, since ontologists may and do 
sometimes put forward and defend their ontological views without vocal 
opposition, for example, when their work is not much noticed at all; and there is 
no apparent reason to exclude such oppositionless discussions from the purview 
of metaontology. However, I do focus on disputes, as a special case of discus-
sions, in chapter 3, where I interpret revisionary ontology from the quizzical 
observer’s point of view. 
In chapter 2, I will further elaborate upon which ontological discussions I 




1.4.2. Historical contextualization 
Having looked into the disciplinary context of this thesis, I will also briefly 
describe the historical context. The standard point from which to start telling the 
history of metaontology is the debate between Quine and Carnap. For example, 
Blatti and Lapointe (2016, 1) write that this was “[t]he single most significant 
episode in the brief history of metaontological inquiry”. In my historical 
contextualization, I will focus on how my project relates to this debate that has 
shaped so much of the contemporary metaontological landscape. In particular, I 
will focus on how my project relates to Carnap’s view, which – as the new 
consensus seems to be – is not seriously undermined by Quine’s criticism. 
However, there is no clear consensus on what “Carnap’s view” is. I will myself 
not take a stand on how to best interpret Carnap, but I think it is not too much of 
a stretch to call my view “Carnapian”, in a sense. 
A motivation for the debate between Quine and Carnap was the worry that 
science, including mathematics and physics, was apparently committed to the 
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existence of numbers (as well as other abstract objects). Numbers and the like, 
however, seemed to be strange entities, with no place in the physical or mental 
world. Much of Quine’s “On What There Is” (1948) is about how to get rid of 
undesirable ontological commitments (including, potentially, commitment to 
various abstract entities) by paraphrasing one’s statements into first-order 
predicate logic in the appropriate way. Carnap’s “Empiricism, Semantics, and 
Ontology” (1950b), in response, was meant to undermine the significance of 
commitment to entities, such as numbers, through using (or having to use) 
certain linguistic forms. Essentially, Carnap’s response was that the apparent 
commitment is nothing other than the acceptance of a linguistic form. Further, 
to ask whether Fs (e.g. numbers) exist is just to ask whether the rules of our 
language – the set of linguistic forms that we have accepted – allow us to say 
that Fs exist; or else it is to ask whether we should accept these linguistic forms. 
The former reading of the existence question is the “framework-internal” 
reading and the latter is the “framework-external” pragmatic reading. The only 
way in which there could be something spooky and undesirable about mathe-
matics’ commitment to numbers is if we would take mathematics to answer 
affirmatively to the framework-external factual reading of the question: are 
there really numbers? But according to Carnap, this is just a meaningless 
question that should not and cannot be raised at all. Moreover, we need not 
suspect scientists of tacitly assuming an affirmative answer to this meaningless 
question. (However, Carnap seemed to suspect philosophers of undue interest in 
the meaningless external question.) 
Quine responded in turn with “On Carnap’s Views on Ontology” (1951), 
where he elaborated upon why Carnap’s supposed “subclass” and “category” 
distinction, underlying the internal and external question distinction, is 
problematic; he then suggested that Carnap could instead rely on the 
analytic/synthetic distinction; but of course, Quine also rejected this distinction. 
Somehow, following that, the consensus came to be that Quine had won the 
debate and rehabilitated philosophical ontology in the process. For example, 
Putnam wrote: 
 
If we ask when Ontology became a respectable subject for an analytic philo-
sopher to pursue, the mystery disappears. It became respectable in 1948, when 
Quine published a famous paper titled “On What There Is.” It was Quine who 
single handedly made Ontology a respectable subject. (Putnam 2004, 78–79) 
 
This consensus has recently been re-assessed (Price 2009, Eklund 2013, Tho-
masson 2015) and now the consensus rather seems to be that Quine’s response, 
in so far as he disagreed with Carnap, was largely irrelevant to the thrust of 
Carnap’s argument and the two actually had quite similar views on ontology. I 
will not be concerned with the details of this debate, because I find that the 
interpretive question that I am concerned with can be pursued effectively 
without delving into Quine’s criticism. My approach is, however, somewhat 
influenced by Carnap, as is much of contemporary metaontology. One of my 
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central claims (viz. that ontological discussions should be understood as 
discussions about how to improve our language) can well be understood as a 
Carnapian claim. This recognition of Carnap’s influence might give the 
impression that the account will be a deflationist one; but I do not in fact take it 
to be such. 
The impression that this will be a deflationist account may arise because 
most contemporary deflationist accounts are explicitly or implicitly 
“Carnapian” in one way or another, drawing on that same 1950 paper. At the 
same time, there are hardly any sightings of “Carnapian” realist accounts – the 
realists rather tend to call themselves “Quineans”. One important variety of 
contemporary Carnapian deflationism is Hirsch’s (2011). Hirsch argues for the 
thesis of “quantifier variance” (roughly, that there can be different equally good 
existence-concepts) and the related idea that many ontological disputes are 
merely verbal (the parties speak different languages with different equally good 
existence-concepts). In Carnap’s terms, the disputants employ different equally 
good (linguistic) frameworks. Another variety of contemporary Carnapian 
deflationism is Thomasson’s (2015). She argues that ontological questions 
should be understood as framework-internal questions and as such, they are 
answerable by conceptual analysis and/or empirical inquiries, but not by the 
sorts of methods employed by ontologists (such as appeal to parsimony or other 
theoretical virtues). More recently, Thomasson (2017) has defended a different 
Carnapian view. She interprets many ontological and metaphysical discussions 
as discussions of the framework-external pragmatic question about how we 
ought to use terms or concepts. However, apparently she remains deflationist 
about those ontological discussions wherein the linguistic choices at stake make 
no practical difference to our lives. 
The main historical backdrop for my account is also Carnap’s (1950b) 
account. As with Hirsch and Thomasson, the general background idea that I get 
from Carnap is that ontology is somehow about linguistic choices: choices that 
the participants to these discussions have made or want others to make. If we 
look at the Carnapian accounts above, my own view is closest to Thomasson’s 
more recent account (Thomasson 2017). Like Thomasson in her recent account, 
I take many ontological discussions to be potentially sensible and important 
discussions about how to improve our concepts. However, unlike Thomasson, I 
do not limit this verdict to discussions where the conceptual choices have 
practical import. Instead, I develop the idea that ontology is about conceptual 
choice in a manner that is along the lines suggested by Sider (2011). Against 
both Carnap and Thomasson and in agreement with Sider (and possibly, Quine), 
I find that the framework-external question about how best to revise the 
linguistic framework (or conceptual system) need not be a mere practical ques-
tion; it can also be a factual one. It can be a factual question if we allow that 
different conceptual schemes can reflect the structure of reality to different 
degrees and we can compare how well the conceptual schemes do that, by 
comparing their theoretical virtues, such as coherence, simplicity and elegance. 
Then, we can at once ask the practical question about concept choice (which 
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conceptual scheme should we use?) and the factual question about the world 
(which conceptual scheme best reflects the objective structure of the world?). 
Beyond metaontology, the background literature that is most relevant for my 
thesis concerns the method of “explication”, “conceptual engineering” or 
“ameliorative analysis”. Whatever we call it precisely, the idea is that philo-
sophers should not just analyse concepts descriptively, reporting on how 
expressions are used by particular communities; they should also propose norms 
governing the use of the concepts, while keeping in mind the role played by the 
relevant expression/concept in a theoretical framework or in social practices. 
Here as well, important contributions have been made by Carnap (Carnap 
1950a, 1963). Recently, Burgess and Plunkett (Burgess and Plunkett 2013a, b) 
have called the field concerned with normative (as opposed to descriptive) 
issues about concepts “conceptual ethics”. Plunkett and Sundell (Plunkett and 
Sundell 2013, Plunkett 2015) have done important work in laying out a 
framework for analysing apparently object-level disputes (e.g. a dispute on 
whether a certain bottle of water displayed in a museum is art) as covert meta-
linguistic negotiations (e.g. on how we should use the term “art”). Both Tho-
masson and I (as well as Belleri (2017)) make use of Plunkett and Sundell’s 
framework and apply it in the interpretation of ontological disputes. We propose 
that although such disputes appear to be about object-level issues (e.g. whether 
there are chairs), they are in fact covert metalinguistic negotiations (e.g. on 
whether we should quantify over chairs or use the predicate “chair”). 
 
 
1.5. Outline of the thesis 
In the rest of my thesis, I will first further clarify how I understand and address 
the interpretation question about revisionary ontology (in chapter 2). Then, I 
will defend my answer to the interpretation question – the answer that I call the 
“theoretical metalinguistic account” – from the “quizzical observer’s” point of 
view (in chapter 3). Then I will defend the same account and elaborate upon it 
from the revisionary ontologists’ point of view (in chapter 4). Finally, since my 
discussion so far will have focused on “mainstream” revisionary ontology, I 
will show how my account applies to a project that does not seem to fit the 
characterization of revisionary ontology provided up to this point – namely, the 
project of “feminist” revisionary ontology (in chapter 5). 
In more detail, the structure of the thesis, excluding the introduction and the 
conclusion, is the following. 
 
Chapter 2. “Interpreting the interpretation question” 
I will begin by seeking a better understanding of the central question of the 
thesis: the interpretation question about revisionary ontology. First, what is the 
object of interpretation? Are metaontological inquirers supposed to interpret 
“existence questions” as such or a particular practice of asking existence ques-
tions? On my approach, we should focus on a particular practice of asking 
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existence questions. I will defend this approach, in chapter 2. I will also 
characterize the practice in question, by laying out the participants’ shared 
assumptions about the subject matter (its nature and significance) and the proper 
methods for addressing that subject matter. I will give examples of the relevant 
discussions in revisionary ontology (to which, in this thesis, I will restrict the 
interpretation question): Unger’s problem of the many (1980), van Inwagen’s 
(1990) argument from composition, Merricks’ (2001) causal over-determination 
argument, and Unger’s (1979) and Horgan and Potrč’s (2008) sorites 
arguments. 
I will then ask: what does it mean to interpret this practice of asking exis-
tence questions? Presumably, it means trying to understand what the partici-
pants to the practice are doing. But what does this mean? In particular, why not 
just ask the ontologists what they are trying to do? I will explain why simply 
asking is not enough (or in other words, why the conscious aims of the onto-
logists may need to be disregarded), given the interpretive points of view taken 
up in this thesis. I will also characterize the main options for interpreting 
revisionary ontology. 
 
Chapter 3. “Interpreting revisionary ontology from the quizzical observer’s 
point of view” 
Having clarified the interpretation question, I will begin to defend and elaborate 
a certain answer to it. The answer is that revisionary ontology is a project of 
conceptual engineering: it seeks to improve the concepts that we use to form our 
beliefs. 
In chapter 3, I will defend this answer to the interpretation question with the 
“quizzical observer’s” interpretive situation in mind. A “quizzical observer” is a 
philosopher, but an outsider to ontological disputes in the sense that she does 
not engage in such disputes herself. However, she is not just any outsider: she is 
sufficiently familiar with the discussion, not to be epistemically required to 
dismiss her misgivings about the discussions as probably caused by her own in-
competence, rather than by some problem with the disputes. Sufficient familia-
rity, more precisely, means that the quizzical observer has heard all the main 
arguments and possesses all the standard philosophical training that might be 
required for understanding them, to the relevant degree (a degree such that the 
observer is not required to dismiss her sense of pointlessness as arising from her 
own incompetence). It would not be surprising if an outsider “from the street” 
was confused about a fairly technical philosophical dispute. For such an 
outsider, it would be most reasonable to practice some humility and assume that 
the discussion makes sense, although it is inaccessible to her. The interesting 
case, however, is one where a philosophically competent observer who has 
observed these disputes for quite a while, and is sufficiently familiar with the 
arguments, remains confused. “Remaining confused”, here, means a particular 
phenomenology that I will call the “quizzical phenomenology”: the feeling of 
pointlessness, mild annoyance, perhaps even frustration. 
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In this interpretive situation, the audience of the interpretation is also the 
provider of the interpretation: the quizzical observer is looking for an account to 
satisfy her own need for explanation. The interpretation should explain both the 
quizzical phenomenology and the fact that this phenomenology is caused by 
disputes between her presumed epistemic peers. I suppose that deflationist 
accounts like Thomasson’s (2015) and Hirsch’s (2009) are motivated by the 
need to explain their quizzical phenomenology. However, such accounts often 
fail to take note of the other datum that needs to be explained: namely, that this 
apparently pointless dispute is going on between one’s presumed epistemic 
peers. I will argue that a particular metalinguistic account of revisionary onto-
logy (as conceptual engineering for theoretical purposes) can satisfy both ade-
quacy conditions: it can explain the quizzical phenomenology, while respecting 
the presumption that the disputants are roughly the observer’s epistemic peers. 
The metalinguistic account that I propose combines elements from Plunkett and 
Sundell (2013), Sider (2011), and Bennett (2009). I will also defend it as supe-
rior to the existing metalinguistic accounts (Thomasson 2017, Belleri 2017). 
 
Chapter 4. “Interpreting revisionary ontology from the ontologists’ point of 
view” 
This chapter is perhaps the “meat” of the thesis. Here, I will take up a different 
kind of interpretive situation, one that obtains when the (mainstream) revisio-
nary ontologists themselves need to give an account of what they are doing. 
There are several ways in which this could happen and, accordingly, several 
kinds of audiences that they might need to explain themselves to. For example, 
ontologists might need to explain what they do for popularizing purposes, to 
outsiders from philosophy. This is not the interpretive situation that I will take 
up in the thesis. When I look for an account of revisionary ontology from the 
revisionary ontologists’ own point of view, I mean an account that is intended 
for a relatively well-informed philosophical audience. Further, it is an audience 
that is even to some extent sympathetic: they feel the pull of the ontologists’ 
arguments. In the quizzical observer’s case, I did not assume this, because I 
have not seen the prototypes for the “quizzical observer” – deflationists such as 
Thomasson (2015) or Hirsch (2009) – admitting that they feel such a pull. How-
ever, there are those who do feel the pull; I would even go as far as to call it a 
typical reaction to the arguments. I will call this feeling of pull the “sense of 
destabilization”. 
Further, I will be interested in an audience who not only feels the pull, but 
also a certain counter-reaction to the pull: the feeling that despite the arguments, 
the audience remains entitled to their ordinary beliefs about what there is. For 
example, they remain entitled to the belief that there are chairs or that there are 
no talking donkeys. This entitlement seems to have something to do with what 
the audience can see or, more generally, perceive. I will call this counter-
reaction the “sense of (perception-based) entitlement”. The revisionary onto-
logists, then, need to explain what they are doing in a way that makes sense of 
this dual reaction: the sense of destabilization (or pull) and the sense of 
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entitlement. Further, they also need to explain how what they are doing is 
worthwhile: they need to give a defensive account of revisionary ontology. The 
account should be “defensive” in the sense that it should serve to defend, or 
demonstrate the value of, revisionary ontology. (Of course, it should not be 
“defensive” in the sense of failing to take in appropriate criticism.) The reason 
why the account needs to be defensive, in this sense, is not because the 
revisionary ontologists know themselves to be intelligent people who would not 
engage in a pointless activity – the reason is not that there is such higher order 
evidence about their own discussion. Although it is not an entirely silly idea for 
the revisionary ontologists to consider such evidence concerning their own 
competence as well, I will leave it aside here. So I do not consider the need for a 
defensive account to be an evidential consideration that constrains the account. I 
instead consider this need to be a strategic constraint on the account. Of course, 
the defensive account that the ontologists seek must still fit the data; so the 
ontologists are not free to tell whatever story they like. 
Since the account sought is a defensive one and there seems to be no non-
epistemic value to the (mainstream) revisionary ontologists’ project, the account 
must explain how the revisionary ontologists’ project improves the audience’s 
epistemic standing. This would be easy enough if the ontologists could give 
what I will call a “simple incompatibilist account” of revisionary ontology. 
According to the simple incompatibilist account, ontologists are showing that 
many of our ordinary beliefs about what there is are false and the ontologists are 
trying to make us revise those beliefs. This revision would be an improvement 
in beliefs because beliefs are good when they are true and bad when they are 
false. For reasons that I will seek to make clearer, ontologists should not be 
satisfied with this simple incompatibilist account. Briefly, this is because the 
simple incompatibilist account fails to properly account for the sense of 
perception-based entitlement that I have described above. Instead of the simple 
incompatibilist account, I will argue, ontologists should also not provide one of 
the standard compatibilist accounts (accounts that say that there is no conflict 
between what the ontologists argue and what most people believe). They should 
rather provide my proposed account, according to which the ontologists are 
improving the ordinary conceptual scheme that we use to form beliefs. On this 
alternative account, revisionary ontology is supposed to improve our concepts 
in their capacity as the building blocks of beliefs; and the ultimate aim is to 
improve our beliefs. 
This, of course, raises the question about what good beliefs are like; are the 
ontologists’ proposed conceptual revisions really improvements, in light of 
what beliefs are supposed to do? I will criticise Sider’s (2011) suggestion that 
all beliefs aim to conform fully to the world and should thus be cast in joint-
carving concepts. Then, I will introduce my distinction between two kinds of 
beliefs: the theoretical and practical ones. It makes sense for ontologists to 
maintain that their project only seeks to improve our theoretical beliefs (by 
making the concepts used in forming them more joint-carving). Maintaining 
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this, however, does imply that the epistemic significance of their project is 
importantly limited. 
 
Chapter 5. “Applying the account to the metaphysics of gender” 
Finally, I will take up the point of view of the feminist ontologists of gender. In 
contrast to the previous interpretive situations, it is not clear here whether the 
interpreters are “insiders” or “outsiders” to (mainstream) revisionary ontology. 
They are insiders to feminist revisionary ontology, of course; and what interests 
them is precisely whether this puts them in the same basket with mainstream 
revisionary ontology. Are the two projects ultimately the same project or not, 
and whether and how should the self-conceptions and methods of the partici-
pants to these projects be modified, in light of whether they are? This is the 
interest guiding the interpretive inquiry here. From my point of view, the 
question about feminist revisionary ontology arises also because certain features 
of feminist revisionary ontology do not fit in well with my previously defended 
account of revisionary ontology as improving concepts to improve theoretical 
beliefs. Drawing on the distinction between two kinds of beliefs that I have 
introduced previously, I will argue that the two projects, mainstream and 
feminist revisionary ontology, are importantly independent of one another. Both 
aim to improve the concepts that we use to form beliefs; but feminist revisio-
nary ontology of gender primarily aims to improve the concepts that we use to 
form practical beliefs, whereas mainstream revisionary ontology aims to 
improve the concepts that we use to form theoretical beliefs. 
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2. INTERPRETING THE INTERPRETATION QUESTION 
2.1. Chapter introduction 
As I stated in the introduction, this is mostly a thesis in metaontology: the thesis 
aims to answer the interpretation question about ontology (the question “How 
should we interpret ontology?”), and not any question within ontology. This 
chapter, however, is rather one in metametaontology. It aims to answer a 
question about the interpretation question about ontology. And this question 
about the interpretation question is itself also an interpretation question, namely: 
how should we interpret the interpretation question about ontology? The inter-
pretation question about ontology has two central terms in need of inter-
pretation: “ontology” and “interpret”. I will take these up in turn. 
I will devote the majority of this chapter to clarifying what I mean by “onto-
logy” in this thesis, or in other words, what I take the object of interpretation to 
be when I ask how we shall interpret ontology. Are we interpreting ontological 
questions, disputes, discussions or something else? I will defend my approach 
according to which we are interpreting what I call “ontological discussions”: 
discussions between philosophers, where (what at least look like) existence 
questions are addressed and where the participants share certain assumptions 
about their subject matter and the appropriate way for addressing it. In the first 
part of the chapter, I will also explain my focus on revisionary ontology and 
give examples of arguments in revisionary ontology (Horgan and Potrč 2008, 
Merricks 2001, Unger 1979, 1980, van Inwagen 1990). 
I will then ask what it means to “interpret” ontological discussions, thus spe-
cified. Interpretation, here, means giving an account of what the discussants are 
doing. The account may, but need not contradict appearances: it may turn out 
that ontologists are doing exactly what they appear to be doing, but it may also 
turn out that they are doing something else. For instance, it may turn out that 
while ontologists appear to be debating factual matters, they are actually 
debating how to use words. I will argue that it is important to look into the 
purpose(s) of interpretation: who needs to interpret ontological discussions and 
why? Although the primary purpose of interpreting ontology is to make 
progress with the evaluation and recommendation questions, more specific 
interpretive aims can influence the adequacy conditions for the account. In 
particular, for the purposes that will be relevant in this thesis, the account may 
need to disregard the ontologists’ conscious aims, to some extent. I will end the 





2.2. “(Revisionary) ontology”: the object of interpretation 
2.2.1. Are we interpreting questions, disputes, or discussions? 
What are metaontologists interpreting, evaluating and making recommendations 
about? Or what should they be interpreting, evaluating and making recommen-
dations about? In other words, what is the (proper) object, or the subject matter, 
of metaontology? It is “ontology”, of course; but what is “ontology”? 
One might propose that metaontology should focus on existence questions, 
understood as questions of the form “Are there Fs?” or “Do Fs exist?”, “What 
exists?” or “What is there?”. The job of metaontology, then, would be to ascer-
tain what such questions really mean (the interpretation question), whether 
discussing these questions is worthwhile (the evaluation question), and how the 
questions are to be addressed (the recommendation question). According to 
such a view, metaontologists are not concerned with any actual ontological 
discussions, but rather with the meaning, value, and proper method of dis-
cussing questions like “Are there (really) chairs and tables?”. Blatti and 
Lapointe seem to exemplify this approach to the object of metaontology, 
writing that in metaontology, “One may ask how, for instance, are ontological 
questions to be understood, and what really is at stake in raising and attempting 
to answer them” (Blatti and Lapointe 2016, 1). Similarly, van Inwagen writes of 
the question of metaontology: “What are we asking when we ask ‘What is 
there?’” (van Inwagen 1999, 233). Balaguer also exemplifies the view. He de-
values the project of diagnosing actual ontological disputes, as opposed to all 
possible disputes on a given existence question, as merely verbal: 
 
But actual-literature verbalist views are only interesting in an exegetical, history-
of-philosophy sort of way. They’re not metametaphysically interesting because 
they don’t imply that there’s something wrong with the relevant metaphysical 
questions themselves; they imply only that there’s something wrong with the way 
that certain people have debated those questions. (Balaguer 2017, 2) 
 
The metametaphysically interesting question, according to Balaguer, is whether 
there is a non-verbal dispute to be had about the relevant existence question. 
Eklund (2016, 179) makes a similar suggestion. I disagree: I find the question 
about the actual discussions (and relevantly similar discussions) to be at least an 
interesting question for metaontologists, if not the interesting question. The 
evaluation question about all possible disputes on a subject matter appears to be 
the question of whether there can be a valuable dispute on a question that can be 
formulated in a certain way in English (for example, “Are there tables and 
chairs?”). I think that such a general characterization of metaontology, as con-
cerned with questions of a certain form, is misguided. This is for two reasons: 
first, this approach makes the scope of metaontology unreasonably broad; and 
second, it is not in line with metaontologists’ central guiding interests in asking 
the evaluation and recommendation questions, which motivate asking the 
interpretation question. I will elaborate on these reasons in turn. 
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First, it would be odd to centre a research effort, such as the research effort 
of metaontologists, around questions of a certain form, rather than questions 
with a certain content. This is especially so, when the questions of a certain 
form make up a rather diverse cluster, as we find with questions of the form 
“Are there Fs?” and “Do Fs exist?”. For example, consider “Are there (really) 
bigfoots?”, as asked by a naïve tourist, “Are there nuclear weapons in North 
Korea?”, as asked by a concerned politician, and “Are there tables?”, as asked 
by van Inwagen (1990). These are questions of the same, supposedly relevant 
form; but there seems to be little reason to think that the answers to the 
interpretation, evaluation and recommendation question about these questions 
would be the same or that these answers should be pursued in the same way. 
The naïve tourist and the politician seem to be involved in projects or inquiries 
that are rather different from that of van Inwagen, and we probably should not 
interpret and evaluate all these projects and inquiries similarly, nor should we 
make similar recommendations about them. To introduce all these different 
projects and inquiries into the metaontologists’ domain, simply because of the 
form of the questions addressed in these projects and inquiries, seems like an 
unwarranted manoeuvre. It would make the subject matter of metaontology 
unreasonably diverse. 
This consideration – the unreasonable diversity of the subject matter, if 
defined by the form of the questions – could be overridden if we had reason to 
believe that those doing metaontology indeed focus their attention on questions 
of the specified forms, without having in mind any special context for asking 
these questions. Metaontologists might be focusing on questions of these 
specific forms either unreasonably or for some good, unobvious reason. Either 
way, if we had independent reason to believe that this is what metaontologists 
are interested in, based on how they frame and motivate their work, it would 
make sense to consider questions of this form the object of metaontology. 
However, based on how those putting forth metaontological views actually 
frame and motivate their work, we have reason to believe the opposite: they 
focus on existence questions as asked and answered in a specific kind of 
context. We may call this the “ontological” context, although this will not 
illuminate much, of course. By “ontological context”, I mean the context of 
discussions between philosophers who generally, but not always, identify as 
metaphysicians and who have certain sorts of assumptions about their subject 
matter and how it is to be addressed. (I will come to these assumptions shortly.) 
In so far as metaontologists seem to be interested in all existence questions of 
the relevant form, as used in any context, this is because they are interested in 
whether and how what is going on in the ontological context is different from 
what is going on in other contexts where questions of this form are raised. 
It is with good reason that metaontologists are not just concerned with 
questions of a certain linguistic form. The question about the meaning, im-
portance, and proper way of addressing questions of a certain linguistic form 
would be detached from the concerns that typically motivate metaontology. 
When philosophers ask metaontological questions about ontology, they are 
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concerned with issues like whether a sub-field of philosophy, as it currently 
operates, is devoid of value or in need of reformation, or whether certain kinds 
of intellectual projects (those characteristic of the field in question) should be 
pursued or not. These questions can arise both from the outsider’s perspective 
(the quizzical observer’s perspective) or the insider’s perspective (the 
revisionary ontologists’ own perspective). The issue, then, is not about what 
certain kinds of questions (individuated by linguistic forms) mean or whether 
they deserve to be addressed or how they should be addressed; the issue, 
instead, is tied closely to the current assumptions and practices of actual 
ontologists who are either concerned to provide an account of their own 
practices or whom outsiders are trying to understand and evaluate. 
The relevant discussions of existence questions between and among onto-
logists are sometimes, but not necessarily, disputes. Disputes, in the philosophi-
cal literature, are usually taken to be linguistic exchanges where the parties, by 
means of their behaviour (such as shaking heads) or the expressions they use 
(such as “No!”), show signs of disagreement.2 “Disagreement”, in philosophical 
parlance, means that there is a rational conflict between the parties’ attitudes. 
For example, the parties’ beliefs on a matter cannot both be true, or their desires 
cannot both be satisfied.3 Not all disputes in fact express disagreements: a 
dispute can take place without the parties actually disagreeing about the subject 
matter of the putative disagreement, for example, when a dispute is merely 
verbal. Notably, Hirsch (2009) has diagnosed many ontological disputes as 
merely verbal. This has contributed to the impression that metaontology is and 
should be concerned with ontological disputes, rather than ontological 
discussions more generally. The dispute character of many ontological 
discussions does give rise to certain sorts of metaontological issues that do not 
arise with respect to non-dispute ontological discussions. For example, the 
metaontological inquirer might ask: do the parties to ontological disputes really 
disagree (or do they just appear to)? Is there a rational resolution to the dispute, 
or in other words, is there a right answer to the question at stake? Are the parties 
able to arrive at this resolution in practice, by mutually agreeable methods? 
Since these questions are what intrigue many metaontological inquirers about 
ontological discussions, and since these questions only seem to apply to 
disputes and not to other kinds of discussions, there is some reason to say that 
metaontology is particularly concerned with ontological disputes. 
                                                 
2 For example, Plunkett defines a “dispute” as “a linguistic exchange that appears to express 
a disagreement” (Plunkett 2015, 835). Jenkins, similarly, writes: “[W]hether or not you are 
disputing with someone depends at least partly on whether you are doing things like shaking 
your head, saying ‘No, you’ve got it all wrong’, banging the table, and so on (or polite 
alternatives).” (Jenkins 2014, 13) 
3 This again follows how Plunkett and Sundell use the terms “dispute” and “disagreement”. 
For example, “we can take a disagreement ... to be something that involves a kind of 
rational conflict in mental states” (Plunkett 2015, 835). Jenkins, similarly, writes that dis-
agreement “has everything to do with belief and nothing (or almost nothing) to do with 
behaviour” (Jenkins 2014, 13). 
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However, while some criticisms of ontological enterprises pertain speci-
fically to ontological disputes, and not to other kinds of discussions, not all 
criticisms are thus constrained. For example, Thomasson (2015), in her criti-
cism of ontology, objects to the inadequate methods by which ontologists 
address existence questions. The ontologists should address their issues by 
conceptual analysis and/or empirical investigations, according to her, but 
instead they appeal to considerations like the “simplicity” or “elegance” of the 
competing theories. Thomasson’s criticism does not require the targeted philo-
sophers to be involved in a dispute: a philosopher who is not in a discussion 
with anyone else and hence does not give off the appearance of disagreement 
can still address the ontological issues via misguided methods. Further, the 
suspicions that ontological discussions of existence questions might involve a 
semantically defective pseudo-concept of existence (Chalmers 2009) apply 
likewise to disputes and other kinds of ontological discussion of existence 
questions. 
What are discussions, however (of which disputes are a special case)? I take 
discussions to be linguistically mediated attempts to resolve a (theoretical or 
practical) problem. A person may conduct a discussion alone, as long as she 
uses language to do so. A discussion may in principle occur only in someone’s 
mind. There are various options for individuating discussions. For example, one 
may individuate them by the time and space in which they take place; or one 
may say instead that all linguistically mediated attempts to resolve the same 
problem belong to the same discussion. I talk about discussions rather in the 
latter sense, but I further suppose the following: all linguistically mediated 
attempts to address what is taken by the participants to be the same problem, 
with the same assumptions about its nature and the proper methods for 
addressing it, belong to the same discussion. Understanding discussions in this 
way makes sense, given the aims of metaontology, because metaontology is 
directed at answering the evaluation and recommendation questions about 
certain discussions. It would not make sense to take this evaluative and 
prescriptive concern to be directed at discussions taking place in a particular 
place and at a particular time; it makes sense to evaluate and make recom-
mendations about discussions that are conducted and understood by the 
participants in a particular way. 
In chapter 3, “Interpreting revisionary ontology from the quizzical obser-
ver’s point of view”, I will focus on interpreting disputes in revisionary onto-
logy, rather than discussions more generally. This is because the quizzical 
observer’s interest in seeking an interpretation is sparked by the disputational 
character of the relevant discussions: why would people who are as competent 
as the quizzical observer engage in disputes that appear pointless to her? Also, 
at least one of the quizzical observer’s proposed explanations for the sense of 
pointlessness applies specifically to the disputes qua disputes: the sense of 
pointlessness may be explained by the fact that the disputes are merely verbal. 
However, in the later chapters, I will not assume that the discussions in question 
35 




2.2.2. Characteristic assumptions of ontological discussions 
In this section, I will list the characteristic assumptions that set the ontological 
discussions of existence questions (i.e. discussions of existence questions in the 
“ontological context”, i.e. “ontological discussions”) apart from, for example, 
discussions of existence questions as they may take place in response to the 
naïve tourist’s question “Are there (really) bigfoots?” or the concerned poli-
tician’s question “Are there nuclear weapons in North Korea?”. I have argued 
that ontological discussions are at least a proper concern, if not the proper 
concern for metaontologists, when they pursue the interpretation, evaluation and 
recommendation questions. Therefore, it is important to get clearer about the 
nature of ontological discussions, as we try to interpret the interpretation 
question about ontology. I will do this by laying out the participants’ own 
characteristic assumptions about the subject matter of their discussion (its 
nature and significance) and about the proper methods for addressing this 
subject matter. 
Sometimes, these assumptions about the subject matter and the proper 
methods are stated explicitly, for example, Merricks (2001, vii) begins his main 
work in revisionary ontology with the assertion that “Ontological discovery is 
not empirical”. More often, however, the assumptions are implicit in the way 
that the ontologists proceed with the questions. Without further ado, I take these 
assumptions to be the following. 
 
Assumptions about the subject matter (its nature and significance) 
(1) The discussion is about what there is, what exists, or what is real; or about 
whether a given entity or kind F is there, exists, or is real. 
Consistent with this basic assumption, ontologists can further spell out the 
subject matter in different ways. Commonly, the relevant sense of “exists” is 
thought to be captured by the existential quantifier and the term is used inter-
changeably with “is there” (Lewis 1990, Sider 2011, van Inwagen 2009). This 
approach is rooted in Quine’s “On What There Is” (Quine 1948). There are also 
other approaches to “exist”, within ontological discussions; for example, Fine 
treats “exists”, in the metaphysical sense, as a predicate and prefers the term 
“real” to express the relevant property (Fine 2001, 2009). Further, there is 
disagreement within ontology about whether there are many relevant senses of 
“exist” or the quantifier, and accordingly, many ways of being (McDaniel 
2009). Also, the relevant sense of the quantifier or the predicate “real” may be 
understood as the ordinary English sense of the relevant terms (Merricks 2001) 
or as some special sense of the terms (Dorr 2005, Sider 2011); there is no clear 
consensus on this among ontologists. 
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(2) The issues at stake are of high epistemic significance. Despite the slow 
progression (if any) of the field towards convergence, these matters must 
continue to be thought about. 
 
(3) Relatedly, ontological answers to existence questions are somehow ultimate; 
ontologists inquire into what there really is. Those involved in the relevant 
ontological discussions would not say that the existence questions that they 
study are highly context-sensitive and that the answers depend on the interests 
at stake in a given project, with no context or project having objectively higher 
epistemic priority. 
 
(4) The issues tend to be difficult, but are not ultimately out of reach for human 
minds. The difficulty of the questions helps explain the slow progress towards 




(1) The main negative methodological assumption is the following: the exis-
tence questions at stake cannot be addressed simply by empirical inquiry, con-
ceptual analysis, or pragmatic conceptual revision. In other words, the onto-
logists in question reject the way Carnap (1950b) delimits the issues and 
methods relevant to answering existence questions. They insist that there is 
something more at stake and something more to do here. It is clear enough that 
ontologists do not take their questions to be addressed merely by empirical 
inquiry, because otherwise we would see ontologists engaging more in 
empirical inquiry and less in thinking and discussing. About the idea that 
metaphysics is all about conceptual analysis, Sider writes: “Most metaphysi-
cians at least sometimes think of themselves as not being engaged in conceptual 
archaeology” (Sider 2011, 72). Regarding the idea that ontology is just 
pragmatic conceptual revision, Kraut mentions: “There is something it’s like to 
do ontology: one has the sense of engaging in discovery rather than invention” 
(Kraut 2016, 45). 
 
(2) The main positive methodological assumptions are the following. The 
existence questions at stake are answerable by (a) recovering the commitments 
of our best general theory of the world (the best theory is determined by 
considering theoretical virtues, such as simplicity, consistency, elegance and 
explanatory power); or (b) appeal to existence criteria, such as causal powers or 
physicality. The first option, of course, is Quinean; and I suppose it is the more 
popular one among ontologists. It is in any case not easy to set these two 
approaches apart. For example, one may think that good theories should not 
posit entities that lack their own causal powers or are not physical, and so the 
appeals to existence criteria like causality or physicality are really appeals to 
theoretical virtues. Likewise, being a commitment of the best theory can be 
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viewed as an existence criterion, so the appeal to theoretical virtues would 
really be an appeal to an existence criterion. 
Another relevant question here is to what extent “our best general theory of 
the world” should be determined by the current scientific consensus (which 
would perhaps be more in line with Quine’s own understanding of the 
methodology) and to what extent it is the work of metaphysicians to find out the 
best theory by their peculiar methods and criteria. Generally, ontologists take 
scientific findings, such as those of fundamental physics, to be relevant for their 
research; but they think that there is still some independent theorizing left for 
the ontologists to do. (See also assumption (4) below.) 
 
(3) The theory should be informed by ordinary intuitions, or common sense, but 
should not be held hostage to common sense. For example, Lewis writes: 
“Common sense is a settled body of theory – unsystematic folk theory – which 
at any rate we do believe; and I presume that we are reasonable to believe it. 
(Most of it.)” (Lewis 1986, 134). Horgan and Potrč similarly write: “Serious 
metaphysical inquiry, we maintain, ought to pay great respect to deeply held 
commonsense beliefs and to reflectively compelling commonsense modes of 
reasoning” (Horgan and Potrč 2008, 4). Ontology tends to begin with reflection 
on the puzzles that arise in connection with common sense judgments and that 
demand moving beyond such judgments, perhaps dispensing with some of these 
in order to preserve others. 
 
(4) The theory should be informed by state of the art science, but not be held 
hostage to it. Ontological discussions are somewhat autonomous from (other) 
scientific disciplines, such as physics, and other fields of philosophy, such as 
philosophy of language. Ontologists balk at the claim that what they do is just 
semantics, for example. On the other hand, they may sometimes seek the 
support of scientific theories for their views, and/or they may take the reality 
they study to be revealed or constructed by ordinary language and thought, 
entirely or to some extent. What they deny is total or nearly total deference to 
another field. 
Note that these are all assumptions of what I call mainstream ontological 
discussions. In a later chapter, I will also discuss revisionary ontology of gender 
(as it might be called). None of the assumptions listed above unproblematically 
apply to the revisionary ontology of gender, as done by “feminist metaphysi-
cians”, such as Haslanger (2000) or Sveinsdóttir (2013). 
 
 
2.2.3. Revisionary ontological discussions 
In this thesis, I further focus on certain kinds of ontological discussions, namely 
those in revisionary ontology. The label “revisionary ontology” is reminiscent 
of Strawson’s “revisionary metaphysics”, which he contrasted with “descriptive 
metaphysics”. As Strawson put it, “Descriptive metaphysics is content to 
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describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary 
metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure” (Strawson 1959, 9). My 
use of “revisionary ontology” is importantly different from Strawson’s use of 
“revisionary metaphysics”, not just because ontology might not exhaust all there 
is to metaphysics. When I talk about revisionary ontology, I am concerned with 
ontology that appears to be revisionary, that is, in contradiction with ordinary 
belief, without assuming any real revisionary intent on its practitioners’ part or 
that the enterprise will indeed have a revisionary impact, if successful.  
Revisionary ontological discussions, as the term will be used here, are 
ontological discussions (characterized by the assumptions specified in the 
previous section), where the participants appear to contradict ordinary beliefs 
about what there is. For example, van Inwagen (1990) appears to argue that 
there are no macroscopic non-living objects, and hence that there are no tables 
or chairs or sticks or stones. Assuming that this is indeed what he argues and 
that most people indeed believe that there are tables, chairs, sticks, and stones, 
what Inwagen argues contradicts what most people believe. However, as I 
characterize revisionary ontology, I do not take for granted either assumption 
when I say that van Inwagen is a revisionary ontologist. It might turn out that 
despite appearances, van Inwagen was actually not arguing that there are no 
chairs, at least not in the sense in which we would be most likely to understand 
this claim. I am also not taking it for granted that most people believe that there 
are chairs and other “ordinary” things. 
In the revisionary ontological discussions in question, then, philosophers 
argue for claims of the form “Fs exist”, “Fs do not exist”, or “Fs are …”, where 
these contentions appear to contradict the general opinion, or folk belief, on the 
relevant matters. Of course, it is not obvious which existence claims even 
appear to contradict the general opinion. For example, do the philosophers who 
deny the existence of numbers or those who affirm the existence of fictional 
characters appear to contradict the general opinion (distinguishing this from the 
question of whether these philosophers really contradict the general opinion)? 
To avoid such questions, I restrict my examples to philosophers who uncontro-
versially appear to contradict the general opinion, even if it is slightly 
controversial whether these views really contradict the general opinion. For 
example, the proposal that there are concrete possible worlds certainly appears 
to contradict folk opinion (even if it should turn out that, against appearances, 
there is really no such conflict). Thus Lewis’ (1986) arguments for the view that 
there are concrete possible worlds belong to revisionary ontology, on my way of 
using the term. On the other hand, the proposal that there are abstract possible 
worlds does not appear to conflict with folk opinion, at least not obviously so, 
and thus I do not count arguments for this view as arguments in revisionary 
ontology. I am, then, committed to certain views about what appears to go 
against folk belief, but I do not find this commitment particularly problematic, 
as long as we stick to the central case of “ordinary objects” (such as chairs and 
tables) and “extraordinary objects” (such as concrete possible worlds and 
arbitrary mereological sums).  
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In order to clarify what I mean by this appearance of conflict with ordinary 
belief, it is helpful to draw on Moltmann (forthcoming).4 She points out that 
there are two ways to understand descriptive metaphysics. On the one hand, it 
can be the study of what ordinary speakers explicitly, reflectively accept about 
what exists. On the other hand, it can be the study of the ontology that ordinary 
speakers implicitly accept by speaking a language. For example, it is plausible 
that English speakers are not reflectively committed to the existence of “the 
average American”, but such a commitment is inherent in their language use. 
We might be able to inquire into the explicit, reflective commitments by 
directly asking ordinary speakers about their judgments about ontological 
matters; but the implicit commitments are discoverable by a more indirect 
investigation, for example, into what sentences people think are grammatically 
acceptable and unacceptable. When I say that revisionary ontologists argue for 
claims that appear to contradict ordinary beliefs, folk belief, or general opinion, 
then by all these things I mean something rather similar to what Moltmann 
refers to as the “explicitly accepted ontology”, or the “reflective ontology” of 
ordinary speakers. In other words, revisionary ontologists’ views need not be in 
apparent conflict with the way we ordinarily speak about the world; they need 
to be in apparent conflict with the way we ordinarily think about the world. 
Hence, a philosopher who denies that the average American exists would not be 
a revisionary ontologist, on my account, even if the folk appear to implicitly 
accept the existence of the average American, in the way they speak. 
I do not include among my examples of revisionary ontology discussions on 
any of the following: “past and future things, the dead who have ceased to be 
and those who are not yet even conceived; unactualized possibilia; universals, 
numbers, and classes; and Meinongian objects, incomplete or inconsistent or 
both” (Lewis 1990, 393). (Lewis lists these as entities that are “controversial” 
among philosophers, in the sense that there are varying views as to their 
existence.) I am also not excluding these discussions from revisionary ontology, 
but I cautiously operate with a more limited set of examples. One may doubt 
how broad a range of metaontological conclusions I can draw on this basis. I am 
happy, however, to draw limited conclusions. The focus on the debates on 
things like chairs and tables does appear to be characteristic of contemporary 
metaontology and in this regard, I am covering just as much ground as most 
metaontologists. In fact, since I discuss how my approach applies to discussions 
in the revisionary ontology of gender, I am covering some ground not covered 
by many metaontologists. 
However, in another respect, I do limit the object of interpretation quite 
narrowly. I am not trying to interpret all past, future and conceivable discus-
sions where philosophers argue for apparently eccentric views about what there 
is or what exists and the discussion is characterized by the assumptions 
                                                 
4 Moltmann, Friederike (forthcoming). “Natural Language and Its Ontology”. To appear in 
Metaphysics and Cognitive Science, edited by A. Goldman and B. McLaughlin, Oxford 
University Press. 
40 
described in the previous section. I am focusing on a cluster of actual discus-
sions and relevantly similar discussions. The analysis may plausibly generalize 
to more cases, but I recognize that in the future, quite different strategies may 
be taken to argue against the existence of putative “ordinary” objects or for the 
existence of “extraordinary” objects, even within the space defined by the 
assumptions described in the previous section. I do not aim to cover all such 
cases with my interpretive account. I will fix the cluster of actual discussions 
and the “relevantly similar” discussions in revisionary ontology by describing 
some examples, in the next subsection. 
 
 
2.2.4. Samples of arguments and preliminary analysis 
The following are some central examples of revisionary ontology. These 
examples should help to fix the object of interpretation for this metaontological 
inquiry. 
 
(1) The problem of the many (Unger 1980) 
Unger’s argument has roughly the following structure. 
P1.  If there are tables, then they are such that a table minus an atom is a table. 
P2.  If tables are such that a table minus an atom is a table, then there are 
millions of tables in each situation where there is at least one table. 
C1.  If there are tables, then there are millions of tables in each situation where 
there is at least one table. [Hypothetical syllogism, P1, P2] 
C2.  Either there are no tables or there are millions of tables in each situation 
where there is at least one table. [Logical equivalence, C1] 
 
The first, crucial premise is essentially a semantic claim about the vague predi-
cate “table”: if such a predicate applies to some object a, and some object b 
only differs from a in a minuscule way (e.g. by a single atom), then the 
predicate also applies to b. (Unger also calls this principle “the principle of 
minute differences”.) 
The reasoning behind P2 is roughly the following. Suppose that there is a 
situation that contains at least one table. Let us call that table that we know to be 
there “John”. Now consider a big part of John that contains all of John except 
for just one atom on the surface; let us call that part of John “Judy”. Since Judy 
only differs from John by one atom, then if tables are such that a table minus an 
atom is a table, and John is a table, then Judy must also be a table. There are 
also many others like Judy in the situation: parts of John that contain all of John 
except for a single atom. There are millions of such things there, in fact. And 
given the antecedent of P2, they would all be tables. The same would apply to 
any situation containing one table (not just the situation with John): such 
situations would all contain millions of objects that only differ from that table 
by a single atom. And if tables are such that a table minus an atom is a table, 
then all those portions of the original table are also tables. Thus we have P2: If 
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tables are such that a table minus an atom is a table, then there are millions of 
tables in each situation where there is at least one table. 
The argument, if sound, leaves us with a dilemma, i.e. a choice between two 
kinds of revisionary ontology: one containing no tables and one containing 
many more tables than people apparently think there are. Both disjuncts seem to 
contradict ordinary belief. Further, the argument does not only concern the 
number of tables; the same argument could be made for any “ordinary object”. 
Not just tables, but also chairs, apples, cars, stones, and so on seem to be such 
that anything that only differs from one by a single atom is also (respectively) a 
chair, an apple, a car, a stone, and so on. 
Here, the relevant theoretical virtue underlying the argument seems to be, 
first and foremost, logical consistency. Since we accept that tables, if they 
existed, would be subject to the principle of minute differences, described in P1, 
and since we cannot help but accept the reasoning behind P2, we must then 
accept the surprising conclusion: Either there are no tables or there are millions 
of tables in each situation where there is at least one table. Of course, we can 
only accept this conclusion at the expense of denying the ordinary judgment 
that there are tables and that there are not that many of them. In this argument, 
consistency ultimately trumps ordinary judgment. At the same time, ordinary 
judgment certainly plays a role in the argument, since this is what grants our 
assent to the crucial P1, or more generally, the principle of minute differences. 
(Ordinary judgment, in this case, consists in ordinary judgments about ordinary 
concepts, such as the concept of table.) We are asked to accept what follows 
from ordinary judgment, even if what follows is itself at odds with ordinary 
judgment. So the argument assumes, methodologically, that we are not to be 
held hostage to ordinary judgment, although we begin our reasoning from 
premises that are at least partly supported by ordinary judgment. 
 
(2) Sorites arguments (Unger 1979, Horgan and Potrč 2008) 
Sorites arguments exploit – in a way that is similar to the problem of the many – 
the vagueness of the predicates designating ordinary objects. The arguments 
have roughly the following structure. 
P1.  If there are tables, then they are such that a table minus an atom is a table. 
P2.  If tables are such that a table minus an atom is a table, then a very small 
number of atoms (e.g. 10 atoms) can be a table. 
C1.  If there are tables, then a very small number of atoms (e.g. 10) can be a 
table. [Hypothetical syllogism, P1, P2] 
P3.  A very small number of atoms (e.g. 10) cannot be a table. 
C2.  There are no tables. [Modus Tollens, C1, P3] 
 
As with the other arguments in revisionary ontology that are considered here, 
this argument can be and sometimes is stated in somewhat different terms. For 
example, Horgan and Potrč (2008) explain what vagueness is by asking us to 
envision a sequence of entities, such that each one differs in some very small 
way from the next, and in a way that is relevant to the predicate (e.g. by only 
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one atom, in the case of “table”, or by only one strand of hair, in the case of 
“bald”). We can imagine, for instance, a line-up that begins with something that 
is uncontroversially a table and ends with a collection of ten atoms. The 
problem, then, is that we want to say that there is no sharp cut-off point in the 
line (e.g. where tables end and non-tables begin), but we also want to say that 
we do not have tables all the way or non-tables all the way. Assuming that there 
is no contradiction-free way to grant both claims, the ordinary way of thinking 
of the world (as containing objects satisfied by the vague predicates) hosts 
contradictions and needs to be dispensed with. Horgan and Potrč dispense with 
it in favour of an ontology containing only one object, the whole universe itself. 
In choosing this view (“existence monism”, or “blobjectivism”, as they also call 
it) over alternatives (such as the view that there are only simples) they appeal to 
the theoretical virtue of parsimony. As with the problem of the many, the sorites 
arguments begin with ordinary judgment; and by appeal to theoretical virtues 
like consistency and parsimony, they end up with ontologies that appear to be in 
stark opposition to ordinary judgment. 
 
(3) The argument from composition (van Inwagen 1990) 
Since this is both a particularly salient example of metaontological discussion 
and a complex argument, I will dedicate more space to it than the other sample 
arguments. 
Van Inwagen’s argument can be reconstructed roughly as follows. 
 
P1.  There is no “principle of composition” (i.e. no principle governing when 
some objects compose a further object) that is both unified (the principle is 
the same for different kinds of thing) and complies with ordinary judgment 
on particular cases of purported composition. 
P2.  If there is no principle of the kind described in P1, then compliance with 
ordinary judgment is less important than the unity of the principle, in 
ascertaining the correct principle of composition. 
P3.  If compliance with ordinary judgment is less important than the unity of 
the principle, in ascertaining the correct principle of composition, then van 
Inwagen’s principle of composition (some objects compose an object iff 
they constitute a life) is correct. 
C1.  Van Inwagen’s principle of composition is correct. 
P4.  If van Inwagen’s principle of composition is correct, then there are no 
ordinary objects like tables and chairs. 
C2.  There are no ordinary objects like tables and chairs. 
 
P1 says that a principle of composition satisfying certain constraints (unity and 
compliance with judgments on particular cases) cannot be found. But why was 
van Inwagen concerned with ascertaining the correct principle of composition? 
A clue can be found in one of van Inwagen’s more recent writings, where he 
discusses what the ontological context of utterance (also known as the 
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“ontology room”) is all about.5 He says that in the ontology room, the 
discussants will not utter a sentence like “There are paintings”, unless they are 
prepared to “answer any serious metaphysical question about the properties of 
paintings”. For example: “Must a painting actually have been painted – or could 
a painting come about as the result of the random collisions of molecules? If a 
painting is vaporized, is the resulting cloud of atoms a thing that used to be, but 
is no longer, a painting?” (van Inwagen 2014, 3). Similarly, then, if one wants 
to say, in the ontology room, that there are material things made of other 
material things – that there are ordinary composite objects like tables and chairs 
– then one must be prepared to answer various questions about such things. And 
one of these questions concerns the conditions under which some objects 
(presumably, smaller objects) make up a composite object. 
Van Inwagen seeks to establish P1 (that there is no principle of composition 
satisfying both the desideratum of unity and the desideratum of compliance with 
ordinary judgment) by rejecting various candidate principles. For example, 
“Contact” is the view that “To get the xs to compose something, one need only 
bring them into contact” (van Inwagen 1990, 33). A problem with this answer, 
for van Inwagen, is that the elementary particles that material objects are 
ultimately composed of are not in contact. So, contact is not necessary for 
composition. Further, it seems that not just any two random objects brought into 
contact thereby compose an object: I can carry my bed from my old flat to my 
new one, put it next to a wall again, but this will only be a rearrangement of 
furniture, and not the creation of a new bed-wall. So contact is not sufficient for 
composition. 
Another candidate principle that van Inwagen considers is “Fastening”: “To 
get the xs to compose something, one need only cause them to be fastened to 
one another” (van Inwagen 1990, 57). Fastening is a more stable variety of 
contact. For example, a watch’s parts are fastened to one another, whereas those 
of a house of blocks are not (ibid., 58). Like contact, fastening is not sufficient 
for composition. For example, if two people shake hands and their fingers 
become paralyzed, so that they are unable to let go of each other, no object 
made of the two people is formed. 
According to the “Cohesion” principle, “one need only cause them [the 
putative parts of the composite object] to cohere” (ibid., 58). For example, 
cohesion is brought about by welding two pieces of metal together. Even such 
                                                 
5 I am not certain about the origins of the term “ontology room”, in the sense of ontological 
context of utterance, but an earlier use occurs in Dorr, who writes, for example: “What we 
debate in the ontology room is the question what there is strictly speaking – what there 
really, ultimately is – what there is in the most fundamental sense” (Dorr 2005, 250). 
Sometimes, the idea of the ontology room goes hand in hand with the idea that there is a 
special language, different from, say, ordinary English, that is used in the ontology room. 
However, “ontology room” may also be used to mean the ontological context of utterance 
more broadly, allowing for the view that it is a special context for speaking a natural 
language, e.g. English. Van Inwagen is apparently using “ontology room” in this broader 
sense, without taking on board the idea of “Ontologese” as a distinct language; and so am I. 
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extra-strong fastening, according to van Inwagen, would not bring about a new 
object. He uses the example of a handshake again, this time with instant skin-
bonding glue. 
A further principle is “Fusion”: “one need only cause the [the putative parts 
of the composite object] to fuse” (ibid.: 58). Fusion, here, means seamless, 
boundariless cohesion. To reject this criterion, van Inwagen uses the case of 
identical twins whose arms have been joined together by a mad surgeon, 
producing a set of seamlessly joined “artificial Siamese twins”. Again, van 
Inwagen submits that a new being has not been created, and thus fusion is not 
sufficient for composition (van Inwagen 1990, 59). 
Several of the counter-examples concern human beings, and indeed van 
Inwagen seems to hold that it is never possible to put two or more human beings 
together and compose (a further) one. This led him to the idea: what if the 
required relation that gives rise to composition is something different for 
different types of things, for example, humans and non-human material entities? 
This is the “Series” answer: “(∃y the xs compose y) if and only if the xs are F1 
and stand in R, or the xs are F2 and stand in R2, or … , or the xs are Fn and 
stand in Rn” (van Inwagen 1990, 63). The “series” principle is attractive, 
according to van Inwagen, because plausibly, Lego parts may compose 
something in virtue of being fastened to one another, but human beings may not 
(van Inwagen 1990, 65). However, while this “series” principle respects 
ordinary judgment about particular cases of composition, the principle fails 
because it is not unified: it is not the same for different kinds of things. 
Thus, we have our justification for P1: the candidate answers all either fail 
the criterion of compliance with ordinary judgment or they fail the criterion of 
unity. 
P2 (i.e. that compliance with ordinary judgment is less important than the 
unity of the principle) just seems to be justified by van Inwagen’s view of the 
proper method for doing metaphysics. Here, once again, we find the view that 
metaphysics, though it begins with ordinary judgment, is not to be held hostage 
to ordinary judgment. Theoretical virtues such as consistency or simplicity are 
to be given more weight. In particular, the virtue of elegance seems to motivate 
the view that the principle of composition must be the same for all things. Van 
Inwagen says that an answer of the “series” style would be “disgracefully 
messy” (van Inwagen 1990, 67). 
An alternative interpretation of the motivation for P2 would be that van 
Inwagen’s preference of unity over compliance with judgments on particular 
cases is itself justified by appeal to ordinary judgment. He writes: “Isn’t there a 
great deal of plausibility in this principle: If there are xs that compose 
something just in virtue of the fact that they stand in R, then, for any ys, if the ys 
stand in R, the ys compose something?” (van Inwagen 1990, 69). Now, “great 
deal of plausibility” might mean conformity with ordinary judgment, but it 
might also mean that the principle appeals to the scientist or the philosopher in 
van Inwagen and (presumably) in the reader: it is essentially the principle that 
we should look for an elegant principle of composition. I find the latter option 
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more plausible: van Inwagen appeals to theoretical virtue, not ordinary 
judgment, in justifying P2. However, it must be said that, in any case, there is 
no sharp division between an appeal to ordinary judgment and theoretical 
virtue: consistency, elegance, simplicity and so on can all be said to appeal to 
the common mindset, rather than just to that of philosophers or scientists. And 
perhaps the common mindset sometimes even prioritizes such virtues over 
compliance with judgments on particular cases. This difficulty – of dis-
tinguishing between ordinary judgment and theoretical virtue as constraints on 
metaphysical theories – unfortunately only illustrates the host of conundrums 
about the methodology of metaphysics that I cannot properly address in this 
thesis. Concerning this particular issue, however, it should be noted that while 
theoretical virtue has appeal outside metaphysics and, furthermore, constrains 
our thinking when we are not theorizing about the world as philosophers or 
scientists, metaphysicians characteristically pursue theoretical virtues in a 
particularly insistent manner, and are willing to give up many other things (e.g. 
convenience of speaking) in this pursuit. 
So this was the justification for P2: the unity of the principle of composition 
is more important than compliance with judgments on particular cases, because 
in doing metaphysics, we must prioritize theoretical virtues over such ordinary 
judgments on particular cases. (Whether the appeal to theoretical virtue is itself 
ultimately an appeal to ordinary judgment, I leave open here.) Now: the next 
step, P3, is about showing that, out of the candidate principles of composition 
that prioritize theoretical virtue over judgments on cases, van Inwagen’s is the 
best. Van Inwagen’s principle, again, is that some things compose a further 
thing iff they constitute a life. Van Inwagen considers two competitors to this 
principle that similarly prioritize theoretical virtue over compliance with judg-
ments on particular cases. These are the “extreme answers” to the composition 
question: Nihilism and Universalism. According to Nihilism, “It is impossible 
for one to bring it about that something is such that the xs compose it, because, 
necessarily (if the xs are two or more), nothing is such that the xs compose it” 
(ibid., 72). According to Universalism, “It is impossible for one to bring it about 
that something is such that the xs compose it, because, necessarily (if the xs are 
disjoint), something is such that the xs compose it” (ibid., 74). Against Nihilism, 
van Inwagen says that it “would appear to be false, for you and I exist and we 
are composite objects” (ibid., 73). Against Universalism, van Inwagen says that 
it “does not seem to force itself upon the mind as true” (ibid., 74) and it is in 
conflict with the plausible idea that persons exist and persist through time, while 
changing their parts, that is, the atoms that they are composed of (ibid., 75). 
Van Inwagen’s proposed principle of composition, in his own phrasing, is 
that “(∃y the xs compose y) if and only if the activity of the xs constitutes a life 
(or there is only one of the xs)” (ibid., 82). I will not elaborate on how he further 
justifies this answer, beyond eliminating the alternatives (as outlined above). 
Horgan and Potrč analyse van Inwagen’s implicit methodology as follows: 
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An adequate metaphysical theory, like an adequate scientific theory, should be 
systematic and general and should keep to a minimum the unexplained facts that 
it posits. In particular, a good metaphysical or scientific theory should avoid 
positing a plethora of quite specific, disconnected, sui generis, compositional 
facts. (Horgan and Potrč 2008, 18–19) 
 
Sider, on the other hand, writes that “van Inwagen seeks the simplest theory that 
accommodates the ‘data’, which in his case are his intuitive judgments plus a 
range of theoretical presuppositions” (Sider 2011, 170). Horgan and Potrč, then, 
seem to think that van Inwagen appeals to the theoretical virtues of syste-
maticity and generality and avoiding unexplained primitives, whereas Sider 
emphasizes simplicity and compliance with intuitions and theoretical assump-
tions. I have myself mentioned the virtue of “elegance” above. Since there are 
no clear-cut distinctions between the different virtues, it is plausible that the 
relevant theoretical virtues underlying arguments in revisionary ontology can be 
elucidated in different ways. For present purposes (giving an idea of how 
arguments in revisionary ontology work), choosing between these options is not 
necessary. 
 
(4) The argument from causal over-determination (Merricks 2001) 
Like van Inwagen, Merricks leaves out of his ontology things like chairs and 
tables, but preserves some macroscopic objects. In Merricks’ case, these are 
persons, rather than living organisms more generally. Merricks’ argument 
against ordinary objects also differs from van Inwagen’s. 
The essence of Merricks’ argument from causal over-determination is put 
forth in the following passage: 
 
If there were baseballs, they would break windows, they would injure batters, 
they would cause visual sensations (and so be seen), and they would cause tactile 
sensations (and so be felt). … But given the Overdetermination Argument … if 
there were such objects, they would not have causal powers, so there are no such 
objects. (Merricks 2001, 81) 
 
I reconstruct the basic argument as follows. 
P1.  If there are baseballs (or other ordinary objects), then there are things that 
are baseballs (or other ordinary objects) and that can cause events. 
P2.  There are no things that are baseballs (or other ordinary objects) and that 
can cause events. 
C.  There are no baseballs (or other ordinary objects). [Modus tollens] 
 
P1 apparently draws on our concept of baseballs: baseballs, if they existed, 
would be the sorts of things that could cause events. So P1, as I understand it, is 
not an appeal to the idea that to be real is to have causal powers (Alexander’s 
dictum). I take the former to be the more plausible interpretation because the 
premise is more appealing on this reading. 
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P2 is justified by the following Overdetermination Argument (Merricks 
2001, 57): 
 
(1) The baseball – if it exists – is causally irrelevant to whether its constituent 
atoms, acting in concert, cause the shattering of the window. 
(2) The shattering of the window is caused by those atoms, acting in concert. 
(3) The shattering of the window is not overdetermined. 
Therefore, 
(4) If the baseball exists, it does not cause the shattering of the window. 
 
The premises of the Overdetermination Argument mostly seem to be supported 
by ordinary judgment, but (3) in particular seems to get support from an appeal 
to the theoretical virtue of simplicity or elegance. The picture that accepts 
overdetermined events would be “an ugly picture”, especially when the case 
with the baseball generalizes so that causal overdetermination would be 
ubiquitous (Merricks 2001, 67). 
Thomasson represents Merricks’ argument in a slightly different way from 
the reconstruction above: “Since positing the existence of baseballs would force 
one to conclude that they both have and do not have causal powers, we can 
conclude that there are no baseballs” (Thomasson 2007, 10). Merricks’ argu-
ment would then have the form of a reductio, beginning from the supposition 
(for reductio) that there are baseballs. I have reconstructed the argument as a 
straightforward modus tollens inference to the conclusion that there are no 
baseballs. I take this to be just another example of how essentially the same 
argument in revisionary ontology can be reconstructed in different ways. Again, 
the choice between such options is not crucial for current purposes (i.e. for 
presenting the gist of the relevant arguments). Likewise, it is not important to 
dwell on the details of how Merricks takes each premise to be supported. It 
should suffice to say that appeal to ordinary judgment and theoretical virtue 
again have a central methodological role. 
The arguments recapitulated above were some of the better known argu-
ments in revisionary ontology. We saw how they appeal to ordinary judgment 
(including conceptual competence with terms like “baseball”) and theoretical 
virtues (including e.g. simplicity and elegance). Revisionary ontological theses 
are often put forth as the best solutions to puzzles, not as conclusions of 
deductive arguments. To this extent, the reconstructions above might be mis-
leading. Nevertheless, hopefully they help one grasp the gist of the arguments. 
There are more puzzles and arguments like these than have been stated above. 
For example, revisionary ontological theses are motivated by their supposed 
capacity to provide solutions to problems like the Ship of Theseus. In that 
puzzle, the question is which of the two candidate ships is the Ship of Theseus: 
is it the one that sailed through the Ship of Theseus’ usual trajectory or the one 
that was made from the planks that were removed from the former, one by one, 
over the course of the trip? Once we admit that there are no composite objects 
like the Ship of Theseus, the question is resolved by denying the question’s 
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assumption that there is a Ship of Theseus: neither candidate is the Ship of 
Theseus, because there is no Ship of Theseus, nor any other ship. Another 
prominent puzzle in revisionary ontology concerns the identity of a lump of 
clay with the statue made of it. Again it is sometimes thought that the best 
solution is to deny that there are statues made of lumps of clay. I will not go 
into the details of other puzzles here. The rest of the thesis will only presume 
familiarity with the arguments outlined in this chapter. 
There are also other types of arguments with apparently anti-common-
sensical ontological conclusions, arguments that will not be given the time of 
day at all, in this thesis. In those arguments, the arguer relies heavily on some 
metaphysical principle that does not have broad appeal among philosophers, let 
alone the folk, and derives a revisionary ontological conclusion on that basis. 
Examples include appeals to the principle that anything that exists must have 
causal powers (Alexander’s dictum), or that what is real must be physical. 
Perhaps the arguments proceeding from such principles may be subsumed under 
the analysis to follow. In any case, I will not assume that they can be. I am 
interested in arguments with premises that can be expected to appeal to anyone 
who is willing to rely on ordinary judgment (including e.g. conceptual judg-
ment) and theoretical virtues (including e.g. simplicity or elegance), in order to 
find out what the world is like. 
In this section, I have not given examples of arguments in feminist 
revisionary ontology of gender, which will be discussed in chapter 5. Those 
arguments also seem to have conclusions that stand opposed to common sense 
or folk opinion: for example, that there are no men and women, or that to be a 
woman is to be oppressed for a certain kind of reason. However, those argu-
ments differ in the considerations they appeal to from the arguments considered 
in this chapter. In particular, ethical and pragmatic issues play a much bigger 
role than they typically do in the arguments of “mainstream revisionary 
ontology” that I have exemplified in this section. I will elaborate on this 
difference and its implications for understanding the two projects, when I take 
up the relationship between mainstream and feminist revisionary ontology in 
chapter 5. For now, I will turn away from the interpretation of the object of 
interpretation, “ontology” (or more precisely, “revisionary ontology”), to the 
interpretation of “interpretation”. 
 
 
2.3. Interpreting “interpretation” 
As has emerged in our discussion of the sample arguments, there is room for 
interpretation in the case of several, if not all, arguments in revisionary onto-
logy. However, the interpretive work undertaken in this thesis is not that of 
establishing, for each argument, how to best reconstruct it and to establish 
which methodological considerations, precisely, are in play – for example, 
whether the author supports a premise by appeal to ordinary judgment or 
theoretical virtue, and if the latter, then which theoretical virtue. Instead, my 
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aim is to interpret the enterprise itself, the practice of providing such arguments 
in support of what appear to be unorthodox views about what there is. In this 
section, I will further explain how I understand this interpretive work. 
First, I will address what might be called a paradox of interpretation: how 
can one interpret a practice at all, without being able to say what the practice is, 
to begin with? One might suspect that in the previous part of this chapter (2.2), I 
have unavoidably already engaged in interpretation, and perhaps even that I 
have done all the interpretation that there is to do. In response, I will distinguish 
fixing the object of interpretation (which I did in section 2.2) from interpretation 
itself (which will be done in the remainder of the thesis). 
Secondly, I will explain why we cannot establish what the revisionary 
ontologists are doing simply by asking them. The central idea here is that when 
one’s conscious aims and one’s methods (in other words, what one is trying to 
accomplish and what one can hope to accomplish by one’s actions) come into 
conflict, then sometimes, methods should be prioritized over conscious aims 
when answering the question about what one is doing. I will explain why for 
each interpretive situation considered in this thesis (the quizzical observer’s 
situation, the mainstream revisionary ontologists’ situation, and the feminist 
revisionary ontologists’ situation), establishing what the ontologists are doing 
simply by asking about their conscious aims is not appropriate. 
Finally, I will list and characterize the main interpretive options that are 




2.3.1. Interpreting versus fixing the object of interpretation  
It might seem like the task of interpretation that I am undertaking is impossible: 
I must have already established what ontology is, before I can begin to interpret 
it. In trying to answer the interpretation question, I am trying to answer the 
question “What is ontology?”. But in order to understand that question, after all, 
I apparently need to understand the term “ontology” that occurs in it. I must 
have this understanding before I can consider different answers to the question. 
So, I must already understand what ontology is in order to meaningfully ask 
and address the question. This paradox of interpretation is apparently a variant 
of Meno’s paradox: it is puzzling how one can purposefully seek knowledge of 
something, X, if one does not already know X (in other words, if one does not 
know one’s purpose in this quest). The solution, in the case at hand, is to draw a 
distinction between the sought after interpretation itself and the mere fixing of 
the object of interpretation. What I did in the previous part of this chapter was 
the fixing of the object of interpretation, but not yet the relevant act of 
interpretation itself. 
What does it mean to fix the object of interpretation? For example, one may 
fix the object of interpretation by ostension, without yet giving an interpretation 
of that object. In a paradigmatic case, the ostensive fixing of the object of 
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interpretation would involve literally pointing to something with one’s finger 
and asking: “What is that?” or “What is going on there?”. This option is 
normally not available for the metaontological inquirers: they are usually not in 
the position to literally point their finger, visibly for their audience, at the 
phenomenon that they are interpreting (and evaluating and making recommen-
dations about). 
Although such “paradigmatic ostension” is usually unavailable for the meta-
ontologist, something similar enough is available. Namely, the metaontologist 
can list examples of the phenomenon to be interpreted. She can say, for 
example: “The conversation between Lisa and David, in yesterday’s seminar, 
was one in ontology”. Of course, one would need to point to more than one 
example, so that the audience can get an idea of the relevant similarities 
between the examples. However, oral conversations between relatively 
unknown people may not serve as the best examples for a metaontologist who is 
trying to fix the object of interpretation for the purposes of a wider audience, 
many of whom may not know Lisa and David or their conversation from the 
day before. Examples that are accessible to a broader audience include, first and 
foremost, famous books and articles that belong to the domain under 
investigation (ontology, or more precisely, revisionary ontology). Not many 
people may have witnessed that conversation between Lisa and David, but more 
of the metaontologists’ potential audience will be familiar with van Inwagen’s 
Material Beings (1990), Merricks’ Persons and Objects (2001), or Unger’s 
“Why There Are No People” (1979). This is why I pointed to such famous 
works, and not private conversations, as examples in the previous section.  
There are also more contentious examples, where it is less clear whether the 
work is part of the same phenomenon (“ontology” or “revisionary ontology”), 
that is the relevant object of interpretation. For example, one may wonder 
whether (dis)proofs of God’s existence or arguments against free will should be 
included. Contentious examples also include work that is labelled “social 
ontology” or “feminist ontology/metaphysics”. For the most part, I will not 
devote special attention to establishing whether a given unobvious case falls or 
does not fall under “revisionary ontology”. I limit my attention to the central 
examples that have occupied most contemporary metaontologists, and I aim the 
interpretation to also cover arguments that are relevantly similar (in particular, 
arguments that similarly appeal to ordinary judgment and theoretical virtues). 
However, I will look at how my approach is useful for understanding feminist 
metaphysics of gender and its relationship to “mainstream” revisionary onto-
logy, in chapter 5. 
When I characterized ontologists’ assumptions about their subject matter and 
the proper way of addressing it, and made suggestions about the methodological 
principles in play in their particular arguments, I did go a bit further than merely 
drawing attention to an object of interpretation. However, this was still not the 
kind of interpretation I am looking for. My interpretive question here is not 
primarily how ontologists do what they do, but what they do. In the next 
subsection, I will explain why we cannot establish what ontologists do simply 
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by asking them. This will also serve to show why the interpretive points of view 
matter: different interpretive situations require (or allow) us to disregard 
ontologists’ conscious aims for different reasons. 
 
 
2.3.2. Why not just ask? The relevance of  
the interpretive situation 
Once we have fixed the object of interpretation, what do we still need to do, in 
order to say what the object of interpretation is? For the case at hand 
(interpreting revisionary ontology), I take the interpretation question that 
remains, to be: “What are (revisionary) ontologists doing?”. One might then 
suggest that a good way to find out what someone is doing is to ask them. This 
is especially plausible if we take the question “What are they doing?” to mean: 
“What are they trying to accomplish?”. However, the question can also be taken 
to mean: “What are they actually accomplishing?”. For example, suppose that 
you see someone moving along slowly and leisurely, but insisting that they are 
trying to run. In this case, we might insist that they are in effect walking, not 
running, even if their intention is to run. In one sense, what they are doing (in 
the sense of “trying to do”) is running, but in another sense, what they are doing 
(in the sense of “accomplishing”) is walking. 
Why not understand the interpretation question as the question about what 
the revisionary ontologists are trying to accomplish? Then, getting the correct 
answer would be as simple as asking them. If the revisionary ontologists give 
different answers, then we could conclude that they are indeed doing different 
things (that is, trying to accomplish different things). Indeed, in certain inter-
pretive situations, “What are they doing?” should be understood as a question 
about the actors’ conscious aims. For example, suppose that revisionary 
ontologists were always inclined to revise their methods so as to better suit their 
conscious aims, whenever there turns out to be a discrepancy between their 
conscious aims and their methods. Suppose further that their conscious aim is to 
find out what is true in ordinary English. And suppose that it turns out that this 
question should be approached by conceptual analysis and empirical 
observation, rather than by appeal to theoretical virtues and the like (the 
ontologists’ current methods). The revisionary ontologists in question would 
then be inclined to revise their methods accordingly, because what they really 
care about is finding out what is true in ordinary English – and they are willing 
to do whatever needs to be done to achieve this aim. For such ontologists, the 
interpretation question about their project might pose no real difficulty: it could 
be answered by an act of introspection. The hard work would lie in finding the 
best methods for doing the work required by the aim thus established. 
Now, for the revisionary ontologist who is determined to achieve the 
conscious aims and willing to change the methods accordingly, inquiring only 
into the conscious aims might well be a legitimate method for approaching the 
interpretation question. However, I do not have in mind the point of view of 
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such a revisionary ontologist when I ask the interpretation question in this 
thesis. That is why I do not approach the interpretation question simply by 
asking revisionary ontologists about their conscious aims. I suspect that the 
point of view in question, that of prioritizing conscious aims over methods in 
the case of a discrepancy, is rare among revisionary ontologists: I assume that 
they are somewhat more committed to their methods than their conscious aims. 
More importantly, it would be imprudent of them to be committed to their 
conscious aims over their methods. If there is indeed an important discrepancy, 
then choosing to revise the methods, rather than the conscious aims, would 
render the work done so far more or less useless and their expertise in the field 
questionable, whereas revising their conscious aims would amount to mere 
changes in framing and phrasing. 
So I will not take up the presumably idiosyncratic interpretive viewpoint of 
those imprudent ontologists who are ready to drop the appeals to theoretical 
virtues, should it turn out that these methods are not best suited for their 
conscious aims in doing revisionary ontology, but are nonetheless well suited to 
some other worthy aims in the vicinity. Whose viewpoint will I take up then? I 
have already listed these viewpoints in the introduction, but I will explain them 
again here, now paying special attention to why, in each case, we might need to 
discount the ontologists’ own conscious aims. This also helps to exemplify the 
relevance of the interpretive point of view in determining the adequacy 
conditions for the interpretation. 
First, I will interpret revisionary ontology from the quizzical observer’s point 
of view: the point of view of a fellow philosopher who is sufficiently familiar 
with the disputes among revisionary ontologists and between revisionary and 
non-revisionary ontologists, but continues to experience a sense of pointlessness 
upon observing and thinking about these disputes. (Again, “sufficiently 
familiar” means familiar enough not to be epistemically required to imme-
diately dismiss the sense of pointlessness as a symptom of one’s own incompe-
tence.) Now, suppose that you observe some people engaging in behaviour that 
feels strangely pointless to you. This is puzzling because you have reason to 
believe that they are roughly your equals, in terms of their relevant mental 
capacities. This compels you to try and understand what they are doing. 
Suppose further that when you ask them what they are doing, this does not 
dissolve the puzzling sense of pointlessness. If they are doing what they say 
they are doing, then they are doing it in quite a silly way, it seems to you. 
However, there is an interpretation available that does not fit their own account 
of what they are doing, but explains how they might sensibly be doing some-
thing else. The interpretation is charitable in that it does not make them come 
out inferior to you in their mental capacities. Note that the mere fact that they 
are wrong about what they are doing does not make them appear inferior to you, 
the interpreter: you are yourself also inclined to misunderstand what you are 
doing sometimes. In order to avoid ascribing severely inferior capacities to the 
persons whose practices one is observing, one should sometimes ascribe a 
misunderstanding of the interpretee’s own practice to the interpretee. I will 
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argue, in the next chapter, that the case with the revisionary ontologists and the 
quizzical observer is the kind of case where the ascription of a relatively minor 
misunderstanding of the practice might be required in order to avoid even 
greater uncharity. 
I accept, however, the presumption that self-reports on what one is doing are 
reliable. So I do not consider it a negligible cost of an account that it attributes 
such reflective failure to those interpreted. Caution is needed in re-interpreting 
ontologists’ projects inconsistently with their own professed intentions. For 
example, it would be an insult to van Inwagen’s (1990) judgment to suggest that 
he wrote a whole book arguing for the rather trivial truth that table-particles are 
more fundamental than tables or that tables are non-fundamental, while thinking 
that he was arguing that there are no tables. Some reflective mistakes are more 
plausible and more charitable to attribute than others. I will elaborate on this 
point in the next chapter. 
After addressing the quizzical observer’s interpretive needs, I will take up 
the point of view of revisionary ontologists who are trying to give an account of 
what they are doing, to an audience that is not entirely unmoved by the 
arguments, but continues to feel entitled to their ordinary beliefs. In so far as 
ontologists are trying to defend a certain practice of theirs, we can ask: what is 
more central to the practice being defended? Is it the consciously endorsed aims 
of the practitioners or the way that the practice proceeds (the methods)? In order 
to understand this question, we need to think further about why the ontologists 
want to defend the practice. Presumably, it is because they want to continue the 
practice and because they want to be recognized for having engaged in a 
worthwhile practice in the past. Suppose now that it is indeed worthwhile to 
pursue the consciously endorsed aims of the ontologists, but it is utterly 
misguided to pursue these goals in the way the ontologists have, so far, been 
pursuing them. Further, suppose that it is also sensible to use the methods that 
the ontologists have been using, for some worthwhile aims, just not for their 
own consciously endorsed aims. In that situation, I contend, it makes more 
sense for the ontologists to give an account of “what they do” that aligns with 
their methods rather than their conscious aims, and to revise the latter. 
Why? First, just having consciously pursued a worthwhile aim in the past, by 
entirely misguided means, is less respectable than having worked efficiently 
towards a worthwhile aim, while not recognizing it as one’s aim. Anyone can 
announce some worthwhile aim as one’s purpose (e.g. inventing a cure for 
cancer or ending all wars), but merely having a worthy purpose in mind, while 
not moving an inch towards it, hardly deserves credit. At the same time, if one 
actually invents a cure for cancer, without realizing that this is what one is 
doing, then this surely deserves more credit. Secondly, looking to the future, 
ontologists want to stay in business: that is their other aim in providing the 
defensive account, besides claiming credit for past activity. If it turned out that 
they have been consciously pursuing a worthy aim, but by entirely misguided 
means, then there would be a case for the pursuit of the worthy aim to continue, 
by different means; but there would not be any obvious case for the continuing 
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pursuit of this aim by those same ontologists. Perhaps there are other 
candidates, such as natural scientists or semanticists, who are better equipped to 
do the work that is really called for. Perhaps the natural scientists or 
semanticists have even been doing this work for some time already. 
For example, Thomasson argues that ordinary-language existence questions, 
supposedly investigated by ontologists, are “straightforwardly answerable by 
making use of our conceptual competence and (often) conducting straight-
forward empirical enquiring”; and the philosophers’ work here “lies on the 
conceptual side” (Thomasson 2015, 20). Revisionary ontologists, however, may 
not be best qualified among philosophers to do that conceptual work, at least in 
so far as it is limited to conceptual analysis; or they might not be especially 
interested in doing it. So this way of specifying “what revisionary ontologists 
are doing” (by reference to their conscious aims) does not align well with their 
purpose in asking the interpretation question: namely, establishing what they 
can take credit for having done so far and what they can continue to do. By 
contrast, the alternative approach of changing their conscious aims and 
preserving their methods would equip revisionary ontologists with a good claim 
to their business – in virtue of their relevant skill and experience. 
One might ask: is there not something dishonest about the approach I have 
been advocating for revisionary ontologists? Suppose that you ask someone 
what they are doing and they respond “X”. You then explain to them why it 
does not make sense to do X at all or why it does not make sense to do X in this 
manner. They say: “Oh, but I was actually doing Y. I just mislabelled it.” 
Suppose also that doing Y is consistent with their observable behaviour (Y can 
be done well by engaging in this sort of behaviour) and Y is a sensible and 
worthwhile thing to do. We may then be suspicious of the person’s change of 
mind about what they were doing, thinking that the rationalization of the 
behaviour is dishonest and that the person was doing X, after all. 
One reason for allowing such a change of mind, for the actor giving an 
account of what they are doing, is that people do sometimes mischaracterize 
what they are doing. So someone’s recognition that she was actually doing Y 
and not X may be sincere and correct. More importantly, in the current case, it 
is not necessary that the ontologists give a literally true account of what they 
have been doing all along. In posing the interpretation question, their audience 
is interested in whether the behaviour characteristic of revisionary ontology 
deserves credit and whether it should continue. Revisionary ontologists are very 
well justified in claiming credit for and continuing their characteristic 
behaviour, if there is some project that (1) is worthwhile and (2) can be done via 
this behaviour, i.e. by the methods characteristic of revisionary ontology, even if 
this is not what they had been doing, via this behaviour. The interpretation 
question, in this case, should be understood as the question of whether there is 
some such project and if so, then what project it is. Perhaps for the revisionary 
ontologists to now really engage in that project would require a change in their 
intentions and self-conception. Perhaps it is not literally true that the revisionary 
ontologists have been doing what they now claim to be doing, all along; but it 
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still makes sense to answer the question “What are you doing?” in this way, and 
it is not particularly misleading or otherwise dishonest, given the audience’s 
interest in the question. 
The third point of view that I will take up is that of “feminist revisionary 
ontologists” who are interpreting their own practice in relation to mainstream 
revisionary ontology. The conscious aims of these feminist philosophers are 
perhaps more diverse than those of mainstream ontologists. For example, 
Haslanger (2000) at least sometimes takes her aim to be that of improving 
concepts for ethical and political purposes, whereas Sveinsdóttir (2013) takes 
herself to be doing metaphysics proper. (I will suggest that improving concepts 
for ethical and political purposes is not “metaphysics proper”, given the 
assumption that metaphysics must be centrally aimed at investigating reality.) I 
will side with some conscious aims against others, in this diversity: I will argue 
that “feminist revisionary ontologists” should understand and present 
themselves as pursuing a project of conceptual engineering that is ultimately 
about improving the world, not about representing the world as it is (and thus 
their project is importantly different from the project of mainstream revisionary 
ontologists). This change in self-understanding and self-presentation again 
involves overcoming a discrepancy between conscious aims and the methods, 
by preserving the methods and modifying the aims where needed. The methods, 
here, involve appeals to ethical considerations that cannot be considered 
evidence for the facts supposedly investigated. The most reasonable response 
for the feminist ontologists, I will argue, is to give up the claim to be 
(exclusively) investigating facts, for example, about the nature of women. 
The interpretation question, then, is: What are revisionary ontologists doing? 
For some interpretive projects, it might be reasonable to understand this as a 
question about the revisionary ontologists’ conscious aims; that is, as a question 
about what they are trying to accomplish. For the interpretive projects I am 
concerned with, however, the conscious aims may need to be discarded. 
Discarding the conscious aims is justified in different ways for the different 
interpretive points of view. From the quizzical observer’s point of view, 
discounting the conscious aims, to some extent, is needed to avoid attributing 
inexplicable asymmetry between the revisionary ontologists’ and the observer’s 
own mental capacities. From the mainstream revisionary ontologists’ own point 
of view, discounting the conscious aims enables them to more effectively 
defend their practice: to explain why its past achievements deserve credit and 
why they (rather than somebody else with more relevant skills and training) 
should be able to continue the practice. From the feminist revisionary 
ontologists’ point of view, finally, discounting the conscious aim of (exclusi-
vely) investigating facts avoids the charge of using non-evidential 




2.3.3. The main options for answering the  
interpretation question 
Finally, I will seek further understanding of the interpretation question, the 
question about what revisionary ontologists are doing, by describing the main 
alternative answers to it. 
 
(1) The plain English view. Revisionary ontologists are defending views about 
what exists in the ordinary, everyday sense of “exist” (and all other relevant 
terms). This view seems to be favoured by the realist Merricks (2001) and the 
deflationist Thomasson (2015). Note that the plain English view is distinct from 
the claim that the object of metaontology involves simply questions of the form 
“Are there Fs?” or “Do Fs exist?” (and perhaps some other specified forms). 
The object of metaontology, on this account, would still involve ontological 
discussions of existence questions. The answer to the interpretation question, 
however, would be that those discussions do not involve any special senses or 
ways of using claims of the form “There are Fs” or “Fs exist”. 
On Thomasson’s deflationist account, an upshot of this position is that we 
should address the existence questions posed in ontological discussions exactly 
as we should address the existence questions posed in other contexts. For 
example, we should address “Are there tables?” similarly to how the naïve 
tourist should address “Are there bigfoots?”. The special methods of ontology 
(i.e. appeals to theoretical virtues and the like) are not required. 
 
(2) The Ontologese view. Revisionary ontologists are inquiring into what exists, 
using some special technical language, perhaps involving a special sense of 
“exist” or “real” that is foreign to natural language. This view is sometimes 
attributed to Sider, but it is doubtful whether he intended this as an answer to 
the interpretation question. He rather seems to remain neutral on the 
interpretation question, focusing on the recommendation question: “All that’s 
important is that one can introduce a fundamental quantifier, which can then be 
used to pose substantive ontological questions” (Sider 2011, 171). It is unclear 
whether any realist actually holds the Ontologese view, as an answer to the 
interpretation question (Sider, again, seems to support the view as an answer to 
the recommendation question); but it is sometimes targeted by deflationists as 
the option to which the ontologists must resort, if they deny using ordinary, 
everyday English. One might ascribe such a view to Dorr (2005) and Fine 
(2009), but in their cases as well, it might be better to ascribe to them 
contextualist accounts, such that the ontological way of using “exist” (or “real”) 
would remain within the natural language.6 Chalmers (2009) apparently defends 
                                                 
6 I elaborate a bit more on the difference between claiming that revisionary ontologists 
depart from the natural language and that they depart from the everyday language, in my 
(Kitsik 2018a). A relevant consideration also mentioned there is that philosophy students are 
quick to grasp the relevant senses of existence claims in the metaphysics class, without 
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the Ontologese view as an interpretation of ontological disputes, but he does 
this as a deflationist, suggesting that the primitive ontological sense of “exist” in 
play in ontological disputes is a semantically defective, empty pseudo-concept. 
 
(3) The multiple languages view. Revisionary ontologists with different views 
are each answering existence questions in their own language; none of these 
languages is ordinary English. This view has been put forth by the deflationist 
Hirsch (2009); but the view could in principle also be defended by a realist who 
thinks that some of these languages are better than others, for describing the 
world. 
 
(4) The contextualist view. Revisionary ontologists are addressing existence 
questions in the natural language, e.g. English, but in a special metaphysical 
context (the ontology room). This view has been favoured by revisionary 
ontologists Horgan and Potrč (2008) and van Inwagen (2014). (These authors 
count as revisionary ontologists on my definition, since they appear to defend 
views that are opposed to ordinary belief; but it is unclear whether they really 
aim at repudiating ordinary belief or whether they can succeed in this.) 
 
(5) The practical metalinguistic view. Revisionary ontologists are revising 
ordinary language, where the question about how to revise the language is 
understood as a matter of practical decision, not as a theoretical question. This 
is the central suggestion in Carnap (1950b). (One might propose instead that 
Carnap’s central suggestion is rather a variant of the Ontologese view and that 
he considers ontologists’ special technical language semantically defective. I do 
not wish to delve into such exegetical issues here; they make no difference to 
my arguments.) A similar view has more recently been defended by Thomasson 
(2017), who has come to see the weaknesses – especially, the lack of charity – 
of her former “easy-ontological” approach, which I have listed under the “plain 
English view” above. Belleri (2017) has also suggested a similar view. 
 
(6) The theoretical metalinguistic view. Revisionary ontologists’ question is 
about how to revise ordinary language, understood both as a practical choice 
and a theoretical problem. This is the proposal that I will defend in this thesis. 
That is, I will defend this as a proposal for interpreting mainstream revisionary 
ontology. For feminist revisionary ontology, my proposal aligns with the 
“practical metalinguistic view” above. 
                                                                                                                       
needing to be introduced to a new language. In fact, Dorr makes a similar observation: 
“[T]he ease with which generations of students have been inducted into the practice of 
foundational ontology is evidence that the basic presuppositions of that practice cannot be 
wholly alien to our ordinary thought” (Dorr 2005, 253). However, he does not seem to use 
this observation – as I do – to argue that the language of the “ontology room” must be 
somehow continuous with the language outside the ontology room. 
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This list just gives the gist of each interpretive option, but there is much 
room for fleshing out the details. In particular, this list does not specify what the 
epistemic significance of the project of revisionary ontology is supposed to be, 
given each option, or in other words, how pursuing each of these questions is 
supposed to improve our epistemic standing. The epistemic significance of 
revisionary ontology is issue that I will devote special attention to, in this thesis. 
I will do this in chapter 4, which is devoted to investigating the interpretation 
question from the revisionary ontologists’ own point of view, since it is from 
that point of view that the question about epistemic significance is particularly 
salient. 
 
2.4. Chapter summary 
Hopefully, some progress has now been made toward understanding the 
metaontological interpretation question. The object of interpretation, as I 
understand it, is ontological discussion: linguistically mediated attempts to 
answer questions of the form “Are there Fs?” or “Do Fs exist?” (or similar), 
where the participants have particular assumptions, laid out above, about their 
subject matter and the proper methods for addressing it. In this thesis, I am 
focusing on revisionary ontology: ontological discussions where the 
participants at least appear to argue for views that stand in opposition to folk 
belief. 
“Interpreting” revisionary ontology (which is distinct from fixing the object 
of interpretation) means addressing the question of what revisionary ontologists 
are doing. Just asking the revisionary ontologists is not enough (the conscious 
aims may need to be disregarded), given the interpretive situations considered 
in this thesis. The main options for answering the interpretation question 
include the “plain English view”, the “Ontologese view”, the “multiple lan-
guages view”, the “contextualist view”, the “practical metalinguistic view”, and 
the “theoretical metalinguistic view”. I defend the theoretical metalinguistic 
view for mainstream revisionary ontology (from the quizzical observer’s and 
the ontologists’ own point of view) and the practical metalinguistic view for 
feminist metaphysics of gender (from the feminist metaphysicians’ own point of 
view). 
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3. INTERPRETING REVISIONARY ONTOLOGY FROM  
THE QUIZZICAL OBSERVER’S POINT OF VIEW 
3.1. Chapter introduction 
Again, my aim in this thesis is to interpret revisionary ontology. There can be 
different reasons to pose the interpretation question about any phenomenon and 
hence different adequacy conditions can apply to the interpretive accounts of 
the same phenomenon. For example, how a phenomenon should be accounted 
for depends upon the audience of the account. When we explain physical events 
in the world to a five-year-old, a good interpretation will be very different from 
the one we would give to an audience of physicists. Yet, we are trying to be 
truthful in both cases. In this thesis, I am seeking interpretations of revisionary 
ontology where both the audience and those seeking the interpretation, in all 
cases, are philosophers. However, they are different kinds of philosophers with 
different kinds of explanatory needs. In this chapter, I will look for an 
interpretation of ontological disputes from the point of view of a “quizzical 
observer”. A quizzical observer is a philosopher who has a good level of fami-
liarity with the ontological disputes in question, but continues to experience a 
certain “sense of pointlessness” upon observing or thinking about them. 
The quizzical observer, I will argue, needs an interpretation of the disputes 
that would (1) explain the sense of pointlessness and (2) respect the pre-
sumption of peerhood, i.e. the presumption that the disputants’ key cognitive 
capacities are roughly equal to the quizzical observer’s. I will argue that certain 
prominent deflationist accounts – Hirsch’s (2009), Thomasson’s (2015) and 
Chalmers’ (2009) – are tailored to explain the sense of pointlessness, but fail to 
respect the presumption of peerhood. I will then defend a metalinguistic account 
that combines Plunkett and Sundell’s (2013) account of metalinguistic nego-
tiation, Sider’s (2011) idea of ontology as the pursuit of a joint-carving con-
ceptual scheme, and Bennett’s (2009) “epistemicist” view that the main 
problem with the ontological disputes in question is that the competing theories 
are on a par in terms of the relevant desiderata and therefore cannot be chosen 
between. This hybrid account, I will argue, satisfies both adequacy conditions 
and has advantages over the metalinguistic accounts already on the table, in 




3.2.1. The quizzical observer’s situation and  
the sense of pointlessness 
Recall that the main metaontological questions about ontological disputes are 
the interpretation question (what are ontological disputes about?), the evaluation 
question (are ontological disputes worthwhile?), and the recommendation 
question (should ontological disputes proceed in the same way, be transformed 
somehow, or end entirely?). The motivation for tackling the interpretation 
question largely derives from an interest in the evaluation question and the 
recommendation question. In the case under discussion in this chapter, the 
interest in the evaluation and recommendation question, in turn, largely derives 
from what might be called “quizzical phenomenology”: feelings of pointless-
ness, annoyance, and impatience that the disputes give rise to, in some obser-
vers. The quizzical observer might articulate the feeling by saying “I don’t 
understand this” or “This is probably pointless”. Since it is a phenomenological 
reaction, however, its precise content is hard to capture in a sentence. 
The viewpoint relevant here is not just that of any person who has this 
phenomenological reaction to ontological disputes, but that of a fellow 
philosopher who is sufficiently familiar with the disputes. That the quizzical 
observer is “sufficiently familiar” with the disputes means that she is epis-
temically permitted to hypothesize that something other than her own incompe-
tence gives rise to the sense of pointlessness, or in other words, she is not 
epistemically required to immediately discount the quizzical phenomenology as 
a sign of her own incompetence. The grounds for claiming sufficient familiarity, 
in the case of the quizzical observer who reacts to ontological disputes could be, 
firstly, that she has rather detailed knowledge of the typical arguments given in 
such disputes; and secondly, that she has the general (not specifically meta-
physical) background knowledge of philosophy that might be required for 
understanding those arguments. So the quizzical observer is not a person from 
the street who finds herself at a metaphysics conference and is confused by the 
sight of apparently intelligent adults debating whether there are tables and 
chairs. Such a quizzical observer with sufficient familiarity, of course, is not 
just a hypothetical possibility; many real-life cases can be found. 
One may wonder, still, about the precise extent of familiarity with the 
disputes that is required from the quizzical observer, for her not to be required 
to assume that her own incompetence is behind the sense of pointlessness. For 
example, supposing that the quizzical observer tends to have the quizzical 
reaction to a variety of different disputes, should she be as familiar with the 
technical details of each of those disputes as the participants themselves? This 
would require great knowledge and competence from the quizzical observer 
indeed: the participants to the individual disputes may themselves be so 
intimately familiar only with their own dispute; but the relevant quizzical 
observer, on this characterization, would have to be equally familiar with a 
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range of different disputes (all those that she has quizzical feelings about). For 
example, she might need to be well versed in the special science knowledge that 
pertains to some of the disputes and have all the competence with formal 
methods that is required to grasp the details of others. I dare to guess that this 
level of familiarity is not typically the case, with the prototypes of the quizzical 
observer (e.g. Hirsch, Thomasson). However, this does not completely dissolve 
the significance of the comparatively limited familiarity with the disputes that 
the relevant quizzical observer does have, familiarity that is still far superior to 
that of the “person from the street”. That comparatively limited familiarity 
(limited, compared to the disputants’ own understanding of their discussion) is 
still sufficient for the quizzical observer not to be required to dismiss her sense 
of pointlessness offhand as a mere manifestation of her own incompetence with 
the terminology or the subject matter. 
In this chapter, I will focus on ontological disputes, rather than ontological 
discussions more generally. This is because it is disputes that cause the 
“quizzical” reaction in question, and further, because certain explanations of the 
reaction are only applicable to disputes. For example, the explanation that the 
sense of pointlessness arises because the dispute is merely verbal does not apply 
to discussions that are not disputes. Whereas a discussion, as understood here, 
can in principle be conducted alone (for example, by writing a thesis that 
nobody will ever read), ontological disputes are linguistic exchanges between 
two or more philosophers. For most observers who are competent with the 
prima facie relevant language (most often, ordinary non-technical English), 
these exchanges appear to be aimed at resolving disagreements about whether 
Fs are (really) there or exist or are real. The typical Fs include “ordinary” 
macrophysical objects, such as tables and chairs; unusual objects, such as 
concrete possible worlds or arbitrary sums of other objects; and abstract objects, 
such as numbers, propositions, and universals. 
This might seem like a needlessly long-winded characterization of onto-
logical disputes. Why not just say that ontological disputes are about what there 
is? I have instead described what ontological disputes appear to be about, 
because what the disputes are really about, or what the disputants are really 
doing, is at issue here. Are the disputes about whether “Fs exist” is true in 
ordinary English? Or perhaps the disputants are each speaking different lan-
guages? Or maybe they are speaking, or at least trying to speak, some special 
technical version of English? Again, there can be different reasons to get behind 
the appearances of a dispute. Sometimes, the disputants themselves wish to 
understand what their dispute is really about or what they are really doing. 
However, here I will look for an account from the point of view of an outside 
observer. Further, it is not just any outside observer, but specifically the 
“quizzical observer”. 
The choice of the adjective “quizzical” is inspired by how Yablo defines the 
noun “quizzicalist”: “Quizzicalists, as I’ll call them, find it hard to take (some? 
all?) ontological debate seriously and hold out little hope for a successful 
resolution” (Yablo 2009, 508). Note, however, that the emphasis in my notion of 
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a quizzical observer is on a characteristic phenomenology rather than a publicly 
espoused deflationary position. That is why I omit the “-ist” in Yablo’s 
“quizzicalist”. The “-ist” seems to convey a publicly espoused position – in this 
case, a deflationist position on ontology – rather than a characteristic pheno-
menology.  
The quizzical observer, then, must be distinguished from the (metaonto-
logical) deflationist, as follows. For being a quizzical observer, it is necessary 
and sufficient that one is a philosopher who is sufficiently familiar with 
ontological disputes and experiences a sense of pointlessness, upon observing 
such disputes. For being a deflationist, it is necessary and sufficient that one 
publicly defends the position that ontological disputes are pointless. There is an 
overlap between real-life quizzical observers and deflationists. However, many 
quizzical observers are not deflationists, because they do not go on to defend 
their gut reaction in public. And it is at least possible to be a deflationist without 
being a quizzical observer. Non-quizzical deflationists might have no particular 
phenomenological reaction to ontological disputes, or they might even have a 
reaction of interest and approval. Perhaps they would have just thought of an 
argument against ontological disputes and presented the argument in public. I 
take this to be consistent with how the term “deflationist” is normally used: it 
refers to the position that one publicly takes and defends; deflationist feelings 
are not required from a deflationist, even if they normally have such feelings. 
The point of drawing this distinction is to explain why it is not accurate to 
say that I am looking for a good “deflationist” account of ontological disputes. 
Since deflationists need not be motivated by the quizzical phenomenology, they 
are not necessarily responding to the explanatory needs that I am focusing on. 
So their accounts need not be assessed according to how well they address these 
explanatory needs. I am not looking for an account for the deflationist, then; I 
am looking for an account for the quizzical observer. And a quizzical observer 
is a philosopher who experiences the described sense of pointlessness and is 
sufficiently familiar with ontological disputes, not to be required to immediately 
dismiss the sense of pointlessness as probably caused by her own incompetence. 
This sense of pointlessness, perhaps together with the recognition that the 
disputants may be presumed to be roughly the quizzical observer’s intellectual 
equals, motivates the observer to interpret the dispute. 
I do not assume that the sense of pointlessness attaches to any particular 
feature of the disputes, such as their subject matter or the method by which that 
subject matter is approached. Yablo, in another article, suggests that sceptical 
feelings towards ontological disputes tend to arise in connection with the 
disputes’ subject matter:  
 
But again, there is a certain cast of mind that balks rather at the program’s goals. 
A line of research aimed at determining whether Chicago, April, Spanish, etc. 
really exist strikes this cast of mind as naive to the point of comicality. It’s as 
though one were to call for research into whether April is really the cruellest 
month, or Chicago the city with the big shoulders, or Spanish the loving tongue. 
(Yablo 1998, 231) 
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By contrast to this suggestion, I take the relevant quizzical feelings to have no 
such definite object, beyond being about the observed disputes in some way. 
The sense of pointlessness may arise in response to the subject matter of the 
dispute or the disputants’ way of approaching it or something else entirely – this 
is yet to be found out. I assume that it is not transparent to the quizzical 
observer herself what precisely gives rise to the sense of pointlessness. 
I suspect that these quizzical feelings are the motivating force for most 
deflationist accounts of ontological disputes. So I think that philosophers like 
Thomasson (2015) and Hirsch (2009) first feel that there is something wrong 
about (certain) ontological disputes and then propose accounts to make sense of 
that feeling. The alternative would be that the deflationists begin with a neutral 
interest in ontological disputes, then find them to be deeply problematic on 
closer investigation, and then develop sceptical feelings towards the disputes. I 
have no hard evidence to support my view over that alternative, but I hope that I 
am not alone in finding the first option (quizzical feelings motivating 
deflationist accounts, rather than the other way around) to be the more plausible 
course of events. Now, supposing that in fact the deflationist accounts are 
motivated by quizzical feelings, rather than the other way around, these 
accounts are responses to an explanatory need. The need is to make sense of the 
quizzical feelings. The quizzical observer putting forth a deflationist account 
should therefore ask: which of the alternative deflationist accounts, if any, is the 
best response to this explanatory need? Are any of these responses acceptable at 
all? Perhaps some non-deflationist account could meet the adequacy conditions 
that apply to the explanatory account? 
Given the salient features of the quizzical observer’s situation and her 
motivation, the interpretation (the explanatory account that she seeks) has the 
following two adequacy conditions. First, the account should explain the sense 
of pointlessness that the disputes give rise to, in the quizzical observer. Second, 
the account should respect the “presumption of peerhood”: the presumption that 
the disputants’ rational, linguistic, and reflective capacities are roughly equal to 
the quizzical observer’s. I am assuming that the quizzical phenomenology, the 
sense of pointlessness, motivates the quizzical observer to seek an interpretation 
of ontological disputes. The quizzical observer wants to understand what it is 
about the disputes that gives rise to the sense of pointlessness. One adequacy 
condition for a satisfactory interpretation of the disputes, in this case, is surely 
that it should explain the observer’s quizzical phenomenology. Explaining the 
quizzical phenomenology is what the interpretation is sought for. However, 
there is also an important constraint on the interpretation: it should respect the 
presumption that the disputants are the quizzical observer’s epistemic peers. I 




3.2.2. The presumption of peerhood 
Persons are epistemic peers, in the sense relevant here, when they have roughly 
equal key capacities, such as rationality, linguistic ability, and reflective ability. 
Rationality refers to the ability to act effectively in pursuit of one’s ends. 
Linguistic ability refers to being able to acquire and correctly apply concepts, 
rules of composition, pragmatic rules of conversation, and similar resources that 
facilitate meaningful thought and communication. Reflective capacity refers to 
the ability to correctly assess and describe what one is doing. The quizzical 
observer need not suppose that the disputants are ideal in these respects. She 
just needs to suppose that the disputants are not inexplicably dissimilar from the 
quizzical observer. That means not just that the quizzical observer should avoid 
ascribing inexplicable grave deficits to the disputants, but also that she should 
avoid ascribing inexplicable major surpluses of abilities. Respecting the 
presumption of peerhood means that whenever the interpreter posits a major 
discrepancy between the capacities of herself, on the one hand, and the subjects 
of interpretation, on the other, the interpreter takes seriously the burden of 
providing a plausible explanation of that discrepancy. If such an explanation is 
not found, the interpreter should look for an alternative account that does not 
posit such a discrepancy. 
To prevent confusion: the quizzical observer’s situation is slightly different 
from standard cases of peer disagreement. The quizzical observer does not 
necessarily find herself disagreeing with her presumed peers. She feels a sense 
of pointlessness regarding disputes between her presumed peers. The disputants 
themselves, of course, do not feel that their dispute is pointless. This difference 
in feelings does not imply, however, that the quizzical observer disagrees with 
the disputants on the truth of the proposition that ‘Ontological disputes are 
pointless’. The quizzical observer’s essential feature is her quizzical 
phenomenology, not any view or belief that she holds about the disputes. One 
can have the quizzical phenomenology without forming any belief or view 
about the matter. A further difference from standard cases of peer disagreement 
is that I am not presuming that the quizzical observer and the disputants possess 
the relevant capacities to exactly the same degree. Attributions of grave deficits 
and great surpluses require an explanation, on my account. 
Also, I do not suppose that all interpreters should always respect the pre-
sumption of peerhood. Sometimes, there is independent evidence that a parti-
cular subject of interpretation is not one’s peer in the relevant sense; and there 
can even be evidence that most subjects of interpretation are unlikely to be 
one’s peers – for example, as when one is an extraordinary genius, such that 
even most renowned specialists in her own research field are far beneath her. 
However, the presumption of peerhood is a justified one for the quizzical 
observer as she interprets the ontological disputants. One reason is that it is a 
part of the original puzzle: a part of what makes the observer’s sense of 
pointlessness something to be explained is that the observer has reason to 
believe that the disputants are roughly on a par with her, in terms of their central 
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cognitive capacities. The situation would be quite different if the quizzical had 
overheard a dispute between small children still learning their native language 
or other persons with known linguistic or rational deficits and had experienced a 
similar sense of pointlessness. That would not have been a particularly puzzling 
sense of pointlessness. The puzzle, of course, is not solved when a part of the 
puzzle is simply ignored in the explanation. Furthermore, it is plausible that the 
quizzical observer should respect the presumption of peerhood, even if it were 
not a part of the puzzle. It would be a farfetched supposition that other philo-
sophers with whom one can have fruitful discussions about non-metaphysical 
matters possess some grave deficit or a great surplus of rational, linguistic, and 
reflective capacities – a deficit or surplus that is not revealed in any other 
context besides metaphysics. 
 
 
3.2.3. Why not charity? 
The idea that deflationists sometimes attribute irrational behaviour or other 
strange shortcomings to ontologists is not novel.7 However, such criticisms of 
deflationist accounts typically point to the requirement of charity, not the 
presumption of epistemic peerhood. The usual way of stating the principle of 
charity is something like: “Maximize the truth and/or rationality of what others 
say or do.” I appeal to peerhood rather than charity because I find the appeal to 
charity too generic and undermotivated. Why should one interpret charitably, in 
the first place, and how does one know whether one is being charitable enough? 
Instead of addressing these questions as they stand, I prefer to appeal to the 
presumption of peerhood, which I think is better motivated and sets a more 
determinate standard for interpretation than the general principle of charity. 
However, the requirement to respect the presumption of peerhood may also be 
seen as a way of spelling out the version of the principle of charity that is 
relevant for interpreting revisionary ontology. 
Appeals to charity often do not involve any justification of the principle of 
charity, as if it was too obvious to need a justification or as if the justification 
was common knowledge. Yet, it is important to consider the justification for 
charity, in order to determine the proper way and extent of applying it. In 
defence of the principle, one might say, in Davidsonian fashion, that it is a 
condition for understanding others at all that we interpret them charitably. For 
example, in order to learn our native language (and this is a condition for any 
linguistic interpretation to take place), we must believe that others are telling the 
truth when they point to objects and say their names. Processing metaphors is 
another example: when someone points to a laptop and says that “This is an old 
dinosaur”, we arrive at the non-literal interpretation by first ruling out the literal 
interpretation; and we rule the latter out because we assume (charitably) that the 
person would not say something so obviously false. If we did not have the 
                                                 
7 For example, see Horden (2014) and Thomasson (2017). 
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inclination to seek a charitable interpretation, we would fail to deal with 
metaphorical communication, then. Further, such charitable inclination might be 
required to deal with context-sensitive, not just metaphorical expressions. 
Suppose we need to figure out what someone means with “John is tall”: what is 
the relevant comparison class, is it basketball players or European men his age 
or some other group? Again, plausibly, at least one criterion that we employ, in 
figuring out the intended meaning, is which comparison class would make the 
statement come out true. More generally, when there are several candidate 
meanings allowed by linguistic conventions, charity is a guide for choosing 
between them. 
However, we are here seeking a justification for the requirement to apply 
charity consciously when we interpret others. The question is why deflationists 
should try to be more charitable towards ontologists, against the deflationists’ 
initial inclinations. It might be tempting to appeal to the inevitability of charity, 
in order to justify the normative principle of charity; but the inference is 
actually hard to make. To the extent that charity is a condition for acquiring 
language and using it successfully, the principle seems to operate well enough 
without conscious effort on our part. When someone says “This is an old 
dinosaur”, pointing to the laptop, we do not have to remind ourselves or be 
reminded by others that in order to understand what they mean, we should 
presume that what they say is true, and that it is not true that the laptop is 
literally an old dinosaur, so this is probably not what they mean. On the other 
hand, we want to say that sometimes, when we are inclined to judge that what 
someone says or does is false or irrational, we should consciously apply charity, 
looking for an interpretation that makes their utterance or action come out true 
or rational. The justification for such a demand to apply charity consciously 
cannot simply be that we employ charity unconsciously all the time in linguistic 
communication. That would be a non sequitur. 
Another possible justification for consciously applying charity is that it is at 
least sometimes not very important to find out what was actually meant by the 
speaker(s). It is more important to find out the truth of the matter. To this end, 
we should examine the most sensible version of what the speaker might have 
meant. One might propose, then, that it is not very important what the onto-
logical disputants really mean, or what their dispute is actually about. Instead, 
we should look for the most worthwhile dispute in the vicinity. However, this 
appeal to charity overlooks the quizzical observer’s motivation in seeking an 
interpretation, and so it is not applicable in the case at hand. The quizzical 
observer’s aim is to explain how her sense of pointlessness arises from what the 
ontologists are actually doing. Given this aim, it would not be of much help to 
look for the most worthwhile thing there is for the disputants to do in the 
vicinity of what they are actually doing. 
Given these problems with the generic appeal to charity, I appeal instead to 
the presumption of peerhood as the relevant constraint on the quizzical 
observer’s interpretation of the ontological disputes. Again, this might also be 
understood as a way of spelling out the relevant principle of charity. When we 
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are inclined to judge that what someone is doing is excessively irrational or 
exhibits other grave deficits, we should remind ourselves of our reasons to 
believe that the persons we are interpreting are not that inferior to us in their 
rational, linguistic, and reflective abilities, and look for an alternative inter-
pretation. However, the presumption of peerhood differs from the principle of 
charity, as commonly understood, in that it also warns against excessive charity 




3.3. Some accounts that disrespect  
the presumption of peerhood 
We now have an idea of what motivates the quizzical to interpret ontological 
disputes and what the central adequacy conditions for such an interpretation are. 
Again, the interpretation should (1) explain the quizzical’s sense of pointless-
ness and (2) respect the presumption of peerhood. Next, I will argue that some 
candidate accounts that are tailored to explain the sense of pointlessness fail to 




A hypothesis that the quizzical observer might propose, in order to explain the 
sense of pointlessness, is that the parties are “just speaking past one another”. 
The quizzical observer’s reaction to the disputes about revisionary ontologists’ 
theses would then be like the reaction of someone familiar with both British 
English and American English to a dispute between an Englishman and an 
American about whether chips are crisps or French fries. This is a variant of the 
interpretive option that I have referred to above (in chapter 2) as the “multiple 
languages view”; but the more specific account considered here asserts not only 
that the proponents of different ontological views speak different languages, but 
that what each ontological disputant says in its respective language (about 
ontology) is true. Further, there is no real (relevant) disagreement between the 
disputants. 
Hirsch (2009) has developed such a deflationist account of ontological 
disputes. Hirsch defines a merely verbal dispute as one in which “each side … 
ought to find it plausible to interpret the other side as speaking the truth in the 
other side’s language” (Hirsch 2009, 238). He submits that in certain ontolo-
gical disputes (such as that between endurantists and perdurantists, i.e. those 
who deny the existence of temporal parts and those who affirm it), each indeed 
ought to find it plausible to interpret the other side charitably as speaking the 
truth in the latter’s own language, and hence concludes that such disputes are 
merely verbal. 
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More precisely, the parties ought to interpret each other in this conciliatory 
manner, because otherwise they would have to attribute egregious a priori 
falsehoods or perceptual errors to their interlocutors. Hirsch interprets the 
principle of charity as the “presumption that typical speakers make perceptual 
assertions that are reasonably accurate, and that they do not assert relatively 
simple sentences that are a priori false” (Hirsch 2009, 240). Perdurantists, when 
shown a wooden stick, would assent to the sentence “In front of us there are a 
succession of highly visible wooden objects that persist for a moment and then 
go out of existence” (ibid.). If endurantists would take the perdurantists to be 
speaking the same language as endurantists themselves speak, then the 
perdurantists would seem to be making a strange perceptual mistake, which is in 
turn “linked to their general a priori mistake of asserting the false E-English 
[endurantist English] sentence, ‘Any persisting object a priori necessarily 
consists of a succession of temporal parts’” (ibid.). Charity, according to Hirsch, 
requires the endurantists to suppose instead that the perdurantists are speaking a 
different language, in which it is true that a persisting object consists of a 
succession of temporal parts. (Assuming, that is, that an interpretation of that 
alternative, perdurantist language – something like a set of translation rules into 
the endurantist language – is available for the endurantists. Hirsch argues that 
such an interpretation is indeed available.) 
Now, how exactly does such a verbalist account explain the quizzical 
observer’s sense of pointlessness: what is pointless about merely verbal 
disputes? “Merely verbal”, of course, sounds bad; but what precisely is bad 
about it? I propose that the answer is to be found in the notion of a dispute. A 
dispute is a linguistic exchange that appears to express a disagreement (a 
rational conflict between the parties’ attitudes); but it is not just that. It is also a 
certain sort of goal-driven activity. It is aimed at resolving a disagreement, by 
convergence on the truth or the right course of action. Note that while my 
definition of a disagreement as a rational conflict between the parties’ attitudes 
borrows from Plunkett’s (2015, 835), my definition of a dispute adds something 
to his. Plunkett defines a dispute as “a linguistic exchange that appears to 
express a disagreement” (Plunkett 2015, 835). On my view, the exchange 
“There are chairs; No, there aren’t” in itself, even if accompanied with non-
verbal signs of disagreement, such as shaking heads and stomping feet, is not 
necessarily a dispute. I take a dispute to be a goal-driven activity, where the 
goal is one of resolving the relevant conflict in mental states by converging on 
the truth or the right course of action. People merely appearing to express 
conflicting mental states, with no goal beyond that, is not a dispute. If it were, 
then the pointlessness of merely verbal disputes could perhaps consist in the 
parties making a mistake about whether they disagree about the relevant 
matters; but I do not think that this captures the pointlessness in question. 
Instead, I suppose that the source of the pointlessness of merely verbal disputes 
is that in merely verbal disputes, the parties already agree about the relevant 
matters and thus the goal of the dispute, namely agreement, is already 
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achieved.8 This is what is ultimately “pointless”, or more generally, “bad” about 
such disputes. Merely verbal disputes are instances of an activity that has a 
characteristic end, i.e. resolution of a disagreement, or in other words, the 
reaching of agreement; and that characteristic end is already achieved, regard-
less of the activity (the parties already agree about the relevant matters). The 
people engaging in a merely verbal dispute are thus prima facie irrational in the 
same way that people who keep washing their already clean hands are prima 
facie irrational. 
The verbalist interpretation, then, explains the quizzical observer’s sense of 
pointlessness with the fact that she is observing prima facie irrational behaviour: 
the disputants are engaging in a certain goal-driven activity, while the goal 
(agreement) has already been achieved, and the participants should be aware 
that it has already been achieved. Hirsch’s implicit argument from mere 
verbalness to the irrationality of a dispute might be the following.  
 
P1.  If the characteristic aim of an activity is achieved regardless of the activity, 
then the activity is irrational.  
P2.  A dispute is an activity that has the characteristic aim of reaching agree-
ment.  
P3.  If a dispute is merely verbal, then the aim of the dispute (agreement) is 
achieved regardless of the dispute. [This is so because in merely verbal 
disputes, the parties already agree about the relevant matters.] 
C.  If a dispute is merely verbal, then the dispute is irrational. 
 
The irrationality of a dispute where the participants already agree on the 
relevant matters, then, would explain the sense of pointlessness that observing a 
merely verbal dispute gives rise to. Now, the problem is that this account does 
not accord well with the presumption of peerhood. We can run an argument 
from the presumption of peerhood (taking the interpreter’s point of view) to a 
denial of Hirsch’s interpretation, as follows.  
 
                                                 
8 The idea that “merely verbal disputes” do not reflect disagreement is a common one, 
affirmed, for example, by Jenkins (2014). According to Jenkins, a merely verbal dispute 
occurs “when the two parties do not disagree about the subject matter(s) of their (putative) 
dispute, but merely present the appearance of doing so owing to their divergent uses of 
language” (Jenkins 2014, 11) Hirsch himself does not emphasize the parties’ agreement on 
the relevant matters: he says, again, that the parties ought to judge that each is speaking the 
truth in their language. However, if each speaks the truth about the same matters, in the 
course of the dispute, then presumably they are in agreement. If there would be disagree-
ment, then the propositions affirmed by each could not be true (recall the definition of 
“disagreement” as rational conflict between the parties’ attitudes, given above). So if the 
parties should judge that the propositions affirmed by each are true, then they should also 
judge that they do not disagree about the relevant matters.  
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P1.  If the aim of an activity is achieved regardless of the activity, then those 
engaging in such an activity are presumably importantly inferior to me (the 
interpreter) in their rational capacities.  
P2.  If a dispute is merely verbal, then the aim of the dispute (agreement) is 
achieved regardless of the dispute. 
C1. The participants to a merely verbal dispute are presumably importantly 
inferior to me in their rational capacities. 
P3. The ontological disputants are presumably not inferior to me in their 
rational capacities. 
C2. The ontological disputants are presumably not participants to a merely 
verbal dispute. 
 
The ontological disputants, on Hirsch’s account, seem to be afflicted with a 
rather grave and basic kind of irrationality. Surely the quizzical observer herself 
would not be prone to engage in goal-driven activities when the characteristic 
goal of the activity is already achieved (and the quizzical observer should be 
aware of this). Further, this deficit of rationality on the disputants’ part seems to 
be grounded in a deficit in a linguistic capacity, namely the failure to apply the 
unconsciously operative variety of the principle of charity. Hirsch writes that 
the principle of charity is “constitutive of the phenomena of language and 
meaning” (Hirsch 2009, 240), which seems to suggest that properly applying 
the principle of charity lies at the foundation of linguistic competence. The 
parties, as competent language users, ought to interpret each other as speaking 
the truth in their respective languages. Yet, somehow they fail at this, according 
to Hirsch. Presumably, this must be because they do not correctly apply the 
principle of charity. Properly applying the unconsciously operative principle of 
charity, then, is a fundamental linguistic capacity that the disputants appear to 
lack (at least locally), and one that the quizzical observer herself presumably 
possesses. 
This is not to say that whenever we diagnose a dispute as merely verbal, we 
attribute grave irrationality to the participants. Normally, merely verbal disputes 
arise because of understandable ignorance of the linguistic divergence between 
the parties. Such understandable ignorance underlying the merely verbal dispute 
would defeat the initial impression that the parties are behaving irrationally. 
Everyday verbal disputes often begin and continue in the absence of a dis-
agreement because the parties are unaware of their relevant different usages of 
language. Misled by the apparent contradiction between their assertions, they 
mistakenly believe that they disagree. For example, an American may not know 
that “chips” means French fries in British English, and an Englishman may not 
know that “chips” means crisps in American English. So they may begin, and 
for some time continue, a dispute without a disagreement on whether a man 
they both see at a distance is eating chips or not. The fact that one of them 
asserts the sentence “The man is eating chips” and the other denies it gives them 
the impression of a disagreement in need of resolving. However, this expla-
nation of how a merely verbal dispute may arise between rational people does 
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not apply to the disputing ontologists. The disputing ontologists are well aware 
of each other’s systematic differences in classifying certain sorts of (putative) 
things as “existing” or not. For example, in a dispute between a universalist and 
a nihilist, the nihilist knows that when there are two indivisible objects in an 
area, the universalist would say that there is also a third one made of those two; 
and the universalist knows that the nihilist would deny that there are any objects 
in the area besides the two indivisible ones. So there appears to be no such 
understandable ignorance of linguistic divergence in the case of the ontological 
disputes. 
My criticism of Hirsch, which may be construed as founded on the principle 
of charity, differs from Horden’s (2014) criticism, which also makes use of an 
interpretation of the principle of charity. Horden insists that charity requires not 
only that we try to make our interlocutors’ statements come out true (as Hirsch 
seems to assume), but that 
 
we should interpret each subject so that we ascribe to her intrinsic desires either 
that we hold ourselves or that explicably differ from our own intrinsic desires. 
And, ceteris paribus, we should ascribe to her whichever instrumental desires 
seem most reasonable in the light of the intrinsic desires and beliefs we ascribe 
to her (Horden 2014, 231). 
 
The strange desire that Hirsch asks the ontologists to ascribe to each other, 
according to Horden, is the desire to state trivial truths. Indeed, on Hirsch’s 
account, ontologists’ assertions of their philosophical positions would be trivial 
truths, by their opponents’ lights; and such assertions of trivial truths are indeed 
hard to make sense of. However, I do not find this requirement of charity, 
namely the requirement to attribute desires similar to one’s own desires – 
which, as Horden notes, can be found in Davidson and Lewis, among others – 
as obvious as those requirements that I have captured in my definition of the 
presumption of peerhood. (Again, the presumption of peerhood is the 
presumption that the interpreted persons are roughly our equals in terms of their 
rational, linguistic, and reflective capacities.) I do not find that we normally 
would or should expect those that we interpret to have similar desires to us. In 
fact, such a presumption may often lead us astray. When we presume that others 
have the same beliefs as us, it is because we presume our beliefs to be true and 
we expect others to be as interested in, and as good as us at, tracking the truth. 
However, with desires, there is no equivalent explanation: we do not (or, in any 
case, we should not) take most of our desires to be the right desires and we do 
not (or in any case, we should not) take others to be interested in tracking the 
right desires. This is mostly because the notion of a “right desire” is a 
controversial one, or in any case much more controversial than the notion of a 
right (true) belief. Further, fleshing out a charity-based criticism of Hirsch does 
not require us to posit the presumption of similar desires as a necessary aspect 
of charity. 
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Thomasson generalizes Horden’s criticism of Hirsch as follows: “[T]hose 
who diagnose ontological debates as mere ‘verbal disputes’ give a charitable 
interpretation of what the disputants are saying (in a way that leaves each 
uttering a truth) at the expense of having difficulties in giving a charitable inter-
pretation of what they are doing” (Thomasson 2017, 6). This formulation does 
not involve the presumption of similar desires between the interpreter and the 
interpretee as a requirement of charity. However, compared to my criticism of 
Hirsch above, it has the disadvantage of not spelling out why exactly the 
verbalist account fails to give a charitable interpretation of what the disputants 
are doing. I spelled this out as the violation of the presumption of peerhood, a 
violation that involves ascribing to the disputants inferior rational capacities that 
are exhibited in an inexplicable engagement in an activity with a characteristic 
aim (a dispute, which has the characteristic aim of reaching agreement), while 
the aim of the activity is already achieved and the parties ought to know this. 
So the verbalist account provides an explanation of the quizzical observer’s 
sense of pointlessness: the quizzical observer is observing an activity that has a 
characteristic aim (agreement), and yet that aim is already achieved. But the 
account also attributes to the disputants a serious deficit of rationality, which on 
Hirsch’s specific account appears to be in turn grounded in a serious linguistic 
deficit (failing to properly apply the principle of charity in interpreting one’s 
interlocutor). No explanation is given of how these deficits came to be; and no 
explanation appears to be within easy reach. Perhaps the verbalist account could 
be elaborated, so as to explain why the merely verbal dispute has arisen and 
why it persists, although the disputants are competent, rational humans, 
similarly to the interpreter. Until such an elaboration is provided, however, I 
take the account to disrespect the presumption of peerhood. 
 
 
3.3.2. The easy-ontological interpretation 
Let us then turn to another way in which the quizzical observer might try to 
explain the sense of pointlessness that the ontological disputes give rise to. 
According to this account, the disputants do disagree about something: namely 
about whether Fs (e.g. chairs or temporal parts) exist, in the plain English sense 
of “Fs exist”. The disputes are still pointless, according to this account, because 
the disputants address the subject matter of the disagreement in a wholly 
misguided way. 
The most well-known version of this account is Thomasson’s (2015) “easy-
ontological” deflationism. Given how she has branded this approach and how 
she tends to describe its gist, it would seem that the problem with ontology is 
that the ontologists subject easily answerable questions to needlessly long and 
complex discussions. She writes about the approach: 
 
I call this the ‘easy’ approach to existence questions, since it entails that those 
existence questions that are meaningful are not deep and difficult subjects for 
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metaphysical dispute, but rather questions to be resolved straightforwardly by 
employing our conceptual competence, often combining this with empirical 
investigations. (Thomasson 2015, 20) 
 
For example, instead of engaging in these long disputes, the ontologists could 
simply infer from the uncontroversial truth that there are particles arranged 
table-wise, the controversial truth that there are tables; such inferences, 
Thomasson holds, are licensed by linguistic competence. However, she quali-
fies this general view, allowing that not all philosophical existence questions are 
easily answerable – for example, whether there is free will requires hard work 
thinking about what free will is. The important point, for Thomasson, is that the 
hard work is conceptual rather than somehow mysteriously metaphysical: 
 
[T]he general point remains that a great many of currently disputed existence 
questions can be straightforwardly answered; and where difficulties arise, these 
are to be resolved by conceptual methods (difficult though those may be) rather 
than by any epistemically metaphysical procedure. (Thomasson 2015, 45) 
 
So the relevant existence questions (which Thomasson takes to be the ordinary 
language existence questions) might be hard to answer, but in any case, they 
should be answered by empirical methods and/or conceptual analysis, and not 
by any specifically metaphysical methods, involving, say, appeals to parsimony 
or intuitions about what the world is really like. As with Hirsch, I will once 
again not go into the details of her justification for this view. As she admits 
herself, she does not have any “decisive arguments” against theorizing about 
existence questions in the “neo-Quinean” vein – that is, the kind of theorizing 
that involves appeals to theoretical virtues (Thomasson 2015, 324). Mainly she 
defends her deflationist approach by indicating that it is a coherent way to 
understand and approach existence questions, which is pragmatically justified 
with its promise of escaping the mysteries of a specifically metaphysical 
methodology. 
How does this account explain the sense of pointlessness? One way in which 
ontological disputes turn out to be pointless, on Thomasson’s account, is 
outlined by her as follows:  
 
Suppose existence questions can be answered easily – often by trivial arguments 
from uncontroversial premises, and always by invoking nothing more than 
competence with language and reasoning and straightforward empirical know-
ledge. That would render ontological disputes pointless in a whole new way, 
while remaining coherent with our everyday uses of existence questions and 
avoiding the epistemic mysteries of hard metaphysics. (Thomasson 2015, 318–
219) 
 
Thomasson here says that if existence questions were answered easily, that 
would render ontological disputes pointless, in some way. More precisely, the 
argument seems to be the following.  
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P1.  If a question is easily answerable, then a dispute devoted to that question is 
pointless.  
P2.  Ontological disputes are devoted to existence questions.  
P3.  Existence questions are easily answerable.  
C.  Ontological disputes are pointless.  
 
Much of Thomasson’s work is devoted to justifying P3: showing that ordinary 
language existence questions can indeed be answered easily. For example, the 
question of whether houses exist is answered easily, by looking out of the 
window on the street and applying one’s linguistic competence to interpret the 
observations; or by relying on one’s confidence that there are particles arranged 
house-wise and drawing the trivial conclusion that there are houses. However, a 
major threat to the argument is the possible meaning shift in “existence 
questions” between P2 and P3: are the existence questions that are easily 
answerable (the ordinary-language existence questions) the same as the 
existence questions discussed by metaphysicians? If not, then the easiness of 
ordinary-language existence questions is just beside the point, when we are 
interested in the worthwhileness of metaphysicians’ ontological debates. The 
following argument purports to show that if ordinary-language existence 
questions are easily answerable by a certain method, but metaphysicians 
painstakingly address their existence questions by another method, then the 
ordinary-language existence questions are presumably not the existence 
questions debated by metaphysicians.  
 
P1.  If a question is easily answerable by method A, then persons who are 
roughly equally rational to me would not painstakingly address it by 
method B. 
P2.  Ordinary-language existence questions are easily answerable by method A 
(conceptual analysis and empirical observation). 
P3.  The parties to ontological disputes painstakingly address certain existence 
questions by method B (e.g. appeals to theoretical virtues). 
P4.  The parties to ontological disputes are roughly equally rational to me. 
C.  The parties to ontological disputes do not address ordinary-language 
existence questions. 
 
The point can also be put as follows. Suppose that the relevant ordinary lan-
guage existence questions (e.g. “Are there houses?”) are indeed as easy as 
Thomasson supposes. Now, if I, the interpreter of ontological disputes, would 
be interested in whether houses exist, in the ordinary English sense, I would not 
seek out another philosopher and start a long theoretical debate about it. I would 
just look out of the window on the street and have my answer. So why should I 
suppose that metaphysicians think that engaging in long disputes with other 
philosophers is a good way to go about finding out whether houses exist, in that 
ordinary sense? Are they so much less rational than me? If I think that meta-
physicians are roughly as rational as me, not particularly prone to perceptual 
75 
errors and roughly as competent English speakers as me, then I can presume 
that they also would not spend much time arguing about questions they could 
answer by looking out of the window. 
So the easy-ontological account too appears to explain the quizzical ob-
server’s sense of pointlessness at the cost of disrespecting the presumption of 
peerhood. The account makes the disputants look particularly bad at choosing 
appropriate means to their ends. Here, the problem is not that the end of the 
dispute is already achieved, but that it is pursued in an inadequate way. (The 
relevant “end” itself, relative to which irrationality is displayed, is also different 
from the previous case: on the verbalist account, the end was agreement; here, 
the end is not agreement, but establishing the truth about the subject matter of 
the dispute.) Further, as in the previous case, the deficit in rationality is 
apparently grounded in a linguistic deficit. The reason why ontologists address 
existence questions (e.g. “Are there chairs?”) in such a wrong-headed way must 
presumably be that they do not understand what those questions mean. Yet, the 
questions are phrased in the ontologists’ native language and often involve only 
common everyday terms (like “table”, “exist” or “there are”). What would 
explain this local, yet pervasive deficit in their linguistic competence? 
The nature and gravity of these deficits in rational and linguistic capacities, 
again, is such that it is implausible that the quizzical herself is similarly 
afflicted. Further, no account of understandable error is provided. As with the 
verbalist account, then, we may conclude that the easy-ontological account 
disrespects the presumption of peerhood, until some explanation of the relevant 
errors on the ontologists’ part is provided. 
 
 
3.3.3. The primitivist account: the deflationist version 
So the quizzical observer must continue the search for the best explanation of 
the sense of pointlessness. The verbalist and the easy-ontological accounts 
explain the sense of pointlessness, but as they currently stand, they seem to fail 
to meet the other adequacy criterion; namely respecting the presumption of 
peerhood. 
Although the presumption of peerhood should make us wary of the verbalist 
interpretation, Hirsch’s idea of quantifier variance does point to a significant 
feature of ontological disputes: the parties’ systematically different patterns of 
using “exist”, “there is” and similar expressions. As we saw, the parties’ aware-
ness of these systematic differences makes the case dissimilar to ordinary 
confusion-based verbal disputes. How should we interpret the situation, then, if 
we are duly reluctant to dismiss the disputes as merely verbal? One option is to 
suppose that, despite their different usages of “exist”, the ontologists neverthe-
less share a primitive (meta-) concept of existence. The somewhat parallel case 
for basic moral concepts may be useful for understanding how this is possible. 
Arguing against moral naturalists’ attempts to posit supervenience relations 
between moral and natural properties, Horgan and Timmons (1992) proposed 
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the following Moral Twin Earth thought experiment. As in Putnam’s original 
thought experiment, everything on the Moral Twin Earth is pretty much the 
same as on Earth, except for the following. The Earthlings’ moral judgments 
and statements are regulated by a certain set of natural properties and the Twin 
Earthlings’ twin-moral judgments and statements are regulated by a different set 
of natural properties. For example, the Earthlings might base their moral 
judgments on the actors’ motivating psychological states and Twin Earthlings 
might base their twin-moral judgments on the consequences of actions (as 
defined by further criteria). Regardless of the systematically different judgments 
about what and who is good and what should be done, twin moral discourse 
“operates in Twin Earth society and culture in much the manner that moral 
discourse operates on Earth” (Horgan and Timmons 1992, 245). Horgan and 
Timmons think that reflection on the thought experiment should make us 
conclude that the Earth-based explorers of the Moral Twin Earth would be right 
in judging that the twin-moral terms of Twin English have the same meaning as 
the English counterpart terms. 
The reason for supposing that there is a sameness of meaning is that after the 
Earthlings become aware of the systematically different usage of moral terms, 
“[t]here is no hermeneutical pressure to revise the original interpretation of 
Moral Twin Earthlings as having a moral vocabulary that they use to express 
moral beliefs” (Horgan and Timmons 1992, 247). Perhaps an even stronger 
point is warranted: there is hermeneutic pressure to interpret the people on 
Moral Twin Earth as sharing the same general moral concepts (like “good” or 
“right”). Indeed, Horgan and Timmons draw the stronger conclusion later on:  
 
What seems wrongheaded is to chalk up the contemplated differences to diffe-
rences in the meanings of “good” and “right”. In fact, here the question about 
what really is the fundamental right-making property seems to be an open 
question, and one over which Earthlings and Twin Earthlings disagree (ibid., 
248).  
 
So here we have a way of accounting for systematically distinct patterns of 
usage without judging the dispute to be merely verbal: the parties may share a 
general meta-concept expressed by the term. Chalmers apparently supports this 
view about ontological disputes. More precisely, he thinks that the disputing 
metaphysicians share a meta-concept of “exist”, which they all use to express, 
“or at least to attempt to express,” the primitive concept of absolute existential 
quantification. Uses of this concept “attempt to quantify over absolutely 
everything – that is, over everything that exists, in the most fundamental sense 
of ‘exists’” (Chalmers 2009, 91). He even finds it “obvious” that ontological 
discourse functions as if there was such a concept. 
It is unclear whether Horgan and Timmons’ motivation for supposing that 
moral discourse involves primitive moral concepts also applies to the existence 
concept. If we discovered different practices of quantification on a faraway 
planet, it is not at all apparent that we should take ourselves to genuinely 
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disagree with the inhabitants of that planet about what exists, instead of 
supposing that they speak a different language. However, a different argument 
can be made for the conclusion that a primitive existence concept is in play, in 
ontological disputes. The reason, essentially, is that there are certain prima facie 
reasons to consider the dispute a verbal one: the disputants apply key terms to 
different things; however, they are not inclined to end the dispute when this 
difference is pointed out or when the use of those terms is disallowed. Chalmers 
pursues this line of argument when he classifies ontological disputes as among 
those verbal-looking disputes that are hard to resolve, by means of disallowing 
the use of the crucial term, “exist”: 
 
Suppose that a mereological nihilist (one who denies that there are any com-
posite objects) and a nonnihilist disagree over “Only particles exist”. We might 
bar “exist” and introduce terms such as “exists1” as a quantifier that ranges only 
over simple objects and “exists2” so that “There exists2 an F” comes to “There 
exist1 simples arranged F-wise”. The parties might then agree that only particles 
exist1 and that not only particles exist2. Is there a residual disagreement? At least 
according to the parties, there is a residual disagreement: it is over whether only 
particles exist and over whether existence1 coincides with existence. Once certain 
basic quantifiers are barred, this dispute may become impossible to state. But 
according to the parties, we should not conclude that the dispute is verbal. 
(Chalmers 2011, 544) 
 
One option, then, would be to say that since ontologists’ dispute cannot be 
resolved by disambiguation (e.g. introducing the terms “exist1” and “exist2” for 
the relevant concepts), the dispute is not merely verbal. Further, one could say 
that the primitivist account is a plausible alternative to the verbalist account: the 
primitivist account also makes sense of the parties’ different application of the 
existence concept, and unlike the verbalist account, it makes sense of the 
parties’ failure to end the dispute by disambiguation. On this basis, Chalmers 
finds it plausible to suppose that the parties to ontological disputes use 
expressions like “exist” at least attempting to express a common concept of 
existence. 
One might wonder why this must be a primitive concept and what precisely 
this primitiveness consists in. That a primitive concept is in play, according to 
Chalmers, is “reflected in the fact that when we try to resolve the dispute, at 
each point the concept of existence (or a cognate concept) reoccurs” (Chalmers 
2009, 91). In this regard, Chalmers finds these disputes similar to disputes on 
what one ought to do: like “ought”, the ontologists’ “exists” is “especially 
resistant to analysis in more basic terms” (ibid.). This is, then, how the 
primitivity of the ontologists’ existence concept is understood: as resistance to 
analysis in more basic terms. And, again, the concept appears to be primitive, 
because the term keeps reoccurring and cannot be dispensed with, in favour of 
other, more basic terms, such that the dispute could be carried on by discussing 
whether these more basic terms apply, instead.  
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Now, one way to further elaborate on the primitivist account is to insist that 
the primitive concept in question is defective: the sentences that the ontologists 
appear to disagree over (e.g. “Tables exist”) do not have determinate content. (It 
is unclear whether the parties really disagree, in this case, or in other words, 
whether there is a rational conflict between their attitudes towards the meaning-
less sentence.) Chalmers suspects that the primitive existence concept is indeed 
a defective, empty pseudo-concept: “something that functions in our thought 
and talk like a concept, in some respects, while falling short in other respects 
(including respects tied to truth-evaluability, perhaps)” (Chalmers 2009, 92).  
This deflationist primitivist account, as we might call it, alike with the 
previously considered accounts (verbalism and easy ontology), explains the 
quizzical observer’s sense of pointlessness rather well. Again, the disputants 
display an irrationality that is bound to irritate an astute observer. In this case, 
the disputes cannot possibly achieve their end of resolving the disagreement by 
convergence on truth, because there is no truth of the matter (nor a right course 
of action). On the verbalist account, the problem was that the dispute’s goal 
(agreement) is already achieved; on the easy-ontological account, the problem 
was that the goal (the truth of the matter) should be pursued by different means; 
and here, the problem is that the goal (again, the truth of the matter) is only a 
mirage and cannot be attained at all. That makes the dispute pointless, and the 
pointlessness of the dispute explains the sense of pointlessness experienced by 
the quizzical observer. 
And once again, the account appears to disrespect the presumption of 
peerhood. Pursuing an end that cannot possibly be attained, because it is only a 
mirage, is irrational, unless one is understandably ignorant of the end being a 
mere mirage. No account of understandable ignorance is provided here. And 
again, as in the previous accounts, the disputants’ deficit of rationality seems to 
be grounded in a local linguistic deficit. The disputants inexplicably fail to use 
language in a meaningful, truth-apt way when they do metaphysics. As with the 
previous accounts, these deficits are not such that the quizzical interpreter 
would plausibly be equally afflicted. Perhaps, again, one could explain how the 
disputants can fail to use language in a meaningful and truth-apt way when they 
do metaphysics, without attributing deficient cognitive capacities to the 
disputants. However, until then, there is some pressure to consider the 
alternative accounts available. 
 
 
3.3.4. The realist primitivist account 
Having put aside the previous accounts, as failing to respect the presumption of 
peerhood (at least as they currently stand), the quizzical observer might think of 
a somewhat different way to explain the sense of pointlessness. Maybe the 
observer herself is somehow deficient, in comparison with the disputants; and 
her deficiency keeps her from seeing the point of the disputes. Specifically, the 
quizzical observer, in comparison with the disputants, might lack competence 
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with the primitive metaphysical concept of existence – competence that is 
essential for understanding what is going on in the ontological discussion. This 
realist primitivist account is somewhat similar to the deflationist primitivist 
account. According to both accounts, ontologists try to pose the question about 
the existence of Fs in a special primitive sense of “exist”. However, according 
to the realist primitivist account, ontologists succeed in this attempt. 
For example, Hirsch suggests that Sider might have in mind such a 
primitivist realist account: 
 
I think that Sider’s idea is that ontological arguments themselves reveal what the 
arguments are about. Those who have an aptitude for ontology become engaged 
with these arguments in a meaningful way. They thereby display their under-
standing of Ontologese and what is meant by ‘logical joints’, though they have 
no way to explain these matters in other terms. (Hirsch 2011, 195) 
 
As one might expect, the realist primitivist account is unpopular with real-life 
quizzical observers. It is not obvious how to articulate the quizzical observer’s 
frustration with the account into an argument against it, however. One might 
want to say that the realist primitivist’s move is somehow an uncommendable 
one in philosophy: that “[i]t is bad philosophical strategy to treat certain notions 
as so fundamental (or “basic”) as to resist analysis, while at the same time 
affording them such central significance as to require that their meaning be 
relatively clear to all” (Kraut 2016, 43). However, perhaps it just is the case that 
such a primitive concept is in play in ontological disputes, and some people 
(such as the quizzical observer) lack the requisite ability that is needed to 
acquire the primitive concept via exposure to ontological arguments. It surely 
cannot be a “bad strategy” to describe truly what is going on in the disputes. 
My suggestion is that the problem with this account as well is that it 
disrespects the presumption of peerhood. In this case, the problem is not that the 
quizzical observer would assign a deficit of the relevant capacities to the 
disputants, but that she would assign a surplus of such capacities. After all, the 
quizzical observer has gone through the same process through which the 
disputants supposedly acquired competence with the primitive concept of 
existence. Just like the disputants, the quizzical observer has read books and 
articles on metaphysics, attended talks on metaphysics and participated in 
discussions on metaphysics. However, unlike the disputants, the quizzical 
observer has somehow failed to become competent with the crucial concept, 
according to the realist primitivist account. That could only be the case, it 
seems, if the quizzical observer lacks a certain kind of linguistic capacity in 
comparison to the disputants. Since she is otherwise roughly an epistemic equal 
with the disputants, it seems odd that she would lack this specific, local 
linguistic capacity that is necessary for doing and appreciating metaphysics – 
the “aptitude for ontology”. 
So once again: while the realist primitivist account would explain the 
quizzical observer’s sense of pointlessness by appealing to the fact that she fails 
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to grasp the special primitive concept of existence that is essential for grasping 
the point of the disputes, the account disrespects the presumption of peerhood. 
 
 
3.4. The metalinguistic account 
I have now put aside the verbalist, easy-ontological, deflationist primitivist and 
realist primitivist accounts, as inconsistent with the presumption of peerhood (at 
least as they currently stand). An account that fares better in this regard, I will 
argue, is a certain metalinguistic account; and we can also explain the quizzical 
observer’s sense of pointlessness within this account. The proposed account 
incorporates elements from three main sources: Plunkett and Sundell’s (2013) 
framework for analysing apparently object-level discussions as covert 
“metalinguistic negotiations”, Sider’s (2011) idea of ontology as the search for 
the most joint-carving language, and Bennett’s (2009) epistemicist deflationism. 
Before turning to the precise account I defend, however, I will look at existing 
work that takes the metalinguistic approach to interpreting disputes in ontology 
and philosophy more generally. 
 
 
3.4.1. Metalinguistic analyses of ontological and other 
discussions: background 
The gist of the suggested account is already present in Carnap. He writes that 
the existence question asked by metaphysicians is a “pseudoquestion, that is, 
one disguised in the form of a theoretical question while in fact it is non-
theoretical; in the present case it is the practical problem of whether or not to 
incorporate into the language the new linguistic forms which constitute the 
framework of numbers” (Carnap 1950b/1956, 209). Carnap may well be under-
stood as saying that metaphysicians are really asking the practical question 
about whether and how to revise our language, while they are wrong in thinking 
of the question and presenting it as a theoretical one. Then, Carnap would turn 
out not to target and deflate ontology itself, but only metaphysicians’ under-
standing of what they do when they do ontology. 
Manley, when he briefly considers interpreting Carnap along these lines, 
notes that the view faces the challenge of providing “a compositional semantics 
in which certain sentences that have the form of declarative, claim-making 
sentences are treated as of a different semantic type from ordinary declarative 
sentences” (Manley 2009, 16). However, there is no need to provide an unusual 
semantics for ontological sentences that appear to be declarative. The linguistic 
proposals can be conveyed pragmatically. Here is an example of how a 
disagreement can be about what the parties should do, while their utterances are 
in declarative form.  
John: “We will go to Italy for our honeymoon.”  
Judy: “No, we will go to France.” 
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Suppose that John and Judy do not take themselves to be psychics and they 
have not yet established plans about where to go. Then, the natural inter-
pretation is that they are negotiating their travel destination in a resolute tone. 
People commonly phrase their proposals or requests in declarative form, so that 
these look like statements about what will happen: “You will not leave this 
room until I am back”, “Our child will not go to a boarding school”, etc. Now, 
here is an example (Plunkett and Sundell 2013, 15) of linguistic proposals being 
negotiated in declarative form, via use (not mention) of the contested term 
(“spicy”):  
(a) That chilli is spicy!  
(b) No, it’s not spicy at all.  
Plunkett and Sundell suggest that it is natural to interpret the parties as 
negotiating what the spiciness-threshold should be, for the term “spicy” to apply 
in the context. Indeed, it seems like a generally sensible policy to consider such 
an interpretation when dealing with a dispute that seems to be about whether Fs 
are Gs (or similar), where one party systematically categorizes Fs as Gs and the 
other party does not, and the parties are aware of this difference. We need not 
suppose that the parties share a primitive meta-concept of G and stop the 
explanation there, if we can find reasons that each party might have to insist on 
their preferred usage of “G” in the shared context. 
Plunkett and Sundell coined the term “metalinguistic negotiation” for such 
disputes (Plunkett and Sundell 2013). Their original focus was on interpreting 
disputes involving normative or evaluative vocabulary as covert metalinguistic 
negotiations. Thomasson (2017) and Belleri (2017) have recently applied 
Plunkett and Sundell’s framework to metaphysical disputes in general and 
ontological disputes in particular. Plunkett (2015) himself has also applied this 
analysis to certain disputes in metaphysics (those concerning grounding, 
supervenience and real definitions), but not specifically to the kinds of 
ontological disputes that concern us here. There are also similar analyses of 
ontological disputes suggested by some who do not use the term “metalinguistic 
negotiation” and do not make use of Plunkett and Sundell’s framework. As I 
already proposed here, Carnap (1950b) can be interpreted as suggesting a 
similar interpretation of ontological disputes; such an interpretation of Carnap is 
also developed by Kraut (2016). Kraut labels this an “expressivist account”, and 
takes the parties to be expressing “pragmatically motivated commitments to the 
adoption of certain linguistic forms” (Kraut 2016, 30). 
The topic of improving language (in particular, concepts) as a concern of 
philosophers extends beyond the interpretation of ontology and also beyond 
detection of the metalinguistic nature of apparently object-level disputes. 
Carnap directly addressed the topic of improving concepts – “explication”, as 
he called it – in his Logical Foundations of Probability (Carnap 1950a). Eklund 
observes that Quine and his followers have tended to share Carnap’s concern 
with conceptual revision: “both Quine and latter-day Quineans are more 
concerned with what sorts of conceptual tools to employ than with what 
conceptual tools we happen to find ourselves with” (Eklund 2017, 194). One 
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motivation for improving rather than simply analysing concepts is that ordinary 
concepts are importantly indeterminate or “messy” and thus an attempt to 
analyse such concepts, by providing necessary and sufficient conditions for 
their application, is bound to come out empty (Eklund 2017, 194). Another is 
that even if ordinary concepts were clear, determinate and straightforward to 
analyse, the ordinary concepts might not be the ones that serve our interests the 
best, among the space of possible concepts: “the concepts that we find ourselves 
with are only some among the possible concepts we could have and use” 
(Eklund 2017, 195). One issue in conceptual engineering is thus which concepts 
we should use at all. Another is which terms we should pair with which 
concepts. Chalmers lists some reasons for caring about this second issue, the 
“ethics of terminology”: “for nonideal agents such as ourselves, the accepted 
meaning for a key term will make a difference to which concepts are 
highlighted, which questions can easily be raised, and which associations and 
inferences are naturally made” (Chalmers 2011, 542). 
Now, although philosophers often address these metalinguistic issues 
directly, it is plausible that they also sometimes debate them in the “material 
mode” or at the “object level”, as opposed to the “formal mode” or “meta-
linguistic level”.9 As was mentioned earlier, Plunkett and Sundell (Plunkett and 
Sundell 2013, Plunkett 2015) have been developing a theoretical framework for 
diagnosing various everyday and philosophical disputes as covert metalinguistic 
negotiations. By a “metalinguistic negotiation”, they mean a “dispute in which 
speakers each use (rather than mention) a term to advocate for a normative view 
about how that term should be used” (Plunkett 2015, 832). For example, the 
disputants might say “This is art” and “This is not art,” referring to an abstract 
piece with “this” and using the term “art” to advocate for a normative view 
about how the term “art” should be used. Although the literal content of the 
parties’ utterances in such disputes concerns object-level matters (e.g. whether 
this or that object is art), the disputants pragmatically convey conflicting views 
about which concept should be paired with a given term. These metalinguistic 
disagreements expressed in the disputes are in turn motivated by deeper 
disagreements about non-linguistic, usually normative matters, such as what is 
valuable and how we should live. In the case of “art”, for example, the 
motivating non-linguistic disagreements could be about which objects we 
should value in a certain way, place in museums for exhibition and 
preservation, and so on. 
As was also mentioned, Thomasson (2017) applies this analysis to meta-
physical disputes, such as disputes about free will between compatibilists and 
incompatibilists, and disputes about personal identity. Regarding the ontological 
disputes that most commonly give rise to the quizzical phenomenology (e.g. 
exchanges that appear to be about whether “ordinary objects” exist), however, it 
is not clear whether Thomasson takes them to be covert metalinguistic nego-
                                                 
9The distinction between the material and the formal mode of speech originates from 
Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language (1934). 
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tiations or not. If she does, she apparently does not take them to be very sensible 
ones at that. In the next section, I will argue against her criticism of such 
disputes, considered as metalinguistic negotiations. Then, I will propose an 
alternative, Siderian metalinguistic account. Combined with Bennett’s episte-




3.4.2. The problems with the practical metalinguistic accounts 
In this section, I will criticize existing attempts to analyse disputes in 
revisionary ontology in a metalinguistic vein, focusing on Thomasson (2017). 
Her account, as well as Belleri’s (2017) are species of what I have called the 
“practical metalinguistic view” in listing the main interpretive options regarding 
revisionary ontology. On this view, the ontological discussants (or more 
specifically, disputants) are seen as discussing whether and how we should 
revise our language, and this is seen as a practical problem, as opposed to a 
theoretical one. According to the practical metalinguistic view, the ontologists 
are not trying to find out facts about what the world is like, but deciding on how 
(in which terms and which concepts) to speak and think, in the light of our 
interests, values, and preferences.  
Thomasson (2017), in proposing a practical metalinguistic account of 
metaphysical disputes, focuses on those disputes that seem to have social 
significance (such as the disputes on free will and personal identity); but she 
also considers the application of Plunkett and Sundell’s framework to 
ontological disputes of the kind that typically give rise to quizzical pheno-
menology: 
 
the sorts of ontological debates that Carnap had in mind, which fill the pages of 
the mainstream metaphysics articles, and are the targets of suspicions that they 
are either verbal or easily resolvable – debates, say, about whether mereological 
sums, tables, numbers, properties, and the like exist. (Thomasson 2017, 17) 
 
Her overall judgment appears to be that such disputes cannot be legitimized by 
the metalinguistic analysis. This is because we cannot understand eliminativism 
about tables, for example, as the view that the term “table” serves a problematic 
function and should thus not be used. According to Thomasson, the function of 
“table” is 
 
to enable us to keep track of our environment … in ways that enable us to more 
simply arrange dinner parties, furnish our homes, cope with our dining and writing 
and other practices, perhaps as part of a social/artefactual environment that plays a 
part in reinforcing a web of behavioural norms. (Thomasson 2017, 18) 
 
Of course, this is a useful function to be served and there also seems to be no 
problem with how the concept currently associated with “table” serves it. Even 
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if using the term-concept pair involves us in some hidden contradiction between 
our commitments, this does not justify giving up the pair if it serves its 
important purpose well; perhaps some modification is then in order (Thomasson 
2017, 18). 
Thomasson here appears to pay insufficient attention to the possibility that 
the same concepts can be employed for different purposes in different contexts, 
such as the “everyday” context and the “ontological” context. I wish to resist 
the idea of each concept having a single function. If eliminativists about tables 
were insisting that the function served by the concept of table in ordinary 
discourse is a bad one, or that the concept of table does not serve this function 
well enough, then this would indeed be silly of them. However, we can employ 
concepts for various purposes; and it is more plausible that the eliminativists are 
saying that we should change the way we use concepts in the ontological 
context.  
The same point applies to Hofweber’s remark on interpreting ontological 
disputes about numbers:  
 
As a practical question it is undisputed that number talk is useful and great. … 
Whatever question other than the standard question philosophers are in fact 
asking when they continue to ask whether there are numbers is thus not the 
question whether it is useful to describe the world in the numbers language 
(Hofweber 2016a, 21–22). 
 
This inference seems too quick. The “usefulness” of a piece of language can be 
considered relative to different purposes for which we might want to employ it 
in different contexts (including theoretical purposes), not just relative to its 
original or most common function. So we cannot rule out the possibility that 
ontologists are sensibly disputing whether to use the concept ‘table’ or number 
concepts, merely on the ground that the concepts obviously serve their purposes 
in ordinary discourse or mathematics well enough. Granted, if we wish to claim 
that ontologists are sensibly discussing whether and how to use such concepts in 
the ontological context, for special ontological purposes, we must explain what 
the ontological context is all about and what those special purposes are. I will 
take up this task in the next section. Before this, however, I will also look into 
Belleri’s (2017) application of Plunkett and Sundell’s framework for the 
analysis of ontological disputes. 
Belleri suggests the metalinguistic analysis as a move against Hirsch’s 
diagnosis that the dispute between the endurantist and the perdurantist is merely 
verbal. She recommends the metalinguistic analysis as “the best way of 
explaining the persisting intuition of disagreement in the face of the presence of 
a verbal dispute” (Belleri 2017, 2215). Belleri’s account, in contrast to mine in 
this chapter, seems not to be aimed at understanding what particular ontologists 
are doing, but rather at finding a way for a deflationist to think of the enterprise 
of philosophical ontology, conceived of in some more abstract way. This allows 
her to eventually leave aside the interpretively more plausible idea that 
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ontologists are in the business of identifying a joint-carving language and 
conclude instead that an ontological dispute “could be taken as a stipulative 
enterprise in which the parties aim to decide which language – and thus which 
ontological commitments – to choose given certain practical (or even aesthetic) 
interests or standards” (Belleri 2017, 2224). Before Belleri arrives at this 
conclusion, her account has similarities to mine in that she also suggests that the 
deflationist should adopt Bennett’s (2009) idea that the theoretical virtues of the 
relevant languages are on a par; and she takes the theoretical virtues to be 
possibly indicative of joint-carving. In these regards, her account has 
advantages over Thomasson’s (2017), who suggests that the metalinguistic 
analysis, applied to the disputes over ordinary objects and the like, would imply 
that the ontologists are arguing about whether we should preserve or modify the 
talk of tables, etc., in everyday discourse. Still, I do not see why the deflationist 
would be compelled to consider the standards in play in ontological disputes to 
be practical or aesthetic, after accepting that the theories are equivalent in terms 
of their theoretical virtues. 
I find both Thomasson’s and Belleri’s eventual emphasis on practical (or 
pragmatic or aesthetic) considerations as those that drive the ontologists’ 
metalinguistic negotiation implausible; at least in so far as we are interpreting 
the ontologists from the quizzical observers’ point of view. From that point of 
view, it does not make sense to say that the ontologists ultimately disagree 
about the practical or aesthetic value of ways of speaking. That would arguably 
again disrespect the presumption of peerhood, by attributing an inexplicably 
inferior reflective capacity (that is, an inferior ability to understand what they 
are doing) to the disputants. Ontologists take themselves to be investigating the 
way the world is; other things being equal, it would be preferable to find an 
account that sustains this central feature of their self-conception. Further, the 
appeal to theoretical virtues would not make much sense, given the practical 
metalinguistic views: how are theoretical virtues supposed to amount to 
practical considerations? What ends (if not the end of representing the world as 
it is) are they supposed to be a means to? Granted, there is some appeal in the 
suggestion that the relevant theoretical virtues are really aesthetic criteria; a 
view along those lines has been defended by Benovsky (2016). If theoretical 
virtues were indeed ultimately aesthetic virtues, then it would make sense for 
ontologists to argue about how to make our language more beautiful, by 
appealing to theoretical virtues. However, the inferior reflective capacity issue 
would remain: ontologists, I assume, would adamantly deny that their project is 
about how to make our language more beautiful. Their project, they would say, 
is about finding out what reality is like. This issue does not seem to have much 
to do with the issue of finding a beautiful language. This reflective mistake is 
not the kind of mistake about our purposes that we, the interpreters, would be 
inclined to make. We would not find out that while we thought we were talking 
about what the world is like, we were really looking for a beautiful language in 
which to describe the world. So there seems to be a problem with respecting the 
presumption of peerhood here. 
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Finally, it is unclear how the sense of pointlessness is to be explained on 
such practical metalinguistic accounts. Does the sense of pointlessness arise just 
because the disputants appear to be having a merely verbal dispute, while they 
are really engaging in practical metalinguistic negotiation? Then we would 
expect the sense of pointlessness to disappear, once the quizzical observer 
adopts the proposed metalinguistic account instead of the verbalist account; but 
it is unclear whether the sense of pointlessness would indeed disappear. Also, 
not all quizzical observers who experience the sense of pointlessness share the 
impression that the disputes are merely verbal (for example, some instead have 
the impression that the disputants approach the issue by the wrong methods). So 
this explanation of the sense of pointlessness (arising from the impression that 
the dispute is merely verbal) does not apply to all the quizzical observers. 
 
 
3.4.3. The Siderian theoretical metalinguistic account 
What could then be the revisionary ontologists’ reasons for insisting on a given 
way of using language in the metaphysical context, i.e. in the ontology room? In 
the last section, I put aside the option that it could be practical interests or the 
desire to find the most beautiful language (in combination with the belief that 
theoretical virtues are features that make a language beautiful). What are the 
other options? Insistence on one’s own way of using language might sometimes 
just be a product of conservative character, coupled with inexperience with local 
or individual linguistic differences; but this is also implausible in the onto-
logists’ case. Ontologists hardly ever bring up the generally accepted practices 
of quantification (either in the metaphysical community or in the broader 
community) in support of their view or as an objection to someone else’s. On 
the contrary, the reasons that revisionary ontologists give for and against saying 
that something exists are remarkably independent of what other people and 
other ontologists say exists. Let us leave aside conservatism as a motivation, 
then.  
I draw instead on Sider (2011) for an idea of why ontologists might want to 
insist on their way of using language, in the ontology room. Sider himself does 
not straightforwardly propose it as an interpretation of ontological disputes. He 
rather presents it as something that ontologists could reasonably switch to 
doing, instead of what they currently do. Also, his proposal is rather that the 
ontologists ought to speak the language that is appropriate to the ontology room 
(Ontologese), not that they should speak about what that language would be 
like. Nevertheless, Sider’s core ideas about ontology are useful for developing a 
theoretical (as opposed to practical) metalinguistic account. 
According to the Siderian metalinguistic negotiation account that I propose, 
the aim in the ontology room is to identify the conceptual scheme that reflects 
the world’s objective structure, or “carves at the joints”. On this account, the 
eliminativist ontologists, when they say “Tables don’t exist”, are insisting that 
the concept of table, or the concept of existence that allows quantification over 
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tables (I will remain neutral between these options), is not among the optimal 
representational resources, given the aim of carving at the joints. More 
generally, according to this account, revisionary ontologists are debating which 
conceptual scheme is best suited for the purpose of joint-carving representation. 
And it is the revisionary ontologists’ shared understanding that the choice 
between the competing conceptual schemes is to be made by weighing the 
relevant theoretical virtues of the schemes: comparing how well the schemes 
fare in terms of criteria like simplicity, explanatory power, and elegance. 
I do not want to say anything too specific about what “concepts” are, but 
what I have in mind is close to what Machery calls the psychologists’ concept 
of ‘concept’: “A concept of x is a body of knowledge about x that is stored in 
long-term memory and that is used by default in the processes underlying most, 
if not all, higher cognitive competences when these processes result in judg-
ments about x” (Machery 2009, 12). As Machery also notes, one should not 
read too much into the word “knowledge” here: unlike philosophers, psycho-
logists apparently do not think that knowledge needs to be true or justified. The 
important part is that concepts are in individual minds (stored in long-term 
memory) and we draw on them to make judgments about the things that these 
concepts are about. Further, I suppose that we can talk about “shared” concepts, 
the concepts of a language shared by many individuals, by appeal to the 
overlaps between individuals’ concepts, i.e. the bodies of knowledge in 
individual minds. 
There are various options for understanding how concepts are “bodies of 
knowledge”; in particular, there are various views about what form the body of 
knowledge takes. Sometimes, the body of knowledge is thought to involve a 
mental image of a prototypical satisfier of the concept (e.g. a picture of a typical 
dog, in the case of the concept of a dog), or a set of features associated with the 
concept (e.g. “has four legs, has a tail, barks…”), or something like a proto-
scientific theory of the satisfiers of the concept (e.g. that dogs are a biological 
species – which would allow us to find out that a given thing that looks like a 
dog and has superficial features that we have associated with dogs is not really a 
dog). I am neutral between these options. Further, any of these options, I 
suppose, can accommodate the talk of concepts as rules for using expressions: 
our concepts tell us which judgments we are allowed to form, using the relevant 
expressions. I am neutral on whether the concepts tell us how to use an 
expression via mental images or feature lists or something else. What is impor-
tant is that the body of knowledge, whatever form it takes, leads us to make 
judgments, for example, about whether a concept applies in a given situation. 
Revisionary ontologists, on my view, are concerned with the consistency, 
elegance and simplicity of the set of those judgments, conceived of as our 
theory of the world. 
I also assume that not all the desiderata for a set of concepts are inscribed 
into the “bodies of knowledge”, or the mental rules for using the relevant 
expressions. For example, my concept of a table does not itself include the 
desideratum that the concept should be applied in a contradiction-free way. This 
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allows us to talk about improving concepts as a distinct enterprise from 
inquiring into how the concepts, as they currently are, ought to be applied. 
With this metalinguistic account of revisionary ontology in mind, the reasons 
given by ontologists in the disputes make good sense. Take, for example, the 
desideratum of avoiding contradictions between our judgments. Concepts that 
involve us in hidden contradictions (i.e. bodies of knowledge in our long-term 
memory that license contradictory judgments) are not necessarily a problem if 
we only employ such concepts for practical purposes. We operate with vague 
concepts all the time and their vagueness only gets us into trouble in exceptional 
circumstances, for example, when confronted with sorites paradoxes by 
revisionary ontologists. The kind of logical troubles highlighted by revisionary 
ontologists – for instance, that a table minus an atom is still a table, but 
something made of only three atoms is never a table – apparently hardly ever 
bring with them any adverse practical consequences. Avoiding such logical 
troubles, then, should not be a relevant desideratum when we are looking for a 
concept of table that would best serve the original function of the concept of 
table in everyday discourse. However, we presumably do not want our ultimate 
theory of the world to involve such contradictions. We want our ultimate theory 
of the world to embody theoretical virtues like simplicity and elegance to an 
especially high degree that is not needed for the representational devices that we 
devise for practical purposes. And the ontology room is all about devising our 
ultimate theory of the world, starting out with ordinary concepts. 
More details about on how we should interpret revisionary ontology as a 
project of conceptual engineering will be revealed in the next chapter, where I 
defend this account from the revisionary ontologists’ own point of view, as 
opposed to the quizzical observer’s point of view. In the next chapter, the focus 
will accordingly be on how the account allows the revisionary ontologists to 
explain the epistemic significance of their project. Here, the focus is instead on 
finding a rough outline of the account of revisionary ontology (in particular, 
disputes in revisionary ontology) that would explain the quizzical observer’s 
sense of pointlessness without disrespecting the presumption of peerhood. In the 




3.4.4. Meeting the adequacy conditions 
How does this account fare in terms of the two adequacy conditions: does it 
respect the presumption of peerhood and does it explain the quizzical observer’s 
sense of pointlessness? 
Let us begin with the presumption of peerhood. Unlike the verbalist account, 
the metalinguistic account does not take the parties to be disputing in the 
absence of a disagreement, i.e. engaging in a goal-directed activity, while the 
characteristic goal of the activity (agreement) is already achieved and the parties 
ought to know this. According to the current account, the parties really disagree. 
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They disagree about the best conceptual scheme for the purposes of 
constructing our ultimate theory of the world. Further, unlike the easy-onto-
logical account, the current account does not take the parties to be appealing to 
intuitions about simplicity and the like, when they should be conducting 
straightforward empirical investigations or analysing the application conditions 
of ordinary-language terms. According to the current account, the considera-
tions that ontologists bring to the table are relevant for addressing the issue that 
they are concerned with. For example, logical coherence is plausibly relevant 
for attaining the best, most joint-carving theory of the world, even if we can get 
along well enough with an incoherent conceptual scheme in daily life. This 
account also does not attribute to the disputants a failure to understand how a 
question phrased in their native language should be properly addressed – i.e. the 
linguistic failure that plausibly underlies the poor choice of methods for 
addressing the question, on the easy-ontological account. 
One might suspect, however, that as with the deflationist primitivist account, 
the current account takes the ontologists to be making purported statements 
without determinate content or truth-value. More specifically, the quizzical 
observer who accepts the above account might be suspicious about whether 
there actually is a fact of the matter about which conceptual scheme is best for 
our ultimate theory of the world, or for carving nature at the joints. My response 
is that the mistake of the ontologists who mistakenly believe that there is such a 
fact of the matter would be quite unlike the mistake of the ontologists who have 
simply started speaking nonsense, invoking an empty pseudo-concept of 
absolute quantification, for no reason at all. The quizzical observer who adopts 
the proposed metalinguistic account may indeed believe that the goal of the 
ontological dispute cannot be attained, because there is no truth or right course 
of action upon which to converge. However, here the fact that the parties 
nevertheless participate in the dispute is not explained with a brute fact of local 
linguistic incompetence (the ontologists imagining that a concept is a deter-
minate one when it is not). Instead, the ontologists, unlike the quizzical obser-
vers, judge that there is a fact of the matter about which conceptual scheme is 
most joint-carving. If this judgment is mistaken, then this is not a mistake that 
would disqualify ontologists as the quizzical observer’s epistemic peers, in the 
sense relevant here. It is the kind of mistake that someone can make even if they 
have roughly equal rational, linguistic, and rational capacities to the quizzical 
observer’s. 
Finally, the current account, unlike the realist primitivist account, does not 
take the ontologists to possess a special linguistic aptitude for ontology that the 
quizzical observer lacks. This may also be a controversial point; some quizzical 
observers may insist that they cannot understand what terms like “joint-
carving”, “objective structure” or “ultimate theory of the world” mean. I do not 
force the current account on such quizzical observers; but I think that such 
quizzical observers have little hope of arriving at an interpretation that would 
satisfy the two adequacy conditions. In any case, introducing the talk of struc-
ture and joint-carving makes progress with rendering the ontological enterprise 
90 
more intelligible to the observer, beyond the mere positing of a primitive 
absolute quantifier. And this at least diminishes the worry that the observer 
needs to attribute superior linguistic capacity to the disputants. 
In these ways, then, the current account respects the presumption of peer-
hood more than the previous accounts. On the other hand, a new problem arises 
in connection with the presumption of peerhood. The current account seems to 
attribute a deficient reflective capacity to the disputants. They might be doing 
something relatively sensible, but they are strangely unable to describe it 
accurately. They say and feel that they are discovering and describing reality 
when they are actually debating how we should use concepts in a certain con-
text. As Kraut puts the problem: “There is something it’s like to do ontology: 
one has the sense of engaging in discovery rather than invention” (Kraut 2016, 
45). Further, revisionary ontologists sometimes specifically say that their state-
ments are not a matter of convention, as conceptual choices presumably would 
be. For example, van Inwagen writes: “It is a basic conviction of mine that this 
theory [the “contact” theory of composition] is wrong and that its being wrong 
is in no sense a matter of convention” (van Inwagen 1990, 36). 
My response is that the disputants’ self-conception is actually not thoroughly 
misguided. The dispute is ultimately about what the world is like, and not just 
about linguistic conventions, although the issue of what the world is like is 
discussed by discussing the best concepts for describing the world. So the 
disputants are not mistaken about the ultimate topic of their disagreements or 
the aim of their enterprise. They might only be mistaken about what they 
communicate when they speak (linguistic proposals rather than statements about 
the world). A failure to understand what exactly one communicates in an ex-
change is nothing unusual.10 Further, it is unclear whether ontologists even hold 
strong views, or even any views, about what precisely they communicate in 
their disputes. Chrisman (2007, 239–240) plausibly suggests that ordinary 
speakers do not have fine-grained opinions about their claims’ expressive force. 
Although ontologists are not quite “ordinary speakers” (for example, because 
they can be assumed to know what “expressive force” means), I still do not 
know of any evidence that ontologists hold strong views about the expressive 
force of their claims. I suppose they do tend to believe strongly that they are in 
the business of investigating the world (and not just occupied with linguistic 
issues); but the current account is not in conflict with this belief. Ontologists, on 
this account, investigate the world via discussing the best concepts for 
describing it.  
Now, what about the other adequacy condition: explaining the quizzical 
observer’s sense of pointlessness? I propose that the sense of pointlessness is 
best explained with the fact that the alternative conceptual schemes, advocated 
by the disputants, appear to the quizzical observer to be on a par in terms of 
their theoretical virtues, such as coherence, simplicity and elegance. Bennett 
(2009) calls the position that the competing theories are equally good at meeting 
                                                 
10See also Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 23).  
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all the desiderata, and therefore that we are not in a position to choose between 
them, “epistemicism”. Bennett’s own characterization of the epistemicist view 
is the following: “’There are Fs’ is either true or false, and disputes about its 
truth-value are not verbal disputes. But there is little justification for believing 
either that it is true or that it is false” (Bennett 2009, 42). At least one reason 
why there might be little reason for accepting or rejecting “There are Fs”, as 
uttered in an ontological dispute, is that both the theory accepting Fs and the 
theory rejecting Fs seem to be on a par, considering the relevant desiderata 
(centrally, theoretical virtues). This is the kind of epistemicism I will have in 
mind here: the view that we cannot rationally choose between the competing 
theories because they are on a par in terms of their theoretical virtues.  
It may well seem to the quizzical observer that there is little reason for 
taking either side in the disputes that she observes, precisely because each side 
puts forth a theory that is on a par, in terms of theoretical virtues, with that of 
the opponent. Granted, in order to come to this judgment, the quizzical observer 
would have to observe the disputes in quite close detail. It is far from an 
obvious matter whether the competing theories are equally simple, coherent, 
and so on. But this is in accordance with how we have defined the relevant 
“quizzical observer”: it is someone who has a good level of familiarity with the 
disputes, more precisely, a level such that she is not epistemically required to 
immediately dismiss her sense of pointlessness as a sign of her own in-
competence. We are not here trying to explain the sense of pointlessness of 
someone who just takes a quick glance at the ontological disputes. 
Bennett herself advocates epistemicism for only a limited range of onto-
logical disputes and warns against the assumption that generalizations can be 
made about the problems haunting metaphysics or ontology in general, without 
delving into the specifics of particular discussions. (She elaborates on this 
methodological concern in (Bennett 2016).) Note that I do not side with Bennett 
on her epistemicism for any disputes; I remain neutral on this. Instead, I suggest 
that the quizzical observers can explain their sense of pointlessness with their 
epistemicist judgments. So I combine the Siderian metalinguistic account with 
the idea that quizzical observers are epistemicists in Bennett’s sense, even if 
they do not fully realize it themselves; and this epistemicism is the source of 
their quizzical phenomenology. Whether the quizzical observer is wrong or 
right about the theoretical virtues of the competing views being on a par, I 
cannot say. I consider it something that reasonable people can disagree about. 
So, when the quizzical observer diagnoses this as the source of her sense of 
pointlessness, she is still able to regard the disputants as reasonable, capable 
persons and is not committed to denying that the disputants are her epistemic 
peers, in the relevant sense. 
One might ask why the observer’s sense of pointlessness should necessarily 
be explained by the diagnosis of a (real or apparent) failure in the observed 
disputes. Perhaps the quizzical observer should be more self-critical than that 
and rather suspect that some bias of hers is in play or perhaps she just does not 
find interesting some issues that other philosophers find interesting. This is 
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indeed a legitimate option. However, it surely seems to the quizzical observer 
that there is something wrong with the disputes. An explanation of the sense of 
pointlessness that would invoke a bias or a lack of interest in the topic would 
need to account for the quizzical observer’s mistaken impression that the sense 
of pointlessness arises because there is something wrong with the disputes. 
Perhaps this can be done, but this is an option that I will not explore here. 
Regardless of how the sense of pointlessness is to be explained, as long as it is 
an explanation that is compatible with the theoretical metalinguistic account and 
respects the presumption of peerhood, the main thrust of the argument here is 
not threatened. The main thrust of the argument here is that the quizzical 
observer should find an account that explains the sense of pointlessness while 
respecting the presumption of peerhood, and the theoretical metalinguistic 
account meets those requirements. What exactly the explanation for the sense of 
pointlessness is, on the proposed account, is not crucial for my purposes. 
 
 
3.4.5. Implications for evaluating the disputes 
What, if anything, does this conclusion about how the quizzical observer should 
interpret ontological disputes imply about how she should evaluate the 
disputes? I will argue that the proposed metalinguistic account rules out certain 
ways in which the disputes could in principle fail, but does not imply that the 
dispute indeed fails in the way diagnosed by the quizzical observer. Her judg-
ment that the theoretical virtues of the conceptual schemes are on a par, and that 
therefore the matter cannot be settled, might be mistaken. 
There are various ways for a dispute to fail. If Tolstoy is to be believed about 
families, then disputes might be similar to families, in this regard: the successful 
ones involve the same prominent features, whereas the unsuccessful ones can 
lack any single one of those features, or some, or maybe even all; and so the 
unsuccessful disputes vary more than the successful ones. 
Here is a provisional list of the features of worthwhile disputes. 
(1)  The dispute reflects a genuine disagreement between the parties.  
(2)  The disagreement concerns a proposition that is either true or false (or in 
other words, an issue that is a matter of fact) or a course of action that 
should be taken or should not be taken.  
(3)  The disputants pursue the issue by appeal to relevant considerations and 
adequate methods. 
(4)  It is important whether the proposition is true or false (or what the fact of 
the matter is) or whether the course of action should be taken (or alter-
natively: the effort spent on the dispute is proportional to the importance of 
the issue). 
(5)  The parties can in principle come to know whether the proposition is true 
or false or whether the course of action should be taken (the relevant 
evidence and considerations are available to them);  
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(6)  The parties have sufficient common ground regarding the assessment of 
evidence and considerations. 
 
This list is not meant to be exhaustive. The basis for its compilation is rather the 
attempt to find the success conditions that correspond to the failings that onto-
logical disputes are most often charged with. Some of the failings cor-
responding to these success conditions make us especially suspicious of 
whether the disputants are as rational and otherwise capable as us. For example, 
when the dispute fails because there is obviously no fact of the matter and there 
is also no explanation of why the disputants would think that there is a fact of 
the matter, that raises the question whether their rational capacities are not 
significantly inferior to ours. Likewise, this question is raised when the 
diagnosed failure of the dispute is that the disputants pursue their issue via 
appeal to strikingly irrelevant considerations and strikingly inadequate methods 
(as the ontological disputants do, according to the easy-ontological account). 
And likewise, suspicions about inferior capacities are raised when the parti-
cipants do not really disagree and there is no explanation of why they would 
reasonably think that they disagree. 
On the other hand, some of the failures do not indicate severely inferior 
capacities. When the quizzical observer looks for a failure that would explain 
her sense of pointlessness, she should prefer the options that attribute errors that 
could be made by a person of roughly equal capacities. I have proposed that the 
theoretical metalinguistic account allows the observer to explain her sense of 
pointlessness without diagnosing the kinds of dispute failures that would be 
indicative of participants having severely inferior capacities. The account still 
allows the observer to diagnose other kinds of failures; for example, she might 
judge that the parties do not have sufficient common ground to make progress 
with their disagreement or that they are unable to come to know the facts of the 
matter (the matter being the most joint-carving conceptual scheme). 
Finally, when the quizzical observer has identified some such potential 
problem with the dispute that does not indicate the severe inferiority of the 
participants, she cannot jump to the conclusion that the dispute indeed has the 
problem in question. The sense of pointlessness, although its source is the 
diagnosis of a certain failure by the interpreter, may not be veridical. The 
quizzical observer must now go on to think about whether the theoretical virtues 
of the conceptual scheme indeed are on a par, whether the disputants are indeed 
unable to come to know the facts of the matter, and so on (depending on what 
the failures diagnosed exactly are). 
 
 
3.5. Chapter summary 
In this chapter, I addressed the interpretation question about revisionary onto-
logy from the quizzical observer’s point of view, focusing on disputes in 
revisionary ontology, rather than discussions more generally. The quizzical 
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observer is a fellow philosopher who feels a sense of pointlessness upon 
observing or thinking about ontological disputes, and is sufficiently familiar 
with the disputes, not to be epistemically required to immediately dismiss the 
sense of pointlessness as caused by her own incompetence. The quizzical 
observer’s situation (her motivation in seeking the interpretation and the 
knowledge available to her) suggests two adequacy conditions for the account 
sought: the account should explain the quizzical observer’s sense of pointless-
ness and do justice to the presumption that the disputants are roughly the 
quizzical observer’s epistemic peers. In the light of these adequacy conditions, I 
argued that a certain metalinguistic negotiation account fares better than the 
verbalist, easy-ontological and (deflationist and realist) primitivist accounts. 
I agree with Thomasson’s (2017) and Belleri’s (2017) suggestion that 
Plunkett and Sundell’s (2013) framework for diagnosing apparently object-level 
disputes as metalinguistic negotiations is a valuable resource for those 
struggling to make sense of ontological disputes. However, according to the 
accounts that Thomasson and Belleri propose, the ontologists’ motivating 
considerations in the metalinguistic discussion are practical, pragmatic, or 
aesthetic, whereas on my account, the ontologists are seeking the most joint-
carving conceptualization of the world. In addition to Plunkett and Sundell’s 
framework, my account incorporates Sider’s (2011) view of ontology as the 
search for the most joint-carving conceptual scheme and Bennett’s (2009) view 
that the main problem with ontological disputes is that the contending theories 
embed the relevant theoretical virtues (simplicity, elegance, etc.) to the same 
extent and that we are therefore unable to rationally choose between them.  
I have here only argued that this account is a good one for the quizzical 
observer to adopt. So I cannot make a swift move to prescribing a revision in 
the disputants’ self-understanding. The disputants’ hermeneutic situation differs 
from that of the quizzical observer: their own dispute does not confront them as 
a puzzle. Might the best interpretation of any philosophical dispute be the one 
that should be given by a puzzled peer? I do not take a stand (and do not even 
have any intuitions) on this. Here, I have merely addressed the question of how 
the puzzled peer should interpret the disputes if she is to respect the 
presumption of peerhood as well as to account for the sense of pointlessness. In 
the next chapter, I will take on the interpretation question from the revisionary 
ontologists’ own point of view. 
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4. INTERPRETING REVISIONARY ONTOLOGY FROM  
THE REVISIONARY ONTOLOGISTS’ POINT OF VIEW 
4.1. Chapter introduction 
In this chapter, I will again defend the theoretical metalinguistic account of revi-
sionary ontology, or in other words, the view of revisionary ontology as a 
project of conceptual engineering that is aimed at investigating the world. 
However, now I will defend this account from the revisionary ontologists’ own 
point of view, with different arguments. I will also add some detail about the 
account; in particular I will include a proposal about the project’s (limited) 
epistemic significance, given this interpretation. The proposal involves a 
distinction between two kinds of beliefs (practically and theoretically oriented 
beliefs, or practical and theoretical beliefs, as I will also call them). My view is 
that (mainstream) revisionary ontologists should see themselves as targeting the 
concepts that we use to form theoretical beliefs, but not those that we use to 
form practical beliefs. 
My general aim in this chapter is to look for a plausible story for revisionary 
ontologists to tell about what they are doing and why it is worth doing. For a 
reminder: I use the label “revisionary ontology”, because it is familiar and 
relatively short, compared to, for example, “apparently anti-commonsensical 
ontology”; but I do not assume that revisionary ontologists in fact try to revise 
anything. Instead, “revisionary ontology” is extensionally defined here; the best 
characterization of the project is to be sought. In the extension of “revisionary 
ontology”, then, are certain discussions conducted by metaphysicians like 
Horgan and Potrč (2008), van Inwagen (1990), Merricks (2001), and Unger 
(1979, 1980); and other relevantly similar discussions. In the relevant discus-
sions, the metaphysicians at least appear to be denying the existence of certain 
ordinary objects, such as chairs, tables, sticks and stones; or they at least appear 
to be affirming the existence of certain extraordinary objects, such as talking 
donkeys and the object made of a dog and the tree, when the dog is resting its 
back on the tree. Further, the discussants have certain shared assumptions about 
their subject matter and the proper way of addressing it, and they give 
arguments for their claims. At the centre of these arguments are the puzzles that 
the ordinary way of thinking about the world gives rise to. I will provide 
examples of such puzzles later. (I have earlier provided examples of arguments 
in revisionary ontology, but here I will elaborate on how these arguments can be 
seen as puzzles.) So this is what revisionary ontologists appear to be doing; but 
what they are really doing and why it needs to be done is the question asked 
here. 
The answer that I will propose is that revisionary ontologists are pursuing a 
project of conceptual engineering and this project is meant to improve our 
theoretical beliefs. Theoretical beliefs are beliefs that, rather than helping us 
achieve our ultimately non-cognitive goals (like most of our ordinary beliefs), 
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are formed solely for the sake of the intrinsically worthwhile epistemic 
achievement. In proposing this account, I both draw on and criticize Sider 
(2011). Similarly to Sider, I take revisionary ontology to be the project of 
making our conceptual scheme more theoretically virtuous (e.g. more coherent, 
elegant, simple) and therefore more likely to reflect the objective structure of 
reality, or to “carve at the joints”. But I will address certain pressing questions 
that Sider and others, to my knowledge, have not quite satisfactorily addressed: 
questions about the epistemic value of revisionary ontology, thus conceived. 
Once we accept such a general idea of revisionary ontology as conceptual 
engineering (towards greater joint-carvingness), a necessary further question is: 
what are we developing this conceptual scheme for? How does such an 
improvement of the conceptual scheme improve our epistemic standing? 
Granted: the ordinary conceptual scheme has prima facie problems, such as 
inconsistency or a certain inelegance. The ontologists’ puzzles, such as sorites 
paradoxes, bring these problems to light; and their proposed alternative schemes 
might overcome the problems. I also grant that such theoretically superior 
alternative conceptual schemes might capture the objective structure of the 
world better than the ordinary, flawed scheme does; and I grant that there is an 
objective structure of the world. (I grant all this for the sake of the argument.) 11 
But still, this is not enough to prescribe revising the ordinary scheme: it seems 
that despite its problems, the ordinary scheme works well for most practical 
purposes. In fact, the ordinary scheme might work better, for such practical 
purposes, than a theoretically superior and presumably more joint-carving 
conceptual scheme. Briefly put, this is why I cannot accept Sider’s suggestion 
that the joint-carving conceptual scheme should be employed for all belief 
formation. But then we need a different way to understand the epistemic 
significance of revisionary ontology, if we are to view it as the pursuit of a more 
joint-carving conceptual scheme. My proposal is that although improved joint-
carvingness is not necessarily an improvement for most of our beliefs, it is 
plausibly an improvement for a small subclass, which I will call “theoretical 
beliefs”. This modification to Sider’s account limits the potential epistemic 
significance of revisionary ontology. 
However, before I can come to Sider’s views and my account that builds on 
those, I will need to reject certain alternative accounts that might seem more 
                                                 
11 There is, of course, a rich literature on whether and why we should take theoretical virtues 
in general or particular theoretical virtues to indicate something about reality. For example, 
regarding simplicity, it is sometimes supposed that reliance on this “virtue” involves the 
unwarranted assumption that the world is simple rather than complex. Huemer (2009) 
challenges this supposition, but is ultimately still sceptical about the legitimacy of appeals to 
parsimony in philosophical argumentation. There is also discussion on how we should 
understand the various theoretical virtues, more precisely. For example, in the case of parsi-
mony, we might ask whether it is only qualitative or also quantitative parsimony that 
matters. Nolan (1997), for instance, argues against Lewis that quantitative parsimony does 
matter. I just mention these examples here to gesture towards important debates concerning 
theoretical virtues, debates that I will not be able to engage with in this thesis. 
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obvious and appealing. After explaining further what kind of account of 
revisionary ontology I am seeking (what the adequacy conditions are), in the 
next section (4.2), I will criticize such more obvious accounts, starting from the 
most obvious one, which I will call the “simple incompatibilist account” 
(section 4.3). In section 4.4, I will criticize the most popular alternatives to 
simple incompatibilism: three kinds of compatibilist account. In section 4.5, I 
will introduce and criticise an incompatibilist account of revisionary ontology 
that builds on Sider’s views. This is an account of revisionary ontology as a 
project of conceptual engineering, of seeking the best language for “writing the 
book of the world”, where the rationale for the conceptual engineering is that all 
our beliefs should conform to the world as perfectly as possible. I reject this 
rationale. Finally, in section 4.6, I will defend my modified Siderian account, 




4.2. Understanding the question 
4.2.1. Two adequacy conditions: explaining the sense of 
destabilization and the sense of entitlement 
Before examining the possible answers, let us get clearer on the question: what 
is the nature and epistemic significance of revisionary ontology? More 
specifically, I will be looking for an account that revisionary ontologists should 
provide for an audience who has a certain typical reaction to the puzzles posed 
by the ontologists. This reaction is made up of two components, which I will 
call the “sense of destabilization” and the “sense of (perception-based) entitle-
ment”. The account that we are seeking should make sense of these reactions 
and explain how revisionary ontology can improve the audience’s epistemic 
standing. 
By the “puzzles posed by the ontologists”, I mean a central element in 
revisionary ontologists’ argumentation: questions (or arguments) that cause 
puzzlement, either because the respondent is inclined to give contradictory 
answers to the questions (or assess the premises and conclusions’ truth value 
inconsistently) or because she does not know how to answer (or how to assess 
the premises and conclusions) at all. For example, the ontologist might ask: 
“Which ship is the Ship of Theseus? Is it the one that departed to the sea and 
then had all of its parts gradually removed and replaced; or is it the one that was 
made of those removed parts?”. The respondent might want to say that both 
ships – the one with all the original parts and the one that sailed through the 
ship’s usual route – are the same ship as the original one. But the respondent 
might also want to say that the original ship cannot be numerically identical 
with two different ships. The respondent would then be committed to an 
inconsistent set of claims. 
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Another puzzle that can be seen as purporting to reveal the inconsistency of 
ordinary beliefs is the puzzle of causal over-determination (Merricks 2001): 
does the ball cause the same event, the breaking of the glass, that is also caused 
by the ball-particles? The respondent does not want to say that an event can be 
causally over-determined like this; but she wants to say, when confronted with 
the two individual cases, that the ball does cause the breaking of the glass, and 
that the ball-particles do cause the breaking of the glass. Likewise, the “problem 
of the many” points to an inconsistent set of commitments: the respondent 
wants to affirm that there can be exactly one table in a room, but is also inclined 
to agree that the table minus a particle is a table, and there would be many of 
those in the room as well (Unger 1980). A somewhat different case is van 
Inwagen’s puzzle of composition: what does it take for some things to compose 
a further thing (van Inwagen 1990)? Do we need to bring the things into 
contact? For how long a period? What about scattered objects, like galaxies? A 
satisfactory answer proves hard to find. The puzzle of composition might not 
reveal inconsistent commitments, however, but rather a lack of order, of 
principle, in a basic feature of our thinking: our notion of a composite object. 
The general moral of the puzzles, it seems, is that the way we normally think 
about the world does not hold up on closer investigation. The audience’s 
reaction tends to support this contention: the puzzles seem to show that 
something is wrong with their beliefs. I will call that audience reaction the 
“sense of destabilization”. For example, van Inwagen has said that puzzles like 
the Ship of Theseus “perhaps create a vertiginous sense of inhabiting a world to 
which the laws of logic do not apply” (van Inwagen 1990, 69). I suppose that 
the “vertiginous sense” has something to do with belief destabilization. Korman 
writes that “when one is reminded of one’s own commitment to scattered 
objects (e.g., constellations), and finds oneself unable to identify any principled 
difference between them and trout-turkeys, one feels the pressure to accept the 
very thing that one was at first inclined to deny” (Korman 2015, 303). This 
“pressure”, I suppose, is also an aspect of the sense of destabilization. 
This, then, is one set of data that the account of revisionary ontology sought 
here must accommodate: revisionary ontologists put forth puzzles like those 
described and these puzzles give rise to a sense of destabilization, the feeling 
that something is wrong with our ordinary beliefs. For example, presented with 
the problem of the many, one is likely to feel that there is indeed something 
wrong with holding that (1) there is exactly one table in the room, and that (2) a 
table minus an atom is a table, and that (3) there is also a table minus an atom in 
the room (rather many of those, in fact). In this case, the sense of destabilization 
is presumably grounded in the respondent’s recognition that to accept all three 
claims would be to accept claims that are logically inconsistent and that it is not 
alright to do that. The same holds for the puzzle of over-determination and the 
sorites arguments: the audience recognizes the impermissibility of inconsistent 
beliefs and this destabilizes the audience’s confidence both in the directly 
relevant beliefs (e.g. the belief that there is exactly one table in the room) and 
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many other beliefs that are indirectly affected (e.g. that there is exactly one 
chair in the room, or that there are tables and chairs at all). 
The sense of destabilization can also be understood in this way for the puzzle 
of composition. Perhaps the audience is committed to the claim that there must 
be a unified principle of composition, rather than a hodgepodge of facts about 
when things do and do not compose a further thing; and this is inconsistent with 
their particular judgments on when a composite object is or is not formed. 
Another way to understand the sense of destabilization, for the puzzle of 
composition, is that in this case, the puzzle reveals some other problematic 
feature of the audience’s set of beliefs, instead of logical inconsistency. 
Possibly, the puzzle reveals the disorderly, unprincipled, inelegant nature of the 
belief system – a less gruesome, but still troubling theoretical shortcoming of 
the belief system. This problem is still somewhat similar to outright logical 
inconsistency; possibly, it is a less extreme version of the same problem. 
So the puzzles lead the audience to experience a sense of destabilization – a 
sense of dissatisfaction with their beliefs – by revealing logical inconsistency or 
some other troubling theoretical shortcoming in the belief system. But there is 
also another, contrasting phenomenological reaction to the puzzles. I will call 
this other reaction the “sense of perception-based entitlement”. It is the feeling 
that one remains entitled to the ordinary beliefs about what there is, despite the 
problems revealed by the puzzles. Further, this entitlement seems to have 
something to do with what one can see or, more generally, perceive. As I look 
at the table in front of me – for all I know, the only table in the room – I cannot 
help but feel that I am permitted to believe that there are tables and there are not 
millions of them in each situation where there is one. This is because there is 
exactly one table in this room, as I can see. And the ontologists’ arguments do 
not appear to touch this justification for my belief that there are tables and there 
are not millions of them in each situation where there is one. 
The sense of (broadly) “perception-based” entitlement can arise even if I do 
not have a table in front of me right now, but I can imagine the kind of situation 
that I know obtains in most kitchens, and that the ontologists would also agree 
obtains in most kitchens, in the area where people usually sit down to eat. On 
the basis of this imagining and my assessment of what is the case in the 
situation that I imagine, I feel entitled to the belief that there is exactly one table 
in all these situations, and thus also the belief that there are tables. Again, the 
ontologists’ arguments do not seem to undermine this entitlement. Further, on 
the basis of my assessment of relevant imagined situations, I feel similarly 
entitled to the belief that there are not millions of tables in each of these 
kitchen-situations, and that a dog resting its back against a tree and the tree do 
not make up a thing. I feel entitled to believe that there are no dog-trees because 
when I see or imagine a dog resting its back against the tree, I do not see or 
imagine a dog-tree. I see two things (or a thing and a being) there, not three; and 
this entitles me to believe that the dog-tree does not come into existence, in this 
situation. And, again, it seems that the ontologists’ arguments do not defeat this 
entitlement.  
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The dual reaction to the puzzles, consisting of the sense of destabilization 
and the sense of entitlement, might be expressed as follows: “Yes, I agree that a 
table minus an atom is a table and that there are many of those in the room, as 
well as the one table that I said is in the room. And I do not like saying that the 
ball and the ball-particles both caused the window to break. And I am confused 
about which of the two ships is the Ship of Theseus. But I can see that there is 
exactly one table in this room. And I can imagine the relevant situations that, as 
revisionary ontologists would agree, really obtain and that according to the 
revisionary ontologists do not include balls and ships; and in such imagined 
situations, I see balls and ships. On this basis, I am entitled to the belief that 
there are tables, balls, and ships. The ontologists do not manage to take away 
this entitlement, it has a source that the arguments do not touch. Although the 
puzzles make me feel a bit uncomfortable about my ordinary beliefs, they are, 
in some way, perfectly alright for me to have.” 
It is important not to confuse this explanandum, the sense of perception-
based entitlement, with some others, for example, the relevant perceptual expe-
riences or the perception-based beliefs themselves. It is one thing to explain 
why we see the world in a certain way, it is another to explain why we have 
certain beliefs about the world, and yet another why we feel entitled to certain 
beliefs about the world, based on what we see. The relevant datum, the sense of 
entitlement, is also not to be confused with the closely related datum that the 
folk do not retract their assent to the relevant claims, when confronted with the 
arguments. For example, Daly and Liggins describe the latter datum as follows: 
“[W]hen the folk understand the objection to taking all infinite numbers to be 
equal, they will straightforwardly retract their claim, whereas when the folk see 
the revisionists’ objections, they will become ambivalent and confused but not 
retract” (Daly and Liggins 2016, 409). Daly and Liggins here describe how the 
folk tend to behave in response to the arguments and some accompanying 
phenomenology (like confusion), but not the specific psychological pheno-
menon that plausibly motivates the non-retracting response, namely the pheno-
menon of the sense of perception-based entitlement. 
I will be looking for an explanatory and defensive account of revisionary 
ontology that the ontologists should offer to someone who has this dual 
reaction. In order to be “defensive” in the relevant sense, the account should not 
just make sense of the sense of destabilization and the sense of perception-based 
entitlement; it should also explain the value of the project. What kind of value 
could that be? It is implausible that the project would bring practical benefits, at 
least when we restrict revisionary ontology to the kind of discussions con-
sidered in this chapter. One might instead think of “revisionary ontology” in a 
broader sense, so that it also includes certain discussions on the existence and 
nature of gender and race, and then a part of the project of revisionary ontology 
could indeed be practically significant: it could have important practical 
implications for how we behave in everyday contexts. However, I do not 
include the metaphysics of race and gender in the “revisionary ontology” that is 
my object of interpretation in this chapter. There are important differences 
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between the metaphysics of gender and race, on the one hand, and the project 
that I focus on here, on the other hand. In particular, the metaphysics of gender 
and race involves appeals to ethical considerations and not just appeals to the 
demands of reason, such as the requirement to avoid inconsistency. Although I 
think both kinds of revisionary ontology can be seen as projects of conceptual 
engineering, they are engineering concepts for different purposes. (I will elabo-
rate on the relationship between mainstream and feminist revisionary ontology, 
conceived as different projects of conceptual engineering, in the next chapter.) 
Now, it seems that if the project of mainstream revisionary ontology con-
sidered here brings any value, it must be epistemic value. One of the adequacy 
conditions for the defensive account of revisionary ontology sought here, then, 
is that the account should say what that epistemic value consists in, or in other 
words, what the epistemic significance of revisionary ontology is. I will 
elaborate on this adequacy condition in the next section. 
 
 
4.2.2. The third adequacy condition: explaining  
the epistemic significance of revisionary ontology 
How then shall we understand “epistemic value” or “epistemic significance”? I 
propose that we understand it as follows: a project has epistemic significance 
(or epistemic value) if and only if the project is conducive to the satisfaction of 
epistemic aims. I further understand “the satisfaction of epistemic aims” as 
follows: the satisfaction of an epistemic aim means that an epistemic target of 
evaluation meets one of its success-conditions.12 Some epistemic targets of 
evaluation are beliefs (or belief sets), agents, and minds. Some relevant success-
conditions are truth, knowledge, understanding, coherence, and rationality. 
Some target/success-condition pairs, for example, a “knowledgeable belief” and 
a “true mind”, are inappropriate and cannot be considered “epistemic aims” on 
my account. Appropriate target/success-condition pairs include, for example, 
true beliefs, coherent belief sets, and rational agents/minds. Here, I do not 
assume that in addition to the target of evaluation being an “epistemic” one, the 
success-condition also needs to be “epistemic”, in order for the target meeting 
the success-condition to count as the satisfaction of an epistemic aim. Since 
there is no such restriction on the success-conditions, the belief set’s conduci-
veness to the belief-bearer’s happiness, for example, can count as the satis-
faction of an epistemic aim, as long as conduciveness to the belief-bearer’s 
happiness is indeed a success-condition for belief. What the success-conditions 
of beliefs actually are will turn out to be a crucial issue for understanding the 
epistemic significance of revisionary ontology. 
                                                 
12 I also interpret epistemic aims in similar terms in my (Kitsik 2018b), but there I only 
consider an epistemic target of evaluation meeting an epistemic success-condition as the 
satisfaction of an epistemic aim. 
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In what follows, I will assume that the relevant target of evaluation is belief 
and I will try to understand how revisionary ontology can help belief meet its 
success conditions – this is how I investigate the epistemic significance of 
revisionary ontology. This includes investigation into the success conditions for 
beliefs. Elsewhere (Kitsik 2018b), I have pointed out that we may need to 
consider targets of evaluation other than beliefs, in particular, the agent; and a 
relevant success condition for the agent, I argued, is understanding connections 
between facts. This led to a line of criticism against Sider’s account that is 
distinct from the criticism to be pursued here. Here, the only relevant targets of 
evaluation that I consider are beliefs. Suppose, then, that we take the relevant 
epistemic target to be a belief or a belief system. What could the epistemic 
significance of revisionary ontology then consist in? 
Revisionary ontology centrally involves arguments. Whatever epistemic 
significance revisionary ontology has, we can expect it to have that significance 
in virtue of the arguments proposed by revisionary ontologists, or more pre-
cisely, because of the effect of these arguments on the audience. Supposing also 
that the epistemic significance of revisionary ontology must consist in the 
improvement of beliefs (in the beliefs meeting their success-conditions), then 
what we need is an account of how the revisionary ontologists’ arguments 
improve their audience’s beliefs, or in other words, how the arguments make 
the audience’s beliefs more successful as beliefs. (Note that the revisionary 
ontologists who propose the arguments may themselves also count as the 
“audience” whose beliefs are to be improved. So in the cases where there is no 
audience other than the revisionary ontologist herself, the ontologist’s argu-
ments can still be epistemically significant, if the arguments improve the 
ontologist’s own beliefs.) 
Now, there are different ways in which arguments can improve beliefs. 
These correspond to the different ways in which arguments can have effects on 
beliefs. The main relevant options for the effects of arguments on beliefs appear 
to be the revising of beliefs and the (mere) adding of beliefs. Revising may 
occur to different extents. In radical belief revision, the audience previously 
believes that a proposition is certainly true (the degree of belief is 1), and as a 
result of the arguer’s efforts, they come to believe that it is certainly false (the 
degree of belief is 0), or the other way around. Often, however, the audience 
changes their degree of belief less dramatically. For example, suppose that I feel 
quite confident that a particular state policy should be implemented, because of 
its expected beneficial consequences; someone then points out some counter-
balancing negative consequences; I am now slightly less certain that the policy 
should be implemented. In the case of mere adding of beliefs, as opposed to 
revision of beliefs, by contrast, the audience begins to believe a proposition that 
they previously had no beliefs about. For example, suppose that I go to a 
physics conference as a complete novice and the presenter convinces me of the 
truth of a theory in a subfield I did not even know existed. The theory does not 
have implications regarding any prior beliefs of mine, as far as I know. So I 
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only gain in knowledge, as a result of the arguer’s efforts, but no former beliefs 
on the subject matter of the new belief are revised. 
These effects, as described, are evaluatively neutral. In order for the argu-
ment to be epistemically significant, in the relevant sense, the effects need to 
involve not just any revision or addition of beliefs, but the revision or addition 
also needs to be such that afterwards, either the audience’s beliefs on a given 
subject matter meet the success-conditions for beliefs that they previously did 
not meet (or the beliefs on the subject matter meet the success-conditions to a 
higher degree, if the success-condition admits of degrees); or beliefs on a new 
subject matter are added, such that these beliefs meet the success-conditions for 
beliefs. For example, if the relevant success-condition for beliefs is truth, then 
in order for the arguments to be epistemically significant, the arguments need to 
either replace false beliefs on a subject matter with true ones (or at least raise 
the degree of truth of the beliefs on a subject matter, if we allow talk of degrees 
of truth) or else the arguments need to add true beliefs on a new subject matter, 
on which the audience was previously neutral. 
 I will suppose, then, that the main desiderata for the account of revisionary 
ontology sought here include making sense of the audience’s dual reaction to 
the arguments (consisting of the sense of destabilization and the sense of 
perception-based entitlement) and explaining the epistemic significance of the 
project (i.e. how the ontologists’ arguments can improve the audience’s beliefs). 
Now, focusing on the last desideratum – explaining the epistemic significance 
of revisionary ontology – the obvious candidate account that comes to mind is 
what I will call the simple incompatibilist account. However, as I will show in 
the next section, although simple incompatibilism provides a straightforward 
explanation of the epistemic significance of revisionary ontology, it does not 
fully make sense of the audience’s dual reaction to the ontologists’ arguments. 
In particular, it does not properly account for the sense of entitlement that 
remains, despite the sense of destabilization. 
 
 
4.3. Rejecting simple incompatibilism 
4.3.1. What simple incompatibilism is 
According to the simple incompatibilist account, revisionary ontologists are 
doing just what they appear to be doing: defending existence claims that contra-
dict what most people believe. Further, according to this account, the onto-
logists reveal these ordinary beliefs to be false. This account certainly makes 
revisionary ontology look epistemically significant and explains the sense of 
destabilization. By revealing the theoretical shortcomings (the inconsistency 
and disorderliness) of our belief system, the puzzles indicate that there is a 
mistake, perhaps a widespread mistake, in the system. Further, the account 
involves a specific view about the nature of the mistake, namely, the beliefs 
affected by the mistake – beliefs like ‘There are tables’ and ‘There is one table 
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in the room’ – are false. The sense of destabilization, caused by the recognition 
of inconsistency and disorderliness, indicates a possibly widespread mistake, 
the prevalence of false beliefs in the belief system. As the audience does the 
rethinking that this sense of destabilization calls for – conceding, for example, 
that there are no tables or that there are millions in each situation where there is 
one – they replace their false beliefs with true ones. And since truth is a 
success-condition for beliefs (true beliefs are better than false beliefs), the 
replacement is an improvement. What beliefs exactly are the false culprits is a 
further question. Perhaps there are far fewer things or perhaps there are many 
more than we thought. In any case, “the puzzles are shown to have rested on a 
mistake” (Merricks 2001, 55), and the mistake is in some subset of our beliefs, 
which are false. 
Merricks (2001) is perhaps the most well-known proponent of the simple 
incompatibilist account. Many revisionary ontologists reject simple incompati-
bilism. I will look at some of their reasons in the next sections. In particular, I 
will look at the reasons that are popular, but in my view not very good ones. 
Then, in the section after that, I will turn to what I consider to be a good reason 




4.3.2. Bad reasons for rejecting simple incompatibilism 
Revisionary ontologists’ reasons for rejecting simple incompatibilism are 
usually based either on the idea that ontologists need to grant the truth of 
ordinary beliefs or else the idea that ontologists need to grant truth of what 
people ordinarily say. For example, van Inwagen focuses on the authority of 
what people ordinarily say, writing that he is “enough of a Wittgensteinian to 
think that it is not possible for very much of what we say ‘in the midst of life’ to 
be false” (van Inwagen 2014, 9). His wife’s assertion of “The chair you said 
you’d carry upstairs is still in the living room” is true, he says; and not just that. 
The assertion is 
 
[t]rue without qualification. True when taken straightforwardly and literally. 
True tout court. True simpliciter. True full stop. True period. Not “true in the 
loose and popular sense but false in the strict and philosophical sense,” but just 
true. (van Inwagen 2014, 10) 
 
In a similar spirit, but referring to ordinary beliefs, rather than what people 
ordinarily say, Fine writes: 
 
[I]n this age of post-Moorean modesty, many of us are inclined to doubt that 
philosophy is in possession of arguments that might genuinely serve to under-
mine what we ordinarily believe. It may perhaps be conceded that the arguments 
of the sceptic appear to be utterly compelling; but the Mooreans among us will 
hold that the very plausibility of our ordinary beliefs is reason enough for 
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supposing that there must be something wrong in the sceptic’s arguments, even if 
we are unable to say what it is. (Fine 2001, 1) 
 
One reason to think that what people ordinarily say or believe is true is that we 
need to be charitable. The objection from charity is discussed and criticized by 
Daly and Liggins (2016). However, they do not discuss it as an objection to the 
simple incompatibilist account of revisionary ontology, as I do, but as an 
objection to revisionary ontology itself, conceived of in accordance with the 
simple incompatibilist account. In particular, they consider the objection that 
“nihilism and universalism are both unacceptably uncharitable because each of 
them implies that a great deal of what we ordinarily believe is false” (Daly and 
Liggins 2016, 405–406). As they further construe the objection, it involves the 
assumption that the (non-) existence of tables and the like is a trivial a priori 
matter, such that it would be a sign of some sort of linguistic “idiocy” to be 
mistaken about this matter – and the folk, on the revisionary ontologists’ view, 
must apparently be wrong about this trivial a priori matter. Daly and Liggins 
take this objection (which they attribute to Hirsch) to be question-begging: it 
assumes without argument that the (non-)existence of tables is a trivial matter 
(whether it is trivially true or trivially false), which is something that revi-
sionary ontologists clearly would not agree with. I agree with Daly and Liggins’ 
assessment of this objection, but I suppose that my argument against the simple 
incompatibilist version of revisionary ontology, which I will present shortly, is 
different from this question-begging argument. 
One way in which one may argue against the simple incompatibilist account, 
then, is that the existence or non-existence of tables and the like is such a trivial 
matter that it is uncharitable to attribute a mistake on this matter; and the 
revisionary ontologists attribute a mistake on this matter to the folk. And the 
problem with this argument, again, is that it simply assumes without argument 
that the existence or non-existence of tables and the like is a trivial matter. A 
somewhat different and perhaps more common reason for rejecting the simple 
incompatibilist account of revisionary ontology (or revisionary ontology as a 
whole, on the assumption that it can only be properly made sense of on the 
simple incompatibilist account) is the Moorean argument. The Moorean argu-
ment appeals to the fact that the revisionary ontologists’ audience is typically 
more confident about the falsity of the ontologists’ arguments’ conclusions than 
about the truth of their premises. For example, van Inwagen (1990) is 
apparently motivated by the Moorean argument to distance himself from simple 
incompatibilism. He phrases the challenge as follows: 
 
Your position, if it rests on anything at all, rests on certain arguments. But the 
premises of these arguments, whatever they may be, could not possibly be so 
worthy of belief as what you are denying, viz. that there are such things as tables 
and chairs. (van Inwagen 1990, 100) 
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My reason to be suspicious of the Moorean argument is that it generalizes 
problematically as a way of discounting any argument out of hand, if one does 
not like the conclusion: if the conclusion appears to be wrong, then something 
must be wrong with the premises, whatever it precisely is. It seems procedurally 
correct to begin examining and evaluating an argument from its premises, rather 
than the conclusion. Further, I take it to be a contentious empirical question 
whether most people are actually more certain of the falsity of the ontologists’ 
conclusions than of the truth of their premises. 
 
 
4.3.3. My reason for rejecting simple incompatibilism:  
failure to account for the sense of entitlement 
My reason for rejecting simple incompatibilism is different from the previously 
considered unsatisfactory reasons. I reject simple incompatibilism because it 
does not account for the sense of perception-based entitlement that I have 
described above. Further, simple incompatibilism, as put forth above, is prima 
facie inconsistent with what I take to be the best explanation for the sense of 
perception-based entitlement. 
The best explanation for the sense of perception-based entitlement, on my 
view, is that we actually do retain an entitlement to the relevant beliefs, such as 
the belief that there are tables, despite the ontologists’ arguments. This might 
not be an all-things-considered, no-qualifications-necessary kind of entitlement, 
but in any case, the arguments leave a certain kind of entitlement to the beliefs 
untouched. More precisely, on my account we remain entitled to these beliefs 
because a certain kind of justification for the beliefs is left untouched by the 
ontologists’ arguments. That justification is that we can form these beliefs by a 
highly truth-conducive method, namely by drawing on our conceptual compe-
tence with the relevant expressions (for example, we can draw on our com-
petence with “table”, to judge that there is exactly one table in this situation), 
together with the competence to draw certain simple inferences (such as the 
inference from “There is exactly one table in this situation” to “There are tables 
and there are not millions of tables in each situation where there is one”). 
Further, at some level, we recognize or are aware of (although perhaps not 
consciously aware of) our competence with the relevant expressions and 
inference types. We are aware, then, of our conceptual and inferential com-
petences that provide a way of justifying the beliefs, and this justification for 
the beliefs is left untouched by the ontologists’ arguments. This is the gist of the 
explanation; I will now elaborate on it in a bit more detail. 
Let us look at a particular case of the sense of perception-based entitlement 
that arises in response to the ontologists’ arguments, as an example. Suppose 
that I happen to be in a regular kitchen, when the ontologist presents me with 
the problem of the many. I experience the sense of perception-based 
entitlement: it seems to me that I remain entitled to the belief that there are 
tables, despite the ontologist’s argument, and that this entitlement is based on 
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what I can see in the room, or more precisely, it is based on the fact that I see a 
table, or more precisely, that I see exactly one table. So I see what looks to me 
like exactly one table in front of me, I judge that there is exactly one table in 
this situation, and I feel that this judgment entitles me to believe that there are 
tables. My account says that I am aware that the perceptual judgment that there 
is exactly one table in this situation is one that I can make by applying my 
conceptual competence to interpret my experience. Further, from the thus 
justified judgment that there is exactly one table in this situation, I can infer that 
there are tables (because there is at least the one that is in this situation) and that 
there are not millions of tables in each situation where there is one (because in 
this situation, there is exactly one table, not millions). And I know that I am 
competent at drawing simple inferences like the inference from “There is 
exactly one table in this situation” to “There are tables and there are not 
millions of them in each situation where there is one”. My awareness of my 
ability to form the latter belief in this highly truth-conducive way – by applying 
my conceptual and inferential competence – is why I feel entitled to the belief 
that there are tables and not millions of them in each situation where there is 
one. I have a way of justifying this belief that is left untouched by the 
revisionary ontologists’ arguments. Further, this way of justifying the belief 
seems difficult to defeat, for the revisionary ontologists. They cannot plausibly 
maintain that I am not actually competent with the word “table” or that I cannot 
competently draw the kinds of inferences described. This justification could in 
principle be undermined by arguments and evidence, but not by ontologists’ 
arguments and evidence. For example, this justification could be undermined by 
arguments to the effect that I might be dreaming or hallucinating. But this is not 
the kind of argument that revisionary ontologists provide. 
 
 
4.3.4. Alternative explanations for the sense of entitlement 
There are other ways one could try to explain the sense of entitlement. In parti-
cular, one could explain the sense of entitlement as a non-veridical one – one 
could explain why the audience would feel entitled to the beliefs, although they 
actually are not. I suppose that such explanations would centrally appeal to one 
of the following three phenomena: (1) the audience’s intellectual vices, or (2) 
the audience’s inborn or habitual tendency to perceive and think in certain 
ways, or (3) the fact that things would look the same, whether or not there are 
Fs (the entities that the revisionary ontologists argue are there or are not there, 
in apparent contradiction with folk belief). I will go through these types of 
explanation in order, showing why none of them provide a satisfactory expla-




(1) The audience’s intellectual vices 
One way in which this explanation for the sense of entitlement – appealing to 
the audience’s intellectual vices – could be further elaborated is that the 
audience is too intellectually deficient to understand and therefore to appreciate 
how the arguments speak against their beliefs. This variety of the alternative 
explanation can be left aside, since we are assuming that the audience feels a 
sense of destabilization that the arguments give rise to – so they can understand 
that the arguments in some way speak for belief revision. 
A different, better way to elaborate on this alternative explanation is that the 
sense of entitlement is to be explained with something like epistemically vicious 
stubborn dispositions. Perhaps the audience takes pride in being right and 
therefore they resist belief revision (and the admission of mistake that goes 
along with it), even when they actually recognize that belief revision is due. 
This explanation, however, would be better suited to explain a different 
phenomenon: the fact that the audience does not revise their beliefs, in response 
to the arguments. It does not directly address the sense of entitlement, and I 
cannot see how this explanation could account for the sense of entitlement – in 
particular, the sense of perception-based entitlement. The explanation does not 
refer to perceptual experiences at all, in accounting for the sense of entitlement. 
Finally, the phenomenology that we would expect, given this explanation, is 
quite different from a sense of entitlement. It feels a particular way to be 
stubborn about a belief, in the face of relevant arguments speaking against it, 
out of a sense of pride and unwillingness to admit a mistake; and it feels 
different to be entitled to a belief. So I do not believe that this or other expla-
nations that appeal to the audience’s intellectual vices can go far in explaining 
the sense of entitlement. 
 
(2) The audience’s inborn or habitual tendency to perceive and think in certain 
ways 
The second kind of explanation for the sense of entitlement might involve 
reference to hard-wired illusions: ways of perceiving our environment that 
come naturally to us yet are deeply mistaken. For example, we might have 
something like an inborn notion of a paradigmatic macroscopic physical object: 
something that is cohesive (not scattered) and usually moves around (if it 
moves) in one piece, perhaps. Due to this inborn notion, we pay attention to 
certain parts of our surroundings and label them with words like “table”, 
“chair”, “mountain, “cloud”, etc.  
In this vein, the revisionary ontologists could try to explain the sense of 
entitlement as the result of a persistent illusion, arising from how we naturally 
tend to see the world. Daly and Liggins suggest that seeing tables may be 
similar to hard-wired perceptual mistakes, such as seeing straight sticks as bent 
in water (Daly and Liggins 2016, 410). Certainly, we sometimes see things 
being a certain way, come to believe that they are that way on the basis of such 
perception, and then later learn that things are actually quite different. This is 
the case with the illusion that the sun, rather than the earth, moves. In this case, 
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the fact that a normally highly truth conducive way of forming a belief goes 
wrong is explained by appeal to illusion. However, note that once we are aware 
of the illusion, although our perceptual experience may remain the same, we do 
not feel that its appearing to us that the sun moves around the earth still entitles 
us to believe that the sun moves around the earth, regardless of what astrono-
mers argue. Yet, we feel an analogous entitlement in the case of revisionary 
ontology. 
For some reason, Daly and Liggins and others who bring up similar 
examples do not make much of the striking contrast between these examples of 
optical illusion and the case of revisionary ontology: in the latter case, we not 
only have the same perceptual experiences, after being exposed to the argu-
ments, but we also still believe the relevant contents and even further, we feel 
entitled to those beliefs. Perhaps they would say that there is no such sense of 
entitlement; and then my disagreement with them would come down to an 
empirical matter that is difficult to resolve empirically. I will go on to simply 
assume that the sense of entitlement is a real phenomenon. My main point here 
is that it cannot be explained by referring to well known cases of hard-wired 
illusions (seeing straight sticks as bent in water, etc.), which this case (of seeing 
tables, etc.) might be similar to. This is because we do not form beliefs based on 
those illusions, nor do we feel entitled to those beliefs, once we are aware of the 
illusions. So someone who would bring up the hard-wired illusions in response 
to the argument from the sense of entitlement would misunderstand the relevant 
explanandum: the explanandum is not that we see the world a certain way, but 
rather that we continue to feel entitled to the beliefs under attack, despite the 
ontologists’ arguments. 
Perhaps the explanation could go further as follows: normally, when we see 
(in a non-factive sense) that things are in a certain way, then this entitles us to 
believe that things are that way. When we encounter the situation that obtains in 
most kitchens, we see (in a non-factive sense) that there is exactly one table in 
that situation. Since normally, when we see that p, that entitles us to believe that 
p, we think that this is how it works in this case as well. However, in this case, 
what we see is not actually the case, as the revisionary ontologists’ arguments 
should persuade us. Now, the problem with this account is that it still does not 
explain the feeling that the entitlement to the belief that p is unaffected by the 
ontologists’ argument. Given this explanation for the sense of entitlement, the 
sense of entitlement should not persist after the ontologists’ arguments are 
introduced and understood: the arguments tell us that we are not dealing with a 
“normal” case, where seeing that p entitles us to believe that p. 
 
(3) The fact that things would look the same, whether or not there are Fs 
Similar remarks apply to Merricks’ suggestion that “one’s ‘seemingly seeing a 
statue’ is caused – in a non‐hallucinatory, non‐prankish way – by 
things arranged statuewise” (Merricks 2001, 2); and “one’s visual evidence 
would be the same whether or not those atoms composed something” (Merricks 
2001, 9). In other words: things would look the same, even if there were no 
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tables. Now, this might perhaps help explain how the audience could believe 
that there are tables, as long as they are given no reason to believe otherwise. 
They are interpreting the visual evidence in a certain way, because they have 
not yet been given a reason to believe that this is a mistaken way to interpret the 
visual evidence. However, this suggestion about visual evidence does not 
explain the sense of entitlement that persists after reasons have been given to 
believe that there are no tables. (I will here leave aside the question about 
whether Merricks is correct that the world would look the same to us, whether 
there are tables or only particles arranged table-wise. This claim does not strike 
me as obviously correct, however.) 
So the alternative explanations fail to account for the sense of entitlement, as 
opposed to why we see the world in a certain way or why we form certain 
beliefs on the basis of what we see. Now, I have not quite spelled out yet how 
my explanation for the sense of entitlement is prima facie inconsistent with the 
simple incompatibilist account. One way to put the point is as follows. On my 
account, we are entitled to the relevant beliefs, for example the belief that there 
are tables. This entitlement is based on the fact that we can form the relevant 
beliefs via a highly truth-conducive method, namely by applying our conceptual 
competence in the interpretation of an experience to form judgements, and on 
the basis of these judgments, drawing inferences of the sort we are competent in 
drawing. Further, if we can form a belief by such a highly truth-conducive 
method, then we are not only entitled to the belief, but the belief is highly likely 
to be true. According to the simple incompatibilist account, however, the belief 
(e.g. that there are tables) is false. 
Against this, one might argue that our conceptual competence can dispose us 
to make false judgments, and this might be happening in the cases at hand as 
well, for example, when we judge that there is exactly one table in the situation. 
Then, we could still combine the view according to which the sense of 
entitlement is explained by our awareness of our conceptual competence, with 
the view that revisionary ontologists reveal that judgments like the judgment 
that ‘there is exactly one table in this situation’ and the inferred judgment that 
‘there are tables’ are false, in the language that we speak. The view that our 
conceptual competence can dispose us to make false judgments has been 
defended by Eklund, who writes (objecting to the argument from inconsistent 
concepts to dialetheism): 
 
To be fully competent with an expression, a speaker need merely be disposed to 
accept the meaning-constitutive principles for this expression as true. This dis-
position may be overridden, for example by evidence that the meaning-consti-
tutive principles of the language are jointly inconsistent. (Eklund 2002a, 322)  
 
Eklund also develops this idea – that semantic competence can dispose us to 
make false judgments – in (Eklund 2002b). Applied to the case at hand, the idea 
could be that, for example, our semantic competence with “table” disposes us to 
accept as true the sentence “If tables exist, then they are such that a table minus 
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an atom is a table”. However, this sentence, as Eklund argues, could still be 
false – it could be what he calls the “culprit” of the paradox. Further, although 
Eklund himself might pick the “If tables exist, then they are such that…” 
premise (the principle of minute differences) as the culprit, the revisionary 
ontologists could argue instead that the culprit is the perceptual judgment, 
which our competence with “table” also disposes us to make, namely “There is 
exactly one table in this situation”. If revisionary ontologists could hold that this 
perceptual judgment is false, although licensed by linguistic competence, they 
could also reject as false the inferred judgment “There are tables and not 
millions of them in each situation where there is one”. They would then 
maintain consistency within their judgments by affirming all the premises and 
the conclusions of the revisionary ontologists’ arguments (e.g. the problem of 
the many) and rejecting as false the perceptual and inferential judgments that 
make the revisionary conclusion appear false. Then, revisionary ontologists 
could accept my explanation for the sense of entitlement (that conceptual 
competence “licenses”, i.e. disposes us to perceptual judgments like “There is 
exactly one table in this situation”); and they could nevertheless maintain that 
they are showing that the ordinary belief that there are tables (and not millions 
of them in each situation where there is one) is false. Taking this strategy, 
revisionary ontologists would also need to show why the perceptual and 
inferential judgments, rather than some premise(s) in their argument, are false; 
but perhaps they can do this. 
This strategy, of course, would also call for an account of how a judgment 
can be false, even though it is licensed by semantic competence. Eklund 
suggests such an account in his (Eklund 2002b). It is a broadly Fregean account. 
The meaning-constitutive principles for an expression are embedded in the 
Fregean “sense” (I suppose this could also be called the “concept”); and the 
semantic value of the expression, or the “reference”, is what comes closest to 
satisfying all the principles embedded in the sense. Now, the problem with this 
account appears to be that it remains unclear where the requirement of 
consistency comes from, as a further determinant of the semantic value, beyond 
what is contained in the sense. On the Fregean account, sense is supposed to 
determine reference, so if there is an all-trumping requirement of consistency 
that plays a role in determining the semantic value, then this requirement of 
consistency should be a part of the sense, the concept. Alternatively, one might 
appeal to something like “eligibility” as the external determinant of the 
semantic value, in a Lewisian vein; but that move should be avoided, because of 
the mysteriousness of the idea that eligibility can determine meaning, without 
there being a speaker intention involving deference to eligibility (and such 
deference would seem to put the requirement of consistency back in the 
“sense”). 
So it seems that in order for the Fregean account to work, the requirement of 
consistency, as a trumping determinant of the semantic value, should be em-
bedded in the sense. However, then we would expect our dispositions to reflect 
this universal, trumping requirement of consistency. If it is true about a 
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particular expression (e.g. “table”) that competence with the expression 
disposes us to accept inconsistent judgments and this disposition is overridden 
by the requirement not to accept inconsistent judgments, then discovering the 
inconsistency of the judgments should make the speaker retract at least one of 
the judgments that are collectively inconsistent or perhaps suspend judgment for 
all of them (not knowing which one is the culprit). However, this retraction or 
suspension does not seem to happen, in the case of revisionary ontology. There 
is another reason to be suspicious of the idea that all concepts involve the built-
in requirement of consistency: why would our language have evolved like this, 
if concepts that license certain inconsistent judgments seem to be working well 
for most ordinary, practical purposes? For these reasons, I am not convinced 
that the demand of consistency is somehow inscribed into all our concepts, 
trumping the other application conditions. Instead, I take demands like con-
sistency (i.e. the concepts licensing only consistent judgments) to be desiderata 
that are external to the concepts themselves. 
Note that it does not appear to be Eklund’s own view that the requirement of 
consistency is inscribed into our concepts. He rather seems to hold that our 
aversion to true contradictions (an aversion that, as I understand it, is itself not a 
part of our conceptual scheme) makes it the case that our expressions get the 
semantic values that come closest to satisfying the meaning-constitutive prin-
ciples in a contradiction-free way. So the consistency-requiring determinant of 
reference would still come from inside the speakers’ minds, but not from the 
concepts (or senses) in question. I am not certain how the aversion to true 
contradictions can enter into fixing the reference of expressions, without being a 
part of the concept or the sense associated with these expressions; but that might 
be due to my own insufficient familiarity with the relevant discussions. 
Now one will surely ask: do I then accept dialetheism (the view that there 
are true contradictions)? I am inclined to think that one can recognize that there 
are inconsistent concepts (concepts that license inconsistent judgments) and that 
there is no trumping requirement of consistency embedded in all concepts and 
that semantic values are not fixed by eligibility or mental aversions, inde-
pendently of our concepts, and that classical logic can still somehow govern the 
discourse carried out using the inconsistent concepts. This is, however, because 
I find each of these conjuncts independently plausible, not because I have an 
account of how to accommodate all these claims. The threat of dialetheism, 
once we recognize that there are inconsistent concepts, is an important issue that 
nevertheless falls out of the scope of this thesis. 
Further, I suppose that it is not strictly speaking necessary to tackle these 
issues, in order to reject simple incompatibilism on the ground that it does not 
explain the sense of entitlement. If simple incompatibilism were further deve-
loped along the lines suggested above – i.e. by invoking the idea that conceptual 
competence can dispose us to make false perceptual judgments like “There is 
exactly one table in this situation” – then we would be dealing with a more 
sophisticated account that may not ultimately be that different from my own. If 
judgments like “There is exactly one table in this situation” are false, and 
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conceptual competence disposes us to make such false judgments, then we 
should still presumably revise our concepts so that they would not involve such 
a disposition to make false judgments. Revisionary ontology would then still be 
a project of conceptual engineering, although the details might be fleshed out a 
bit differently from how I flesh them out. Revisionary ontology would then be 
epistemically significant because it helps us get rid of false beliefs by revising 
the concepts that dispose us to form false beliefs. On my current account, by 
contrast, beliefs like the belief that there is exactly one table in this situation and 
the belief that there are tables are not false. They are true, but they are just cast 
in theoretically problematic (e.g. inconsistent) concepts. 
Again, I have spelled out the inconsistency of the simple incompatibilist 
account with the best explanation for the sense of perception-based entitlement, 
as follows. According to the best explanation, we can form the relevant beliefs 
(e.g. that there are tables) by a highly truth-conducive procedure, namely by 
applying our conceptual and inferential competence. However, this suggests 
that the relevant beliefs are true, and according to the simple incompatibilist 
account, they are false. I did not find it particularly plausible that these beliefs 
could still be false, although licensed by conceptual competence. (In any case, if 
revisionary ontologists adopt such an account, they should explain why 
precisely these are the false judgments, rather than some premise(s) in their 
argument; and they should give a plausible account of how a judgment licensed 
by linguistic competence can nevertheless be false.) Further, whether the 
inconsistency of my explanation for the sense of entitlement with the simple 
incompatibilist account should be spelled out in this or some other way, the 
explanation that I have provided for the sense of entitlement (citing our 
awareness of our conceptual and inferential competence) calls for a more 
nuanced account of revisionary ontology. We need to understand how we can 
remain entitled to beliefs like the belief that there are tables, in virtue of our 
conceptual and inferential competence, and how revisionary ontologists can 
nonetheless be in a position to destabilize these beliefs and to improve our 
beliefs with their arguments. 
There are some similarities between my criticism of the simple incompa-
tibilist account of revisionary ontology and Thomasson’s (2015) criticism of 
“hard ontology”. Thomasson claims that we can get the answers to the 
supposedly difficult ontological questions by drawing certain simple inferences 
that are warranted by linguistic competence, for example, by going from “There 
are particles arranged table-wise” (which is uncontroversial for many revisio-
nary ontologists) to “There are tables”. So she also appeals to judgments 
warranted by linguistic competence. However, she does not appeal to the sense 
of perception-based entitlement and so her account seems to lack motivation for 
supposing that the relevant inferences are warranted by linguistic competence. 
My account can supply the motivation, although perhaps not for the particular 
inferences that Thomasson thinks are thereby warranted. Further, a significant 
divergence from Thomasson’s account is that I do not take any of this to 
warrant general deflationism about serious, hard ontology; it rather suggests to 
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me that the revisionary ontologists need to look for an alternative to the simple 
incompatibilist account. 
Again, many revisionary ontologists themselves actually reject simple in-
compatibilism, although not for the reason that I have highlighted: the failure of 
the account to explain the sense of entitlement. In the next section, I will look at 
the alternative accounts of revisionary ontology that have been developed or 
suggested by revisionary ontologists, such as van Inwagen, who reject simple 
incompatibilism for reasons that differ from mine. These will be compatibilist 
accounts of revisionary ontology. 
 
 
4.4. Rejecting compatibilism(s) 
Most revisionary ontologists who reject simple incompatibilism adopt some 
variety of compatibilism. According to these compatibilist accounts, there is no 
rational conflict between revisionary ontologists’ claims and ordinary beliefs 
about what there is. I will consider various kinds of compatibilism – Socratic 
compatibilism, indifference compatibilism, and linguistic compatibilism – and 
reject all of these. The categorization of compatibilisms here is based upon the 
following question: what, if any, beliefs on the relevant subject matter (e.g. 
whether there are tables) does the audience have, according to the compatibilist 
view in question, prior to encountering the revisionary ontologists’ arguments? 
 
 
4.4.1. Against Socratic compatibilism 
According to what I call Socratic compatibilism, most people have believed all 
along that, for example, there are no tables or that there are talking donkeys, in 
the one and only literal ordinary-language sense of the sentences “There are no 
tables” and “There are talking donkeys”. I call this “Socratic compatibilism”, 
because the revisionary ontologists, on this view, are embodying the Socratic 
idea that the dialogue with the philosopher brings to one’s awareness what one 
already knows. The idea, then, is that the audience already has all the right 
beliefs about what there is, for example, that there are no chairs and that there 
are talking donkeys (and does not have the wrong beliefs on these same 
matters), and the ontologists’ job is just to bring those beliefs to their awareness. 
I discuss this compatibilist option as a logical possibility; I do not know of 
anyone who explicitly defends this view. However, it seems to fit in well with a 
view about ordinary discourse that is sometimes attributed to van Inwagen 
(although he rejects this attribution (van Inwagen 2014, 11)). The view is that 
when we say, for example, “There are chairs in the next room”, what we mean 
is rather that there are particles arranged chair-wise in the next room. Our 
ontology, what we believe to exist, on this view, is not reflected in how we 
speak; in particular, we speak as if there were chairs, when we really believe 
that there are only particles arranged chair-wise and no chairs. 
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What would be the epistemic significance of revisionary ontology, on this 
account? The significance cannot be the mere gaining of true beliefs, because 
according to Socratic compatibilism, we already had the true ontological 
beliefs, somewhere and somehow, all along – even before the time when the 
revisionary ontologists’ midwifery began. One option for understanding the 
epistemic significance of revisionary ontology, on this account, is by appeal to 
the idea that good beliefs are not just true, but also acknowledged by us as our 
beliefs. So the view would be that it is possible to have a true belief, but without 
recognizing that one has it, or perhaps even while denying that one has the 
belief (as the case seems to be with the belief that there are no tables, on this 
account). Further, one success-condition for beliefs is that they should be true; 
but another is that they should be recognized and reflectively endorsed by us. 
Of course, when a “hidden” belief is false, it cannot be improved by making it a 
recognized and endorsed belief. Only true hidden beliefs can be improved in 
this manner. Indeed, there is some plausibility to the idea that truths hidden so 
deep in the back of our minds that we do not recognize them as our beliefs (or 
are even inclined to deny them) are not as valuable as true beliefs that we 
consciously endorse. Another option for explaining the epistemic significance 
of revisionary ontology, on the Socratic account, is that what matters, episte-
mically speaking, is still just truth, but the ontological midwives help us to gain 
true meta-beliefs about our ontological beliefs, and to get rid of false meta-
beliefs. 
So there are various ways to make sense of the epistemic significance of 
revisionary ontology, on this compatibilist account. The problem with the 
account, however, is that the claims it makes about what people believe are 
highly implausible. If other evidence does not establish that most people believe 
that there are tables, then we can find the evidence in the sense of desta-
bilization and the sense of entitlement. Both of these present us with our belief 
that there are tables: the former presents it as the object of destabilization and 
the latter presents it as the object of entitlement. To override this evidence, we 
would need to explain why we would believe that we believe that p (e.g. ‘There 
are tables’) when actually we do not believe that p and we even believe that not-




4.4.2. Against indifference compatibilism 
According to another compatibilist view – indifference compatibilism – most 
people hold no views on whether chairs exist or whether tables exist. As with 
Socratic compatibilism, discussions in revisionary ontology, on this view, 
concern the truth of existence claims in their ordinary, everyday sense. Ac-
cording to indifference compatibilism, however, the epistemic significance 
would consist in providing people with new beliefs on this matter, rather than 
bringing into their awareness the beliefs that they already have. Another 
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contrast with Socratic compatibilism is that indifference compatibilism, 
although it is similarly a view without much initial plausibility, appears to have 
a prominent proponent: van Inwagen (1990), in the chapter entitled “Why the 
Proposed Answer to the Special Composition Question, Radical Though It Is, 
Does Not Contradict Our Ordinary Beliefs”. This chapter is not very clear, but 
based on what I can make of it, the reason why van Inwagen’s view on com-
position, which implies that there are no tables and chairs, does not contradict 
our ordinary beliefs is that our ordinary beliefs do not include the belief that 
there are tables and chairs. 
One of van Inwagen’s attempts to repudiate the impression that surely we all 
believe that there are tables and chairs goes as follows: 
 
There is what we might call Universal Belief: that body of propositions that has 
been accepted by every human being who has ever lived, bar a few imbeciles and 
madmen; which is accepted even by Spinoza and Bradley when the madness of 
philosophy is not upon them. Is the existence of chairs – or, at any rate, of things 
suitable for sitting on, like stones and stumps – a matter of Universal Belief? If it 
were, this would count strongly against my position, for any philosopher who 
denies what practically everyone believes is, so far as I can see, adopting a posi-
tion according to which the human capacity for knowing the truth about things is 
radically defective. … It is far from obvious, however, that it is a matter of 
Universal Belief that there are chairs. (van Inwagen 1990, 103) 
 
Of course, there is a distinction to be made among the following claims: 
(a) It is not the case that almost everyone believes that there are chairs. 
(b) Most people do not have beliefs on whether there are chairs. 
The first claim, which is what van Inwagen directly expresses in the quote 
above, allows for the possibility that almost everyone believes that there are no 
chairs (the assumption of Socratic compatibilism). However, since this would 
be such an implausible claim about what people believe, I suppose that van 
Inwagen holds the somewhat more plausible view (b) that most people do not 
have beliefs on whether there are chairs. His explicit claim (a) that it is not the 
case that almost everyone believes that there are chairs would also be consistent 
with the claim that only a slight majority of people believe that there are chairs. 
However, that interpretation would not align with van Inwagen’s espoused 
purpose in the chapter, to show that his view “does not contradict our ordinary 
beliefs”. So I take van Inwagen’s position, in his (van Inwagen 1990), to be that 
most people do not have beliefs on whether there are chairs, in the ordinary 
English sense of “There are chairs”. 
Van Inwagen’s attempt to argue for indifference compatibilism (assuming 
that it is indeed his view) falls far short of being convincing. His strategy 
appears to be to show how our everyday talk, much of which seems to entail 
that there are chairs, can actually be free of ontological commitment to chairs. 
This general approach to the interpretation of everyday talk as non-committal 
about ontological matters has been helpfully fleshed out by Eklund (2005), who 
calls the view “hermeneutic indifferentism”. Eklund claims, plausibly, that 
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“even genuinely literal assertions have what we may call non-serious features, 
features that are not important to the point of the assertions”, and that “among 
these features are normally the ontologically committing ones” (Eklund 2005, 
558). Or as he also puts the point: 
 
Relevance to the main point of an utterance is naturally a matter of degree, but 
we can still draw a rough and ready distinction between the features of an utte-
rance that are central to the point of making it (features the speaker takes 
seriously, as I shall put it) and features that are not so central (the non-serious 
ones). My claim is then that the ontological commitments, including ontological 
commitments to spatiotemporal objects, are often (perhaps always) non-serious. 
(Eklund 2005, 564) 
 
Van Inwagen’s approach apparently is to defend indifference compatibilism 
(the view that most people do not have beliefs about the existence of chairs) 
against a certain obvious objection, which van Inwagen considers to be the main 
source of support for incompatibilism: the objection that people often sincerely 
assert sentences like “There are two chairs in the next room”. These sentences 
entail that the entities in question (e.g. chairs) exist; so presumably people who 
assert such sentences believe that there are chairs. Van Inwagen’s defence 
against this objection to indifference compatibilism consists in bringing 
examples of cases where people talk as if Fs existed, without believing that they 
do. This way of supporting indifference compatibilism, by appeal to herme-
neutic indifferentism, is unconvincing, since indifference compatibilism needs 
to be defended against different and more important objections instead. 
These more important objections are different ways of supporting the claim 
that most people believe that there are chairs. For one, we could ask them – this 
is, after all, how we usually inquire into what people believe about a given 
matter. We are not limited to interpreting what people tend to say. Note that my 
aim here is not to argue against hermeneutic indifferentism.13 I am looking for 
an account of what revisionary ontologists are doing, and hermeneutic indiffe-
rentism is not an account of that. Hermeneutic indifferentism is an account of 
what we all do when we quantify over various things in everyday discourse. 
The relevance of this account for interpreting revisionary ontology is that 
hermeneutic indifferentism (or some similar account of ordinary quantifica-
tional discourse) is supposed to make a certain account of revisionary ontology, 
namely indifference compatibilism, more plausible, according to van Inwagen. 
Indifference compatibilism, again, is the view that (1) revisionary ontologists 
argue about what there is in the ordinary, natural language sense of expressions 
                                                 
13 I touch on this in my (Kitsik 2008a), where I point out that hermeneutic indifferentism 
seems less plausible as an interpretation of everyday utterances of sentences like “There are 
chairs” – I bring an example of such an everyday utterance – as opposed to utterances of 
sentences like “There are two chairs in the next room”. Further, I point out there that we may 
expect speakers who utter sentences like “There are chairs” to deny that they are indifferent 
about whether there are chairs. 
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like “There are Fs” and (2) their views (e.g. that there are no Fs) are neverthe-
less not in conflict with what most people believe, because most people do not 
have beliefs on whether there are Fs. Hermeneutic indifferentism is relevant 
only in so far as it can be invoked to explain how it is possible that people can 
go around saying things like “There are two chairs in the next room”, while they 
have no beliefs about whether there are chairs. But hermeneutic indifferentism 
in no way implies indifference compatibilism.14 
Assuming that revisionary ontologists indeed argue that there are no chairs 
(for example), in the one and only, literal English sense of “There are no 
chairs”, then there is good reason to believe that what they argue contradicts 
ordinary belief – regardless of whether hermeneutic indifferentism is true. This 
is, first, because we can ask people, and I assume that they will report their 
belief that there are chairs, when asked. Secondly, in this chapter, I am 
assuming that the audience reacts to the revisionary ontologists with a sense of 
destabilization and a sense of entitlement. Again, the objects of that sense of 
entitlement and destabilization are the very beliefs that, according to indif-
ference compatibilism, are not present: for example, the belief that there are 
chairs. 
Indifference compatibilism, then, should be rejected, although it provides a 
straightforward explanation of the epistemic significance of revisionary onto-
logy. The explanation of the epistemic significance, again, is that revisionary 
ontology gives us new true beliefs about matters we had no prior beliefs about. 
Further, these seem to be significant truths: whether tables exist is a prima facie 
interesting topic. It is certainly not like knowledge of how many blades of grass 
there currently are in my backyard, for example. However, the problem with 
indifference compatibilism is similar to the problem with Socratic compa-
tibilism. The problem with Socratic compatibilism is the implausible belief 
attribution, and the problem with indifference compatibilism is the slightly less 
implausible, but still implausible attribution of non-belief (the lack of beliefs on 
matters like whether there are chairs). 
If one is not convinced that these attributions are implausible in their own 
right, then this criticism of Socratic and indifference compatibilism can instead 
be construed as follows. These compatibilisms do not meet the adequacy 
criteria of accounting for the sense of entitlement and the sense of destabi-
lization. Not only do these compatibilisms fail to explain why we would 
experience these reactions to the ontologists’ arguments, they are inconsistent 
with these data. The sense of destabilization and entitlement arise in relation to 
beliefs with a certain content, for example, beliefs with the content that there are 
                                                 
14 I do not think that Eklund uses hermeneutic indifferentism to defend indifference compa-
tibilism. According to Eklund, the “point that indifferentism is supposed to drive home” is 
that “ordinary assertive utterances are not as much hostage to metaphysical fortune as it 
might seem” (Eklund 2005, 576). What interests us here, however, is not whether there is a 
conflict between ordinary talk and revisionary ontology, but whether there is a conflict 
between ordinary belief and revisionary ontology. 
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chairs. Socratic and indifference compatibilism deny that we have beliefs with 
such content. In principle, these compatibilists could argue that we can have a 
sense of entitlement and destabilization that appear to be about such beliefs, 
while we do not really have these beliefs (and might even believe the opposite 
instead). But then it would need to be explained why it seems to us like we have 
these beliefs. As things stand – with such explanations lacking – Socratic and 




4.4.3 Against linguistic variance compatibilism 
But there is yet another kind of compatibilist to consider, and this one is a 
stronger contender. The “linguistic variance compatibilist” grants, with high 
plausibility, that most people believe that there are tables and that there are no 
talking donkeys, in the literal plain English sense of these claims. The linguistic 
compatibilist further holds that revisionary ontologists address these matters 
(matters like the existence of tables and talking donkeys) in a different sense of 
sentences like “There are chairs” and “There are no talking donkeys”. These 
other, metaphysical readings of the sentences are not readily available to most 
speakers of ordinary English. So we may expect that most ordinary speakers 
have given no thought to the existence of tables and talking donkeys in this 
other sense, and so they have no beliefs about these issues. The unavailability of 
these alternative meanings might not be a principled matter; it might just be that 
most people never find themselves in a context (such as a metaphysics seminar) 
where the metaphysical meanings of sentences like “There are chairs” are 
relevant. 
Such linguistic variance compatibilism may take the form of the view that, in 
listing the main interpretive options, I have called the “Ontologese view”; or it 
may also take the form of the “contextualist view”. On the former view, onto-
logists speak a language that should be considered distinct from the relevant 
natural language, e.g. English. On the latter view, ontologists still speak the 
relevant natural language, but they speak it in a special ontological context. I do 
not think that the difference between these two kinds of linguistic variance 
matters for assessing the tenability of linguistic variance compatibilism in light 
of our adequacy conditions. 
Van Inwagen apparently has become a linguistic variance compatibilist of 
the contextualist variety: “[O]nly metaphysicians (or at any rate only people 
who have been exposed to discussions of the metaphysics of artefacts) have 
ever considered – ever entertained, ever grasped, ever held before their minds – 
the inside proposition” (van Inwagen 2014, 6). The “inside proposition” is the 
proposition that sentences like “There are chairs” express in the “ontology 
room”, the ontological context. Van Inwagen (ibid.) mentions that this linguistic 
variance compatibilist position was already “implicit” in his Material Beings 
(1990); but I find it more plausible to interpret the proposal there as a version of 
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indifference compatibilism. Horgan and Potrč (2008) might also be linguistic 
variance compatibilists of the contextualist variety. 
Van Inwagen, again, draws a distinction between the “inside” and “outside” 
proposition, i.e. what “There are chairs” expresses in the ontology room and 
outside it. He thinks that 
 
the metaphysical neutrality of the outside proposition can be established by a 
very simple observation: it is made true by such states of affairs as that (pretend, 
reader, that I am speaking rather than writing, and that, as I spoke the words 
‘such state of affairs as that’, I made an ostensive gesture in the direction of 
some things arranged chairwise). (van Inwagen 2014, 13) 
 
Further, van Inwagen concedes that “there being things arranged chairwise is 
sufficient for the truth of what is expressed by ‘Chairs exist’ in everyday 
circumstances” (ibid.). Although van Inwagen cites this as a point of agreement 
with Hirsch, it is even more prominently a point of agreement with Thomasson 
(2015). As such, this account also accords well with my Thomassonian 
explanation for the sense of perception-based entitlement. The linguistic 
variance compatibilist can say that the object of the sense of entitlement is the 
belief that there are chairs, in the ordinary, non-metaphysical sense of “There 
are chairs”. Then, the sense of entitlement can be further explained as I did in a 
previous section, as arising from our awareness of our competence with the 
word “chair” (in the ordinary, non-metaphysical sense of “chair”). Unlike the 
previous accounts, then, linguistic variance compatibilism accommodates the 
sense of entitlement rather well: it can help itself to what I have proposed is the 
best explanation for the sense of entitlement. We are entitled to our beliefs 
about what there is because the application conditions for the relevant expres-
sions (like “There are chairs”) are satisfied, in the language that we normally 
speak. And we sense our entitlement because we are aware of our competence 
with our language. However, I will argue that linguistic variance compatibilism 
does not explain the sense of destabilization and does not explain how 
revisionary ontology can improve our beliefs. 
Before this, I need to address an initial problem with linguistic variance 
compatibilism: the problem of understanding the meaning of sentences like 
“There are chairs” in the ontology room, or in Ontologese (the language spoken 
by metaphysicians – perhaps a contextual variant of English, perhaps a distinct 
language). A common response to linguistic compatibilism (and other views 
that posit a special ontological meaning of existence claims) is: how else can 
“There are chairs” be understood, if not in the usual way? One possible answer 
is the following: when ontologists ask what there is, they are asking what there 
fundamentally is, i.e. what the fundamental entities are. But this is unsatis-
factory, as a defensive account of revisionary ontology, because it is unclear 
how the ontologists’ arguments could serve as arguments about the (non-) 
fundamentality of certain entities, rather than their (non-) existence. Also, it 
seems like this would render many theses in revisionary ontology mere 
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platitudes that everyone agrees with and that hardly need book-length defences. 
For example, why write a book defending the claim that chairs and tables are 
non-fundamental? Is there anyone who thinks that they are fundamental (the 
basic furniture of the universe)? The latter worry might be addressed, to an 
extent, by interpreting “fundamental” as “irreducible”. It is not obvious that 
tables are fully reducible to the atoms that they are made of: that the level of 
description and explanation that includes tables can be dispensed with, when we 
want to understand the world. The latter might be a claim that van Inwagen is 
committed to. However, it does not seem to be what his central arguments 
(primarily, the argument from composition) aim to establish. The arguments do 
not seem to draw on the kinds of considerations that are relevant for demon-
strating the reducibility of tables and chairs. The reducibility of things like 
tables and chairs to fundamental particles rather seems to function as a (possibly 
disputable) premise in the argument, not as the conclusion. 
The option that I favour instead, for understanding the point of quantifi-
cational language in the ontology room, is Sider’s (2011). (However, I do not 
think that Sider himself can be considered a linguistic variance compatibilist; 
the incompatibilist aspect of his account will be discussed in the next section.) 
The idea is that revisionary ontologists try to identify and employ a conceptual 
scheme that carves the world at its joints, that is, reflects the world’s objective 
structure. It is controversial whether the world has an objective structure, 
whether concepts can reflect that structure, and whether quantificational 
concepts can reflect that structure (whether there is such quantificational 
structure to be reflected). But I will assume that these worries can be addressed 
and talk of joint-carving concepts, including the joint-carving quantifier, makes 
sense. I further assume that it makes sense for revisionary ontologists to adopt 
Sider’s view about how we should look for the most joint-carving conceptual 
scheme. Namely, we should look for the most elegant, contradiction-free, 
simple – in other words, the most theoretically virtuous – conceptual scheme. 
We can then expect the concepts of that virtuous scheme to be the joint-carving 
ones. This is, of course, a highly contested and contestable assumption, and I 
am only granting the connection between theoretical virtues and reflecting 
reality for the sake of the argument. 
I leave it open here whether the linguistic variance compatibilist’s proposal 
should be that ontologists use a version of English that has an attempt at joint-
carving built into it (as Sider would say) or that the ontologists are talking about 
how to revise ordinary language, so that it would carve at the joints. I do have a 
preference, though, and it is the second option. Sider himself (2011, 2014) 
seems to prefer the first option. Hirsch (2008, 520) has suggested that the 
second one would be more plausible. So claims like “There are no tables”, on 
this account, could be understood as: “In the variant of English with the most 
joint-carving concepts, we could not truly say ‘There are tables’.” 
Let us return to the adequacy conditions. It is prima facie tricky for the 
linguistic variance compatibilist to explain the sense of destabilization. 
According to linguistic variance compatibilism, the ontologists’ arguments do 
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not at all address the beliefs that most people have about the existence of tables 
or talking donkeys. These ordinary beliefs are presumably cast in ordinary 
concepts; but according to the linguistic variance compatibilist, the ontologists 
are either talking about what a joint-carving conceptual scheme would be like or 
are already using that scheme. So it does not make good sense for the audience 
to start doubting their ordinary beliefs, cast in ordinary non-joint-carving 
concepts, when they hear the arguments. A linguistic variance compatibilist 
might propose that the audience mistakenly takes the ontologists’ arguments to 
address the ordinary beliefs about the existence of tables and talking donkeys; 
after all, the arguments’ conclusions are misleadingly phrased (e.g. “There are 
no tables”). Indeed, the mere fact that ontologists, who are plausibly their 
audience’s intellectual equals or superiors, appear to disagree with them about 
whether there are tables, may make the audience (reasonably) doubt this belief. 
However, this does not get the phenomenology right. The sense of destabi-
lization contains more than just the sense that something about what the 
ontologists say makes us doubt our ontological beliefs. The arguments, the 
puzzles make us doubt the beliefs – and not just the fact that the ontologists 
disagree with us. The puzzles reveal problematic features of our belief system: 
our belief system somehow leads us to say contradictory things or leaves us 
confused about what to say, in response to apparently easy questions (like how 
many tables there are in the room). The source of the destabilization is some 
problem with the beliefs, pointed out by the ontologists, and not the mere fact 
that our intellectual equals or superiors appear to disagree with us about what 
there is. 
Similar doubts about compatibilist accounts more generally have been 
expressed by Korman as well (although he does not use my terminology, so he 
does not talk about a “sense of destabilization”): “[I]f after giving the usual 
arguments for her surprising ontological claim the ontologist then claims not to 
be denying what we have believed all along, we wonder why not, since her 
reasons, if taken seriously, strike us as reasons for revising our beliefs” (Kor-
man 2015, 302). Indeed, this problem applies likewise to Socratic compatibi-
lism and indifference compatibilism, as well as to linguistic variance compati-
bilism. I did not bring it up before because there is another, more prominent 
way in which Socratic and indifference compatibilism fail to explain the sense 
of destabilization: they deny that the objects of destabilization, such as the 
belief that there are chairs, even exist. The linguistic variance compatibilist does 
not deny that there is such a belief, but she cannot explain why the revisionary 
ontologists’ arguments would appear to destabilize that belief.  
Linguistic variance compatibilism explains the sense of entitlement, then, 
but does not explain the sense of destabilization. Further, linguistic variance 
compatibilism (without further elaboration) does not explain how revisionary 
ontology can improve our beliefs. According to linguistic variance compati-
bilism, there is no rational conflict between what most people believe about 
what there is and what the ontologists are arguing. But then, why should anyone 
care about the ontologists’ arguments? The linguistic variance compatibilist 
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might respond that the project’s epistemic significance need not consist in a 
challenge to the beliefs we already have, but instead, in providing us with 
additional true beliefs, cast in joint-carving concepts. However, these additional 
true beliefs are to be suspected of a certain kind of uninterestingness, such that 
gaining these beliefs is not an epistemic improvement. If the linguistic variance 
compatibilist is right, then most people already have true beliefs about the 
relevant parts of the world. Suppose, for example, that I have the true belief that 
there are two pens on the table in front of me. According to sophisticated 
compatibilism, the nihilist wants me to acquire the additional true belief that 
there are (in the joint-carving sense) just particles arranged pen-wise there. And 
the universalist wants me to acquire the additional true belief that there is (in 
the joint-carving sense) also a pen-pen, made of the two pens, and not just the 
two pens there. But I already had true beliefs about what is going on there, on 
the table in front of me. Moreover, I have the relevant true beliefs about what is 
going on in the world generally, not just on my table. How is my epistemic 
standing improved by gaining these additional true beliefs? Am I not just 
learning to describe the world in a new language? It is not enough to just say 
that the joint-carving conceptual scheme is a better way to think about what is 
going on, on my table and elsewhere in the world. Why is it better? 
In the next section, I will take up Sider’s incompatibilist account that 
addresses this question. Sider’s account also explains the sense of destabili-
zation and the sense of entitlement. However, I will argue that it fails because of 
an underlying problematic ethics of belief. I will then defend a modified 
Siderian account, in the last section. 
 
 
4.5. Siderian incompatibilism 
4.5.1. How it is supposed to work 
The key point of the account that I will elaborate on and criticize in this section, 
and build upon in the next, is that revisionary ontology is supposed to improve 
our concepts, in order to improve our beliefs that are cast using the concepts. I 
assume that beliefs are attitudes towards propositions, and these propositions 
are cast using certain concepts. For example, the belief that cats love dogs (or 
more precisely, the proposition believed) would be somehow made up of the 
concepts of cats, love, and dogs. Revisionary ontologists’ arguments reveal 
what may be called “theoretical problems” with those concepts that are used in 
the construction of beliefs. Chief among those problems is inconsistency, or 
more precisely, licensing inconsistent judgments. 
The idea that revisionary ontology reveals tensions within ordinary thinking 
is quite common, but it is not always fleshed out in terms of inconsistent con-
cepts. For example, Horgan and Potrč write that their “methodological maxim” 
is to “follow commonsense reflection where it leads”, and this involves “not 
backing off from the inquiry when common sense begins to fall into internal 
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tension with itself” (Horgan and Potrč 2008, 15). I unpack the idea of common 
sense falling into tension with itself, as follows: the arguments show that 
ordinary concepts license inconsistent judgments. To persist with inquiry, upon 
recognizing the inconsistency, is already to propose some way of improving the 
concepts, neglecting some judgments that the concepts currently license, to 
preserve others. Whether this means revising the same concepts or replacing 
them with better ones depends on how we individuate concepts and I will not 
take a stand on this.  
Again, sometimes this general idea about the significance of ontological 
arguments, as revealing tensions within ordinary thought, is described without 
using the word “concept”. For example, Scholl writes about how we are 
disposed to make conflicting judgments in the case of the Ship of Theseus: 
 
Perceptual simulation might continue to suggest that the renovated ship is the 
Ship of Theseus, because if you were to watch it sail around while any particular 
renovation was occurring, you would represent it via the same object file. More 
abstract judgments based on brute similarity or origin might still – and at the 
same time – suggest to you that the scavenged ship is the Ship of Theseus, 
though, since the parts of your mind that generate these judgments are distinct 
from those parts that are cleaving to spatiotemporal continuity. (Scholl 2007, 
584) 
 
Scholl here suggests that our perceptual and abstract judgments tend to clash, in 
the Ship of Theseus case, and in that sense the puzzle reveals a tension within 
our way of thinking about the world. This is not framed as a tension within our 
concepts. Sometimes, however, it is taken as a given that the tension is a tension 
within our concepts. For example, Thomasson describes the relevant arguments 
as “pure a priori arguments based on apparent contradictions within our 
ordinary concepts” (Thomasson 2007, 4). In this and the following section, I 
will further explore how the project of revisionary ontology can be understood 
as a project of conceptual engineering, as opposed to the project of replacing 
false beliefs with true ones, focusing on such “tensions” within our concepts as 
the driving force behind the conceptual engineering. This account, I will argue, 
has better prospects for meeting the adequacy conditions (explaining the 
audience’s dual reaction and the epistemic significance of revisionary ontology) 
than the previously considered simple incompatibilist account and the various 
compatibilist accounts. 
Let us begin with the sense of entitlement. I have proposed previously that 
the best explanation for the sense of entitlement is that we can form the relevant 
beliefs (e.g. the belief that there are tables) by applying our conceptual 
competence and drawing simple inferences, and we know this to be a highly 
truth-conducive method for forming beliefs. The conceptual engineering 
account (or the theoretical metalinguistic account, as I have also called it) is 
compatible with this explanation for the sense of entitlement. Unlike simple 
incompatibilism, the conceptual engineering account allows us to admit that we 
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have the described kind of justification for our belief that there are tables, and 
this justification is untouched by the revisionary ontologists’ arguments. Our 
sense of entitlement reflects our awareness of what our concepts license. For 
example, our concept of table licenses the judgment that there is exactly one 
table in the situation that obtains in most kitchens. 
The sense of destabilization can also be explained, on this account: it reflects 
our awareness that the arguments have revealed a problem with the concept that 
licenses such judgments. For example, the argument might have revealed that 
our concept of table also licenses the more abstract judgment, used as a premise 
in the problem of the many, that if there are tables, then they are such that a 
table minus an atom is a table. This judgment, along with other uncontroversial 
enough premises, leads to the revisionary conclusion that there are no tables or 
there are millions of tables in each situation where there is one. And that 
revisionary conclusion is inconsistent with the judgment that can be easily 
inferred from the perceptual judgment licensed by the concept of table. From 
the licensed perceptual judgment that there is exactly one table in this situation, 
we can infer that there are tables and there are not millions of them in each 
situation where there is one. This is how the problem of the many reveals that 
the concept of table licenses inconsistent judgments and gives rise to the sense 
of destabilization. Contra Thomasson, then, we can find out not just common-
sense truths, but also revisionary truths, by applying our conceptual competence 
and combining the judgments licensed by conceptual competence (e.g. that a 
table minus an atom is a table) with uncontroversial premises and drawing 
simple inferences. What moral to draw from this? In particular, what moral can 
we draw from this that would illuminate the nature and value of the project of 
revisionary ontology? 
One option would be that revisionary ontology shows us that we should not 
rely on our conceptual competence for making judgments, that this is actually 
an unreliable method, since it leads to inconsistent results. But how would we 
then make judgments? The method seems to be indispensable. What is not 
indispensable, however, are the particular concepts that we happen to employ in 
forming these judgments. The problem is not in the method of concept-
application as such (for finding out truths about the world), but in the particular 
concepts used. The value of revisionary ontology, accordingly, could consist in 
demonstrating the problems with our concepts and proposing revisions. 
It is relatively clear how this works in the case of the paradox-based argu-
ments like the problem of the many and the sorites arguments, but there are also 
arguments in revisionary ontology that do not appear to belong in this group, at 
least not obviously so; for example, van Inwagen’s composition argument and 
Merricks’ argument from causal over-determination. However, I think that this 
interpretation can be applied to those arguments as well, without too much 
strain. Van Inwagen’s argument, for example, could be taken to show the 
problems with our notion of a composite object. On the one hand, thinking 
about the matter abstractly, we are disposed to judge that there should be a 
unified principle of composition for all kinds of things; but our judgments on 
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particular cases do not live up to that abstract judgment. Likewise, Merricks’ 
argument from causal over-determination might be seen as revealing a clash 
between the abstract judgment that over-determination is unacceptable and 
judgments on particular cases, such as the judgment that the ball causes the 
breaking of the window and that the ball-particles cause the breaking of the 
window. Perhaps this could be seen as a tension within our concept of causality. 
How each argument is best analysed, in the light of this account of revi-
sionary ontology – as revealing problems with our concepts and proposing 
revisions – deserves further inquiry, but is outside the scope of this thesis. My 
focus here is on showing how this account, no matter how it is to be fleshed out 
for each argument, meets the adequacy conditions I have set up: explaining the 
dual reaction (the sense of destabilization and the sense of entitlement) and 
explaining the epistemic significance of revisionary ontology. I have already 
addressed how this account explains the dual reaction. The sense of entitlement 
can be explained by our awareness that our conceptual competence (in 
combination with uncontroversial assumptions and inferences) licenses the 
relevant judgments. And the sense of destabilization can be explained with the 
recognition that the revisionary ontologists’ arguments show problems with the 
concepts that license these judgments. Often, the problem is that the concepts 
license inconsistent judgments. However, in some cases the problem with the 
concepts could be something a bit different – for example, that the concepts 
license insufficiently systematic judgments (perhaps this is the problem that van 
Inwagen’s argument reveals). Now, how is the epistemic significance of 
revisionary ontology to be explained, on this account? 
So far, I have said that revisionary ontologists’ arguments alert us to 
theoretical problems with concepts. I have also supposed that the epistemic 
significance of the ontologists’ arguments must consist in an improvement in 
the audience’s beliefs. The question to be asked, then, is: how can showing 
theoretical problems with our concepts improve our beliefs? As I explained at 
the beginning in this section, beliefs are plausibly thought of as attitudes 
towards propositions, and these propositions are “cast in” certain concepts. 
Perhaps the epistemic significance of revisionary ontology, then, consists in 
pointing to the problems with those concepts that we use to form beliefs. 
Pointing to the problems is the first step on the way to devising better concepts 
and thus forming better beliefs. An account along those lines has been 
suggested by Sider (2011). I will now give an overview of Sider’s suggestion, 
before criticizing it and providing an improved account in the next section. 
According to Sider’s (2011, 61–62) suggestion, revisionary ontologists’ 
arguments give us a reason to revise our true beliefs. This is because good 
beliefs, the kind of beliefs we ought to have, are not just true, but also cast in 
joint-carving concepts. In more detail, the reasoning would be the following. 
(1) The puzzles presented by revisionary ontologists show that the con-
ceptual scheme employed in forming ordinary ontological beliefs is less 
than ideally theoretically virtuous (consistent, simple, elegant, etc.). 
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(2) Less than ideally theoretically virtuous conceptual schemes are less than 
ideally joint-carving (they do not perfectly reflect the objective structure 
of reality). 
(3) Beliefs that are formed employing a less than ideally joint-carving 
conceptual scheme are non-ideal beliefs. 
(4) So ordinary ontological beliefs are non-ideal beliefs. 
(5) Non-ideal beliefs should be revised, if possible. 
(6) So ordinary ontological beliefs should be revised, if possible. 
Sider does not have much to say on why less than perfectly joint-carving beliefs 
are not ideal as beliefs, which is unfortunate, since this is what my criticism will 
focus on. What he says is that “beliefs aim to conform to the world”; and “if 
belief and the world are both structured, belief aims not just at truth, but also at 
the right structure” (Sider 2011, 62). Before getting to some criticism on this 
point, I will briefly describe how Sider’s account would explain the ontologists’ 
arguments’ epistemic significance. 
The explanation of epistemic significance is rather similar to that of simple 
incompatibilism. The audience’s old beliefs were unsatisfactory (or in any case, 
less than ideal – they did not fully meet the success condition(s) of beliefs), so 
the audience should replace the beliefs with better ones. Revisionary 
ontologists’ puzzles alert us to our beliefs’ failure to fully meet their success 
conditions and advises us about how to revise the beliefs. The Siderian account 
is an incompatibilist one: what the ontologists argue, on this account, speaks 
against the audience’s current beliefs about what there is. However, simple 
incompatibilism differs from Siderian incompatibilism with respect to the 
success-condition of beliefs that the accounts appeal to. In both cases, the 
beliefs are considered unsatisfactory or at least non-ideal, because they do not 
meet an important success-condition for beliefs. But for Siderian 
incompatibilism, the relevant success condition is not (mere) truth, but instead 
conformity with the objective structure of the world.15 That is a success 
condition that appears to admit of degrees; and so we cannot say that ordinary 
ontological beliefs simply fail to meet the relevant success-condition, on Sider’s 
account, but that they do not meet it perfectly. If more joint-carving concepts 
are available, then we should prefer those in belief formation. 
In sum, the Siderian account seems to explain the dual reaction and the 
epistemic significance of revisionary ontology. The problem with the account is 
just the implausible ethics of belief that the account relies upon. This is the topic 
of the next subsection. 
                                                 
15 Some may not agree with how Sider thinks about truth. Perhaps such objectors would 
want to insist that true beliefs are precisely those that conform perfectly to the world, and 
Sider’s thin notion of truth – truth in the language we happen to be speaking – should rather 
be called “correctness” or something along those lines. For example, Horgan and Potrč 
(2008) make a distinction between two kinds of truth, “direct” and “indirect” correspondence 
with the world, that seems to be close to Sider’s proposal in spirit, if not in terminology. But 
I smell a merely terminological issue here and I find that adopting Sider’s terminology is 
helpful for setting his account apart from simple compatibilism. 
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4.5.2. The problem: implausible ethics of belief 
I agree with Sider that truth (in the thin sense – truth in the language we happen 
to be speaking) is not the only relevant evaluation criterion for beliefs.16 Indeed, 
we should also evaluate the concepts that the beliefs are cast in. But I disagree 
with the view, if it is his view, that the best concepts, for all belief formation, 
are the joint-carving ones. 
First, some points on whether it is indeed Sider’s view, before I turn to why 
it is not a plausible view (regardless of whether it is Sider’s or not). The main 
reasons to think that it is his view is (1) that he sometimes makes unqualified 
statements about the superior epistemic value of joint-carving concepts, and (2) 
his previously mentioned proposal that it is constitutive of belief that it aims at 
conforming to the world – an aim that is more fully achieved by beliefs cast in 
joint-carving concepts, as opposed to merely true beliefs. An example of Sider’s 
unqualified claims about the epistemic value of joint-carving concepts is the 
following: “it’s better to think and speak in joint-carving terms. We ought not to 
speak the ‘grue’ language, nor think the thoughts expressed by its simple 
sentences” (Sider 2011, 61). But he sometimes also ties this talk of the superior 
value to the context of “inquiry”, e.g. in the following passage: 
 
The goal of inquiry is not merely to believe truly (or to know). Achieving the 
goal of inquiry requires that one’s belief state reflect the world, which in addition 
to lack of error requires one to think of the world in its terms, to carve the world 
at its joints. Wielders of non-joint-carving concepts are worse inquirers. (Sider 
2011, 61) 
 
Such statements may make one wonder whether he might restrict the superior 
value of joint-carving concepts to the context of “inquiry”, which might mean 
something narrower than the context of belief formation. Perhaps not all belief 
formation is inquiry. Then, Sider might not be affirming the superior value of 
joint-carving concepts for all belief formation, but only some sub-portion 
thereof, the belief formation taking place in the context of “inquiry”. However, 
Sider also explicitly states that beliefs qua beliefs should fully conform to the 
world, which involves carving at the joints, without restricting this to any 
particular kind of belief or context of belief formation. He writes of joint-
carving as “a constitutive aim of the practice of forming beliefs” (Sider 2011, 
61) and that the value of joint-carving derives from the fact that “beliefs aim to 
conform to the world” (Sider 2011, 62). 
                                                 
16 A necessary qualification is that not everyone agrees that truth in this thin sense (truth in 
the language we happen to be speaking) is always required of beliefs. And indeed, 
sometimes, false beliefs may be good for the belief-bearer. However, most would agree that 
most of the time, a (thinly) true belief is better than a false one, and this is enough here. It is 
only in special circumstances that we gain from false beliefs. My focus is on what else is 
normally needed in addition to thin truth. 
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If we take this talk of joint-carving as an important desideratum for all 
beliefs seriously, then Sider’s argument for his ethics of belief seems to be the 
following. Beliefs’ job is to represent the world accurately. Joint-carving true 
beliefs represent the world more accurately than merely true beliefs. So joint-
carving true beliefs do the job of beliefs better. So they are better beliefs. Now, 
I agree that beliefs have a job to do, and that in pursuing epistemic progress, we 
should evaluate beliefs according to how well they do that job. I even agree that 
beliefs’ job is to represent the world (generally) accurately. However, I disagree 
with Sider about how to assess whether a belief does that job well. Here is an 
argument analogous to Sider’s: “A knife’s job is to cut. So the better it cuts the 
better a knife is. The sharpest knife cuts the best. So the best knives are the 
sharpest knives.” Something goes wrong there. It is true that the knife’s job is to 
cut; but when we evaluate how well something does its job, we need to consider 
the context in which the job is done: this gives us a more fine-grained job 
description (the thing’s context-specific job) and we can then more precisely 
evaluate how well the job is done. In order to evaluate how good a knife is as a 
knife, for example, we need to ask (a) what that particular knife is used to cut or 
(b) what we most often use knives for. The sharpest knives are often not optimal 
for practical purposes; for example, the sharpest knives presumably have very 
thin blades, which may break, when cutting something hard. Hence, we should 
not replace all our “unsatisfactory” (or non-ideal) knives for the sharpest ones. 
So what is the most common job-in-context of our beliefs? Beliefs are most 
often formed and employed for practical purposes. Their job-in-context, then, is 
to represent the world accurately so as to serve such practical purposes. By 
“practical purposes”, I mean the attainment of the belief-bearer’s non-cognitive 
aims: aims like avoiding early death, but also some more ambitious aims, such 
as running a marathon or feeding a family. Such practical aims generally make 
accurate beliefs desirable. For example, if a bear is about to attack me, then it is 
good to form the accurate representation that a bear is about to attack me, so 
that I can lie down, feign death and survive (assuming that this is the most 
survival conducive response to a looming bear attack). If I would instead form 
the representation that a big brown bunny is about to hug me, then I would not 
respond as I would to a bear attack, but might instead go along with the 
presumed hug; and then I would not survive. The accurate belief is better than 
the inaccurate one, given the belief’s job-in-context, because the former’s 
accurate representation of the world performs better at keeping me alive and 
well. 
Most of our beliefs serve purposes that are relevantly similar to the purpose 
of surviving potential bear attacks. So beliefs’ most common job-in-context is 
to represent accurately in order to serve practical purposes. Further, the job-in-
context of the beliefs about ordinary objects – the beliefs that revisionary 
ontologists seem to condemn – is also representing accurately for practical 
purposes. Beliefs about ordinary objects normally help us orient ourselves in 
our environment by keeping track of the location, number, colour and so on of 
chunks of reality that are easily observable (as opposed to indivisible atoms or 
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the universe) and practically salient (as opposed to the sum of my nose and the 
Eiffel tower). Given this context-specific job of beliefs, then, should we require 
joint-carving from them? Requiring joint-carving (conformity to the objective 
structure of the world) is more than just requiring general accuracy. I do not see 
why joint-carving true beliefs would always perform better than merely true 
(generally accurate) beliefs, when the job is accurate representation that helps to 
attain the belief-bearer’s practical goals. In fact, joint-carving beliefs might well 
perform worse. It is sometimes noted that we should not rely too much on our 
intuitions or experiences in metaphysics, because these are affected by our 
ordinary concepts, and our ordinary concepts have evolved for non-meta-
physical purposes – purposes like keeping us alive and well.17 The sense that 
time flows, for example, or the unshakable impression that macro-physical 
objects persist through time and change, might give no insight to the structure 
of reality, because our concepts of time and objecthood have evolved to help us 
survive and procreate. Granted, such impressions and judgments are not always 
attributed to the evolution of our concepts, but rather cognitive faculties more 
generally. For example, Schaffer writes: 
 
Evolution suggests that human cognition is a powerful but flawed tool. On the 
one hand it is plausible that many of our cognitive faculties evolved to help us 
with the four ‘F’s (feeding, fighting, fleeing, and reproduction), and plausible 
that this pressured our ancestors towards reliably tracking the environment. On 
the other hand it is equally plausible that many of our cognitive faculties evolved 
to give us quick and dirty heuristics reliable only for limited purposes in 
evolutionarily salient contexts. (Schaffer 2016, 342) 
 
However, at least one plausible way of understanding the relevant evolved 
features of the cognitive system is that they are hard-wired concepts, or the 
dispositions to form certain kinds of concepts rather than others. But now 
suppose that four-dimensionalists are right about the structure of reality and that 
our intuitions and experience indeed lead us astray, due to these evolutionary 
influences on our cognitive systems, or more precisely, on our concepts of time 
and objecthood. Then it would seem that evolution has proven the meta-
physically inferior concepts of time and objecthood to be practically superior. 
And since our beliefs about ordinary objects serve practical purposes, we should 
surely continue to employ those practically superior, although metaphysically 
inferior, concepts in our belief formation. 
So this is one reason to wonder whether joint-carving concepts are especially 
conducive to the practical aims of belief. Other reasons can be found by 
considering the particular functions served by the concepts that are found to be 
theoretically problematic by ontologists; or more precisely, by considering the 
functions served by the very features that are found to be problematic in those 
concepts. I have in mind the feature of vagueness. Wright, for example, 
                                                 
17 For example, see Scholl (2007) and Benovsky (2015). 
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suggests that vague concepts – concepts such that a minute difference in the 
object does not make a difference to whether they apply or not – serve im-
portant practical purposes. We want to be able to tell whether a predicate 
applies by a quick look, when we need to take appropriate action in a timely 
fashion. To facilitate such timeliness, “single changes too slight to be detected 
by casual observation cannot be permitted to generate doubt about the 
application of such a predicate” (Wright 1975, 337). On the other hand, this 
practically advantageous feature of vague concepts is precisely what generates 
the theoretical problems with these concepts. Again, it looks like theoretical 
superiority (and the superior joint-carvingness that, as we are granting, 
accompanies it) and practical advantages of concepts can come apart. 
Sider might reply: so what? Good beliefs are not the ones that it is 
practically advantageous to have. Good beliefs are those that conform perfectly 
to the world, because that is just what beliefs do. If evolution has shaped our 
beliefs to serve practical ends, then we must be aware of such influences and 
resist them. But I find this hypothetical reply strangely dogmatic. Suppose that a 
furniture salesman gave you this sales pitch: “I know you already have a lot of 
furniture, but are you sure that it is the best furniture? After all, when you 
bought it, you took into account various practical considerations: how com-
fortable it is, the space available at your house, what you can afford to buy, and 
so on. This probably led you astray from the goal of identifying and obtaining 
the best furniture – which is exactly what I am now offering to you.” This 
would sound weird because it seems that these are exactly the considerations 
that you should take into account when buying furniture. Now suppose that the 
revisionary ontologist comes along with this sales pitch: “I know that you 
already have beliefs about what there is and these beliefs are even true, so they 
are not completely disastrous to have. But are you sure that these are the best 
beliefs available about what there is? After all, when you formed those beliefs, 
you used concepts that evolved to make you more likely to survive in your 
environment. So you ended up using concepts that were influenced by con-
siderations like cognitive processing efficiency and practical salience. But I can 
offer you the truly best beliefs, beliefs that conform to the objective structure of 
reality. Yes, they come with a slightly smaller chance of survival, but this is 
nothing: you will have the best beliefs!”. We should respond to the revisionary 
ontologist just as we should respond to the furniture salesman: “Get out of here! 
These practical considerations are exactly those that I should have taken into 
account. The beliefs I have are better than what you are offering.” 
How would one even go about justifying the claim that the best beliefs are 
really the perfectly joint-carving ones? It is surely not enough to just say that 
reflecting reality is what beliefs do. One option for saying something further is 
to say that the original purpose of belief-forming was reflecting reality, and it 
was only later that humans started to employ the beliefs for practical purposes. 
The belief salesman would then be saying that we have forgotten about what 
beliefs were supposed to do, what their original function is. No matter what the 
merits of this reply otherwise are, it fails most obviously because it gets things 
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the wrong way around. The original function of belief-forming, most probably, 
is getting by and getting ahead in the world. It was not nature’s intention to 
make us metaphysicians. More plausibly, belief forming caught on because it 
facilitated things like surviving potential bear attacks. To offer a speculative 
story about the origin of belief: perhaps it all began with Gendler’s (2008) 
“aliefs”, i.e. belief-like attitudes that motivate behaviour without being 
consciously recognized at all. Then came conscious awareness and reflection, 
which further facilitated representational accuracy and thereby the achievement 
of practical aims. As a by-product of these developments, reflection was some-
times over-employed and representational accuracy was pursued to an extent 
that was no longer practical. Given this story, the sorts of beliefs that Sider is 
concerned with – beliefs that aim only at reflecting the world – would be a mere 
evolutionary by-product of fitness-enhancing beliefs. 
I am not committed to this story about the origin of belief. I merely take it to 
be more plausible than supposing that beliefs’ original purpose was to conform 
perfectly to the world. Further, I do not in any case find much merit in the idea 
that beliefs’ original purpose can override current context-specific purposes 
when we evaluate how well a belief does its job. Perhaps some other case could 
be made for the conclusion that beliefs that perfectly conform to the objective 
structure of the world are better beliefs. Then, I would say that we should 
sometimes choose worse beliefs over better ones; and the choice of beliefs 
about ordinary objects like tables is one of those cases. Even if from some 
objective point of view, beliefs that conform fully to the world are better 
beliefs, it is not rational for a person to give up the (objectively worse) beliefs 
that serve her purposes better. 
In fact, I find it more plausible that the objectively good beliefs just are the 
ones that we should adopt, all things considered, and a different notion of 
objectively good belief cannot be defended. But I need not suppose this. Recall 
why we are discussing the nature of good beliefs here. We are asking about the 
epistemic significance of revisionary ontology. Now, suppose revisionary 
ontology only informed us about what objectively good beliefs would be like, 
without the implication that the audience should adopt these beliefs. This would 
leave the epistemic significance of revisionary ontology obscure. One might 
suggest that the epistemic significance of revisionary ontology, on this account, 
would be knowledge of objectively good ontological beliefs (that we need not 
adopt); but this does not seem like especially worthwhile knowledge. Suppose 
that moral philosophy told us that the objectively good person would kill one to 
save five, but there is no implication that anyone actually should act like this. It 
might be of some epistemic significance to gain such knowledge from philo-
sophy, but one would hope for more.  
I believe that revisionary ontologists can indeed hope for more than just 
informing people about objectively good beliefs that they, as limited human 
beings in the world they are actually inhabiting, should not in fact adopt. The 
important thing to notice is that not all our beliefs are formed for practical 
purposes – even if the original purpose of belief-forming was practical, most 
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belief-forming currently is practical, and most belief-forming about what exists 
is practical. At least some people attest that they also form beliefs merely out of 
intellectual or metaphysical curiosity, or more broadly, to excel as epistemic 
agents. Might revisionary ontology improve our ordinary concepts for the 
purpose of forming those beliefs? I will elaborate on this option shortly, and this 
is indeed the account that I defend. Before that, however, I will take a look at a 
different account that builds on Sider’s and that might seem to avoid the charge 
of an implausible ethics of belief. That is what I call the “revolutionary 
fictionalist version of Siderian incompatibilism”. 
 
 
4.5.3. Against the revolutionary fictionalist18 version of  
Siderian incompatibilism 
According to revolutionary fictionalism, one need not completely do away with 
current, theoretically problematic ways of thinking about the world, especially 
if these ways of thinking are cognitively or otherwise advantageous. One can 
instead transform one’s attitudes towards the relevant propositions into some 
kind of quasi-beliefs or “pretenseful acceptances”, instead of full, proper 
beliefs. Daly describes the view thus: 
 
Fictionalism so understood [revolutionary fictionalism] … is an account of what 
attitude we should take to the sentences of S. It says that we should not believe 
them. We should regard those sentences as telling (something relevantly like) a 
fictional story. (Daly 2008, 424) 
 
Dorr and Rosen (2002) defend revolutionary fictionalism regarding ordinary 
discourse (in so far as it involves quantification over composite objects – which 
is certainly a significant part of ordinary discourse). They apparently re-
commend revolutionary fictionalism as a preventative measure, because the 
discourse might turn out to be false, if there are no composite objects; and they 
take this issue to be resolvable by metaphysical argumentation, if resolvable at 
all. Here, however, I wish to consider a revolutionary fictionalist version of 
Sider’s view, because one might think that it can escape the problems facing 
Siderian incompatibilism. I think it cannot actually escape the main problem 
with Siderian incompatibilism i.e. the implausible ethics of belief. It also faces 
an additional problem: it involves an odd, under-motivated notion of “belief”. 
The revolutionary fictionalist version of Siderian incompatibilism is the 
following. Appealing to Sider’s ethics of belief, the ontologist can insist that 
one should believe that p only if p conforms perfectly to the world. But the 
                                                 
18 The label “revolutionary fictionalism” was introduced with this meaning by Stanley 
(2001). It is contrasted with “hermeneutic fictionalism”, according to which our current 
attitude towards the relevant discourse is not that of belief, but pretenseful acceptance. If 
hermeneutic fictionalism is true about an area of discourse, then revolutionary fictionalism 
about that area of discourse is unmotivated, of course. 
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response to recognizing that p does not conform perfectly to the world need not 
be revising concepts and acquiring different, joint-carving beliefs. Instead, the 
response could be to transform the belief into a different, less “respectful” 
attitude. The fictionalist twist helps to address the problem that the non-joint-
carving concepts might be practically useful and therefore worth preserving, 
because the fictionalist only requests an attitude change, not a conceptual 
change. 
However, I do not believe that the fictionalist actually escapes the problem 
with the Siderian account, described in the previous subsection. The account 
still lacks motivation for positing the aim of conformity with the world as the 
aim of (all) belief, and thus it lacks motivation for requiring one to withhold 
belief in the propositions cast in the problematic concepts. Further, a new 
problem that arises for the revolutionary fictionalist is: what does this 
prescribed attitude revision actually require from the agent, behaviourally or 
phenomenologically? Looking more closely at the fictionalist’s prescription, we 
find that what she describes as the belief to be withdrawn from propositions like 
“There are chairs” is a rather particular kind of belief-like attitude. And 
although it is plausible that most people believe that there are chairs, it is not 
quite so plausible that they believe it in the fictionalist’s sense of “belief”. Take 
the following example by Dorr and Rosen, about the contrast between belief 
and the kind of attitude they recommend towards ordinary discourse: 
 
Consider the mariner who knows full well that Copernicus was right. When he is 
navigating he speaks and thinks in Ptolemaic terms. In the midst of a storm, 
when things are urgent, he may have no conscious reservations about what he 
says or thinks. Nonetheless, when he says “If Venus has crossed the moon, we’re 
off course” he is not committed to its truth. His official view, his genuine view, 
is that Copernicus was right and that his Ptolemaic remark is a useful fiction. 
(Dorr and Rosen 2002, 171) 
 
Based on this quote (illustrating the difference between belief and the fictio-
nalist’s prescribed attitude), Dorr and Rosen apparently take the revolutionary 
fictionalist’s prescription “Do not believe, but only pretensefully accept p” to 
mean something like the following: “Do not endorse p as your official, genuine 
view; but feel free to rely on the representation that p in deliberating on your 
actions, without conscious reservation (especially when in a hurry).” However, 
plausibly, most people do not endorse it as their “official, genuine view” that 
chairs exist. Plausibly, most people just think of the world in terms of tables, 
chairs and other ordinary objects as they go along, and when they are asked 
whether there are chairs, they find it quite natural to answer affirmatively. When 
they are asked, further, “Is it your official, genuine view that there are chairs?” 
then if they do answer affirmatively, I suppose that they would have formed 
their official, genuine view on this matter there and then, instead of reporting an 
official, genuine view that they already had, prior to hearing the question. This 
is, first, because in order for one to have the official view that p, it seems that 
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one must have thought about whether p and come to the conclusion that p, 
rather than simply acting and reasoning as if p or taking it for granted that p. 
Second, “official, genuine view” just sounds like a more serious and solemn 
attitude than the kind of beliefs we would expect most people to hold about the 
existence of chairs, prior to considering the issue in a philosophical spirit. Now, 
the prescription to no longer endorse it as one’s official, genuine view that 
chairs exist does not make much sense, if one never held it as such. 
This might be taken to suggest that most people do not really believe that 
there are chairs (since, as I am claiming, it is not their official, genuine view 
that there are chairs); but this strikes me as an inflated notion of belief. For 
example, I believe that there is a coffee cup on the table in front of me as I am 
writing this. I would not necessarily say that this is my official, genuine view on 
the matter (at least, it was not my official, genuine view until I paused to think 
about it); but it is nevertheless a belief. 
A remark that helps to capture a relevant distinction between the different 
kinds of attitudes that we call “beliefs”, is Scholl’s. “Many intuitions, after all, 
are not appreciated in an abstract, Platonic sense, but are rather part of how we 
experience and imagine the world,” he writes, questioning whether we should 
take intuitions seriously in metaphysical theorizing (Scholl 2007, 582). 
“Intuitions” in this quote could well be replaced with “beliefs”. The belief of the 
mariner when he navigates the ocean, that the Venus has crossed the moon, 
seems like a “part of how we experience and imagine the world”, whereas the 
mariner’s official, genuine Copernican view is “appreciated in an abstract, 
Platonic sense”. I find that both of these have a good claim to be called beliefs; 
and so I cannot accept the revolutionary fictionalist Siderian’s claim that belief 
should be withheld from non-joint-carving propositions. A certain kind of belief 
(“theoretical belief”, as I shall call it) should be withheld, perhaps, but not belief 
as such. I will elaborate on and defend this idea in the next section. 
 
 
4.6. The modified Siderian account: revisionary ontology 
can improve theoretical beliefs 
A “belief” can be generally characterized as “the attitude we have, roughly, 
whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true” (Schwitzgebel 
2015). In other words, when we believe a proposition, we have a certain sort of 
affirmative attitude towards it. Further, this is not just any affirmative attitude: 
for example, it is not the attitude of wanting the world to be as the proposition 
represents it. It is rather the attitude of taking the world to be as the proposition 
represents it. There are, further, different ways in which we can take the world 
to be as represented by the proposition, or in other words, different ways in 
which we can endorse a representation: for example, we can consciously affirm 
that the world is a certain way or we can act on the assumption that the world is 
that way. 
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The main division that I draw within beliefs, however, is not based upon the 
kind of endorsement of the representation that is involved, but the purpose of 
forming the endorsed representation. Some of our beliefs are formed to 
represent the world so as to guide our actions in pursuit of ultimately non-
epistemic aims, while the forming of others is motivated by the desire for 
intrinsically worthwhile epistemic excellence. I will call the former kind of 
beliefs “practical beliefs” and the latter “theoretical beliefs”; and my view is 
that what I have presented as Sider’s ethics of “belief” might apply to 
theoretical beliefs, but not to practical beliefs. I also find that most people rather 
uncontroversially have the practical belief that there are chairs and tables, but it 
is a more contentious issue whether they have such a theoretical belief. An 
important methodological point here is that when we discuss whether most 
people have certain beliefs, for example, about whether there are chairs, and 
when we discuss whether it is epistemically permissible or ideal to have such 
beliefs, we must take care to make sure to talk about “belief” in the same sense, 
in both cases. Only then can we hope to come to a justified view on the capacity 
of revisionary ontology to criticize and otherwise make prescriptions regarding 
folk belief. An upshot of drawing such distinctions will be that the epistemic 
significance that this modified Siderian account allows to revisionary ontology 
is rather limited. 
 
 
4.6.1. The distinction between theoretical and  
practical beliefs, and how it helps 
In defence of the Siderian account, in light of the criticism put forth in the 
previous section, one may want to say that surely some beliefs are not formed 
for practical purposes, even if the original and overwhelming purpose of belief-
forming is practical. There are also beliefs motivated by “metaphysical 
curiosity”, for example. Metaphysicians seem to be forming beliefs about what 
there is for such impractical purposes; and perhaps others might want to do so, 
as well. I agree: I see no reason to doubt the self-knowledge of the many people 
who say that they sometimes form beliefs just to satisfy metaphysical or 
intellectual curiosity. I might even be one of them. Belief-forming is not all 
about practical purposes; but it is still about practical purposes most of the time. 
Now we need to get clearer on how to modify Sider’s account, in this light. My 
proposal, again, is that the revisionary ontologists should distinguish between 
theoretical and practical beliefs and maintain that revisionary ontologists target 
the concepts that we use to form theoretical beliefs. In this section, I aim to 
make clearer the distinction between the two kinds of beliefs.  
First, this proposal needs to be distinguished from a similar one made by 
Hazlett (manuscript). According to Hazlett, in order to understand the epistemic 
aim of limning structure, we need to posit the attitude of theorizing. In order for 
theorizing that p to be correct, according to Hazlett, p must be both true and 
“structural” (i.e. cast in joint-carving concepts). This is because of the kind of 
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attitude that theorizing is: “Just as belief aims at truth, theorizing aims at truth 
and structure” (Hazlett manuscript, 9). My notion of theoretical belief is 
different from Hazlett’s “theorizing”. I do not take theoretical beliefs’ 
correctness conditions to involve joint-carving, as a matter of how “theoretical 
belief” is defined; i.e. I do not take it to be constitutive of a theoretical belief 
that it aims at structure and is therefore correct if and only it is both true and 
joint-carving. Instead, the correctness conditions are whatever they need to be in 
order to meet the aim of theoretical beliefs: the aim of achieving epistemic 
excellence for its own sake. 
Epistemic excellence need not be understood in terms of mirroring the 
objective structure of the world. It may instead be understood in terms of the 
internal coherence of the agent’s belief system, for example; or it may require a 
subjectively felt state of understanding. An agent could in principle mirror the 
world’s structure perfectly without being subjectively aware of it; and one 
might want to say that this constitutes a shortcoming in epistemic excellence. 
This addition might have important ramifications for Sider’s approach; for 
example, it would complicate comparing the epistemic excellence of agents, 
since someone might lukewarmly affirm propositions cast in more perfectly 
joint-carving concepts, whereas someone else might have a higher degree of 
subjective affirmation towards the relevant propositions, whereas these are cast 
in less perfectly joint-carving concepts. I will not discuss these ramifications 
further, however, since I am not putting this view of epistemic excellence 
forward as my own view, but only as an option, to exemplify how one could 
hold that epistemic excellence is not only about true joint-carving belief. 
So I do not define “theoretical beliefs” as those that must reflect the structure 
of the world, in order to be correct or successful. Someone who says that a 
theoretical belief must reflect the objective structure of the world would, on my 
view, be putting forth a substantive position on what epistemic excellence 
requires. I prefer this approach to defining “theoretical belief”, because positing 
a kind of attitude that has exactly the correctness conditions that are needed, in 
order to make sense of the epistemic significance of limning the structure, 
seems a bit ad hoc. The distinction between kinds of beliefs corresponding to 
aims of belief appears to be better motivated. 
Distinctions between “practical” and “theoretical” beliefs are not unheard of, 
but I have not come across one that would similarly base the division primarily 
upon the purpose of forming the belief. For example, O’Leary-Hawthorne and 
Howard-Snyder, in the context of analysing the nature of theists’ belief in God, 
draw a distinction between “practical” and “theoretical” beliefs as follows: “At 
a first gloss, theoretical beliefs are commitments to the world’s being a certain 
way, whereas practical beliefs are commitments to certain pictures to live by” 
(O'Leary-Hawthorne and Howard-Snyder 1996, 234). They further explain this 
as follows:  
 
According to this conception of things, human beings have a ‘theoretical voice,’ 
which expresses their views concerning how things really are, and a ‘practical 
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voice,’ which expresses the views which they deploy as guides to acting in the 
world. Both deserve to be called beliefs – and yet the verdict of the ‘theoretical 
voice’ on some matter may be quite different from that of the ‘practical voice’. 
(O’Leary-Hawthorne and Howard-Snyder 1996, 234)  
 
There are important differences between the taxonomy of beliefs described in 
this quote and my taxonomy of beliefs. First, unlike O’Leary and Howard-
Snyder in the first quote, I do not tie the notion of belief to the notion of 
commitment. Central to believing is representing the world in a certain way and 
taking the world to be as represented, i.e. endorsing the representation as true in 
some way. The endorsement may consist in being disposed to sincerely make 
certain assertions or in acting in accordance with the representation, for example 
– there are different kinds of relevant endorsement. Perhaps “commitment” 
could be understood as another name for endorsement, in this broad sense, but 
this is not important here. 
A more important issue with O’Leary-Hawthorne and Howard-Snyder’s 
characterization of theoretical and practical beliefs is that it is misleading to say 
that practical beliefs, in contrast to theoretical beliefs, are “guides to acting in 
the world”. Theoretical beliefs, like practical beliefs, are the basis for various 
actions. (In my (Kitsik 2018a) I call these “research actions”.) For example, 
having certain metaphysical beliefs might dispose me to make certain 
assertions, to go to certain conferences and avoid others, to seek out certain 
publications and read them, and so on. So theoretical beliefs can be guides to 
acting in the world, while they are also about “how things really are”. Further, it 
is not clear why our practical beliefs would not be about “how things really 
are”: most of the time, we want our practical beliefs to represent the world 
accurately as well. So I propose not making the distinction based on whether the 
aim of the belief is to represent or to guide action: this is a false dilemma, as 
both practical and theoretical beliefs represent the world and guide actions. 
Instead, I base the distinction upon whether the aim of belief is epistemic 
excellence for its own sake or the aim of belief is to facilitate the belief-bearer’s 
or somebody else’s practical interests. In this chapter, I focus on the belief-
bearer’s non-epistemic interests (for example, survival) as the central constraint 
on the concepts used to form practical beliefs. In the next chapter, when I 
discuss feminist metaphysics of gender as a project of conceptual engineering, I 
will bring up the idea that somebody else’s non-epistemic interests might be 
relevant for how the belief-bearer ought to revise the concepts that she uses to 
form beliefs. 
While the distinction between practical and theoretical beliefs certainly has 
initial appeal, one is bound to notice ramifications when examining the matter 
more closely. First, for some inquiries – some projects of belief-forming – it is 
unclear whether they are pursued for the sake of epistemic excellence (such as 
gaining intrinsically valuable knowledge or understanding) or for practical 
purposes or both. For example, artificial intelligence research seems to have 
both theoretical and practical aims: the aim of gaining a better understanding of 
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the human mind, by analogy with AI systems, and of pursuing technological 
innovations to enhance human well-being. Further, even with “theoretical” 
physics, it is not clear whether it is ultimately (only) theoretical. For example, 
Anderson writes, challenging the idea of physics as a “pure” science, that 
certain significant questions for physics have become significant because “states 
have conceived a political interest in building nuclear weapons and have funded 
most research in physics with military ends in mind” (Anderson 1995, 43). 
However, is it necessary, in order to say that revisionary ontologists improve 
the concepts used for forming theoretical beliefs, to be able to say about each 
inquiry whether it is about forming practical or theoretical beliefs? I think not. It 
might well be that some projects are both about forming practical and 
theoretical beliefs, or perhaps it is indeterminate which beliefs are being formed 
in some project. The important point here is rather that (mainstream) revisio-
nary ontology seems not to be such a project. It seems only aimed at forming 
theoretical beliefs. Even if it should turn out that these beliefs have some 
practical use as well, such possible practical benefits do not seem to guide or 
constrain the construction of those beliefs. So the unforeseen practical appli-
cations of these theoretical beliefs do not threaten the division, because the 
division is not based upon what use the beliefs can be put to, or even what use 
they are in fact put to; the division is based upon the considerations that guide 
and constrain the formation and revision of the beliefs. In the case of purely 
theoretical beliefs, the beliefs targeted by revisionary ontologists, non-epistemic 
desiderata (or non-cognitive, non-theoretical, or non-evidential desiderata) do 
not constrain the formation or revision of the beliefs, given the aim of these 
beliefs: intrinsically valuable epistemic excellence. 
Another issue that might be posed in connection with this division of beliefs 
into two kinds that appear to be isolated from one another (so that we can 
pursue distinct projects of conceptual engineering, for each kind of belief) is 
that the distinction implies a certain kind of self-fragmentation. Although 
O’Leary-Hawthorne and Howard-Snyder’s gloss on practical and theoretical 
beliefs is rather different from mine, the problem of self-fragmentation that they 
recognize is also relevant for my purposes: “this tradition appears to fragment 
the self: the practical self that guides action is to a considerable degree autono-
mous from the theoretical self that pursues an understanding of the world” 
(O'Leary-Hawthorne and Howard-Snyder 1996, 234). I am not convinced that 
such fragmentation into the practical self and the theoretical self should be seen 
as a problem; but the issue is outside the scope of this thesis. (I suspect, how-
ever, that whether the self-fragmentation should be seen as a serious problem 
depends on how we should understand epistemic excellence, in particular, 
whether epistemic excellence for its own sake can be pursued in an isolated part 
of the mind, as it were.) 
One might also wonder whether something as potentially controversial as the 
distinction between practical and theoretical beliefs, understood as two kinds of 
belief, is really needed here: perhaps there are just beliefs, sometimes formed 
for theoretical and sometimes for practical purposes. However, first, I do not 
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think that the view that there is a single kind of thing rightly called “belief” is 
the default, uncontroversial view here. There is much recent discussion on how 
the term “belief” is used to denote different kinds of dispositional profiles (e.g. 
the disposition to sincerely assert that p versus dispositions to act and feel as if 
p).19 I think it may well be the default position, not the uncontroversial one, that 
“belief” is a messy term, as ordinary-language terms tend to be, and it is used to 
denote importantly different kinds of states. Most of the literature on those 
different kinds of states currently seems to be concerned with the different 
dispositions and accordingly different kinds of endorsement of p that we may be 
attributing to someone when we say that she believes that p. I focus on another 
dimension of difference (which I think may also underlie the difference between 
the different kinds of endorsement): the different reasons for which we form 
beliefs. 
I do recognize that there is something not quite satisfactory in speaking as if 
beliefs were discrete countable entities in our minds, such that we can point to 
one and ask: is this one a theoretical or a practical one or something in between? 
If we went more deeply into the metaphysics of the mind, I suspect that notions 
like belief may need to be discarded. However, this is not the place for taking a 
stand on the metaphysical status of folk psychology. Many of the problems that 
arise for my way of talking about beliefs arise for belief talk generally: whether 
we can ask how many beliefs a person has, how to individuate and locate them, 
and so on. Regardless of what may be the standing of folk psychology as a 
metaphysical theory, I am operating under the assumption that belief-talk can be 
usefully employed when we try to understand the epistemic significance of a 
given field of inquiry (i.e. how the inquiry improves our beliefs). And I am 
proposing that the variety of belief-talk that would be particularly useful, for 
this purpose, is the kind of belief-talk that draws the suggested distinction 
between theoretical and practical beliefs. 
But still, one might ask, why not phrase my proposal about the epistemic 
significance of revisionary ontology as follows: revisionary ontology can 
plausibly improve our beliefs for theoretical purposes, and there is no reason to 
assume that it can improve our beliefs for practical purposes. The problem with 
this way of speaking would be that it is ambiguous between my proposed view 
and what might be called the “compromise view”. According to the compro-
mise view, the very same beliefs should serve both theoretical and practical 
purposes and, accordingly, we may need to weigh the relevant theoretical and 
practical desiderata against one another. For example, if the concept of table 
turns out to be inconsistent and therefore theoretically problematic, then this 
theoretical shortcoming may have to be weighed against the practical benefits of 
using the concept of table in belief formation. My view is that there is no need 
for such weighing and compromising: we can engineer concepts for theoretical 
beliefs without worrying about such practical disadvantages. However, I do not 
defend this view in detail in this thesis. (I do touch on it in the next chapter, 
                                                 
19 See e.g. Schwitzgebel (2010). 
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when I discuss the irrelevance of sorites arguments for the issue of whether we 
should use a concept of ‘woman’ for feminist purposes.) 
So I qualify the nature of my claims about the distinction between practical 
and theoretical beliefs: I am not making claims about the ultimate metaphysics 
of the mind, but about a useful way of speaking for the purposes of 
understanding the epistemic significance of revisionary ontology, and 
potentially, other fields of inquiry. I also wish to qualify the strength of my 
claims: I do not consider this to be the only way one could possibly think about 
beliefs, when one is explaining the epistemic significance of revisionary 
ontology. It is only the most promising way that I have come up with, so far – 
and still far from an unproblematic one. 
Now, with all that said, why should we say that the epistemic significance of 
revisionary ontology consists in improving our theoretical beliefs, but not our 
practical beliefs? The reason is that when it comes to theoretical beliefs, it is 
plausible that the more fully they conform to reality, the better they are as 
beliefs – or more precisely, the better they are as the kind of beliefs that they 
are. Again, one might have a different conception of epistemic excellence, but 
beliefs’ conforming perfectly to reality is at least a credible contender as a 
conception of epistemic excellence. If it is indeed the right conception of 
epistemic excellence, then conforming to reality is the only job of theoretical 
beliefs, and matters like cognitive processing efficiency need not be taken into 
account. Revisionary ontologists’ purpose would then be to facilitate the 
improvement of theoretical beliefs, by alerting us to the shortcomings of our 
ordinary conceptual scheme and providing us with a more coherent and elegant, 
and hence more joint-carving alternative, to employ in forming theoretical 
beliefs. For example, perhaps we might be advised to give up concepts like 
‘table’ when we form theoretical beliefs about the world, since the concept 
commits us to practically innocent but theoretically unacceptable inconsis-
tencies. On this account, revisionary ontology would have nothing to say about 
what kind of practical beliefs we should have, however. We may still use the 
concept ‘table’ in forming practical beliefs and hence there is still a sense in 
which we may believe that there are tables. This is the account of revisionary 
ontology that, in broad outline, I accept. It still needs to be clarified whether the 
epistemic improvement in question is somehow “objective”. I will return to this 
shortly. But before this, I need to address how the account explains the sense of 
entitlement and the sense of destabilization. 
The sense of entitlement and the sense of destabilization can be explained 
similarly to how they were explained in the Siderian account considered in the 
previous section. However, on the current account, we are entitled to the beliefs 
cast in ordinary concepts, not only because they are true in the language we 
happen to be speaking (as it was on the original Siderian account), but because 
they are good (practical) beliefs. They do their practical job well: there is 
nothing wrong with the concepts they are cast in, given the purpose that the 
beliefs are formed for. Regarding the sense of destabilization, one option is to 
explain it as a by-product of the norms governing practical belief formation. To 
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a certain extent, pursuing a theoretically virtuous conceptual scheme is desirable 
even for practically oriented beliefs. But such considerations are to be weighed 
against others, such as cognitive processing efficiency and perhaps moral 
considerations. We might have the mistaken impression that as epistemic 
agents, we must pursue the theoretical virtues – logical coherence, in particular 
– without qualification. And perhaps the sense of destabilization, in response to 
revisionary ontologists’ arguments, is an outcome of this mistaken impression. 
Another possible explanation is that those who feel the sense of destabilization 
are concerned with forming good theoretical beliefs, and what gets destabilized 
are their theoretical beliefs, not their practical beliefs. The formers of theoretical 
beliefs would then be responding appropriately to the norms governing 
theoretical beliefs. Finally, the destabilization might occur because the audience 
is confused about whether the arguments address their theoretical or their 
practical beliefs: they might not clearly distinguish between the two. In any 
case, both the sense of entitlement and the sense of destabilization can be ex-
plained, on this account. 
 
 
4.6.2. Limiting the epistemic significance of revisionary ontology 
Let us return to the central issue: the epistemic significance of revisionary onto-
logy. The suggestion above was that revisionary ontology can improve our 
theoretical beliefs, but not our practical beliefs. This claim must now be quali-
fied. The claim that revisionary ontology can improve our theoretical beliefs 
and is therefore epistemically significant implies that we have theoretical beliefs 
or are interested in having them. But I have not shown, nor do I intend to show, 
that all humans aim to form theoretical beliefs or that forming good theoretical 
beliefs is objectively good. Improving practical beliefs is good for all humans 
because all humans form practical beliefs: we all need to form generally 
accurate representations of the world in order to pursue our non-cognitive aims. 
But not all humans must form theoretical beliefs. There are presumably some 
who claim to have no interest in achieving epistemic excellence for its own 
sake. One option for the revisionary ontologist is to insist that humans just are 
formers of theoretical beliefs by nature, whether they recognize it or not. But 
this would need some justification. 
In response, revisionary ontologists might want to insist that their meta-
physical curiosity, or more generally, interest in epistemic excellence, seems to 
signal something of objective epistemic value.20 This would require the revisio-
nary ontologists to accept that there is not just objective structure in reality and 
objective facts about the epistemic value of forming representations of that 
reality, but also that they have intuitive access to those value facts. These are 
                                                 
20 Brady, for example, holds that curiosity defeasibly alerts us to “interesting or fascinating 
subjects” and the interesting or fascinating character of those subjects does not derive from 
the fact that we happen to be curious about them (Brady 2009, 282). 
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substantial commitments to take on. So I would rather recommend the revi-
sionary philosophers to rest content with the view that if someone is interested 
in forming good theoretical beliefs, then revisionary ontology can potentially 
improve her theoretical beliefs. This is a rather limited kind of epistemic 
significance: there are no strong reasons to think that the belief former’s epis-
temic standing is objectively improved. 
Another issue concerning the limitations of the epistemic significance of 
revisionary ontology, on this account, is that theoretical beliefs would seem to 
make up only a very small sub-class of all beliefs. (Let us pretend for a moment 
that we can count beliefs and compare the sizes of sets of beliefs.) However, I 
do not think that we can immediately draw any interesting conclusions about 
the epistemic significance of a project, based on the number of beliefs that it 
potentially affects. Although revisionary ontology, on the view defended here, 
would leave most of our total belief system intact, it would significantly affect 
one kind of relation to the world that we can call “belief”: how we represent the 
world when we represent it just for the sake of epistemic excellence. (For a 
comparison, suppose that somebody said that a burglary you suffered was rather 
insignificant, because the burglar only took away the things that you have 
accumulated in your apartment because you consider them intrinsically, rather 
than instrumentally valuable; and such things only make up a very small sub-
class of all the things in your apartment.) So I do not consider this – the small 
number of beliefs affected – to be a major threat to the epistemic significance of 
revisionary ontology, on this account. 
 
 
4.6.3. Which beliefs are the real beliefs? 
A thorny issue that I have avoided so far concerns which of the two kinds of 
beliefs discussed here really deserves the label “belief”. Some philosophers 
might deny that practical beliefs are really beliefs. Genuine belief, they would 
say, is what we affirm when we think about what is really the case in the world, 
when we distance ourselves from the everyday hassle. On that view, belief is 
our “official, genuine view”, rather than a representation formed in pursuit of 
ultimately non-epistemic aims. But one might also have just the opposite idea of 
“real beliefs”. I suppose that what distinguishes “belief” from other kinds of 
representations, such as those of imaginings, is that in the case of belief, we not 
just represent the world in a certain way, but we take it to be as represented. 
Now, let us think about why we first started representing the world around us 
and why and in what sense it was originally important to take the world to be as 
represented. Plausibly, we started forming these kinds of representations of the 
world for ultimately non-epistemic purposes, such as survival, and it was 
important to “take the world to be as represented” in the sense of perceiving the 
world in the relevant way and acting in accordance with the representation. 
Following that reasoning, one could insist that practical beliefs are the 
“original” beliefs. 
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I am content, however, to call both kinds of states “beliefs”. In this regard, 
my attitude is similar to the one expressed by Chalmers here: 
 
[I]nstead of asking “What is a belief? What is it to believe?” and expecting a 
determinate answer, one can instead focus on the various roles one wants belief 
to play and say, here are some interesting states: B1 can play these roles, B2 can 
play these roles, B3 can play these roles. Not much hangs on the residual verbal 
question of which is really belief. (Chalmers 2011, 538) 
 
Further, the practical/theoretical distinction might not be the only distinction to 
be made among beliefs (in the broad sense of “belief” as a state that involves 
representing the world in a certain way and taking the world to be as repre-
sented). There might be even more “real beliefs”. However, this is the 
distinction that I take to be relevant for understanding the nature and epistemic 
significance of revisionary ontology. 
 
 
4.7. Chapter summary 
The aim of the chapter was to interpret revisionary ontology from the onto-
logists’ own point of view. I set the following adequacy conditions for the 
account: explaining the sense of destabilization and the sense of entitlement (as 
common responses to the ontologists’ arguments) and explaining the epistemic 
significance of revisionary ontology. 
An account that can straightforwardly explain the epistemic significance of 
revisionary ontology is what I called the “simple incompatibilist” account. 
According to this account, the revisionary ontologists’ puzzling arguments 
show that (certain of) our ordinary beliefs about what exists are false. Since 
beliefs are good when they are true and bad when they are false, identifying 
false beliefs and replacing them with true ones is an improvement in beliefs. I 
found that this account has trouble explaining the sense of entitlement to the 
beliefs – the sense of entitlement that remains, despite the sense of destabi-
lization that the arguments give rise to. I also suggested that the best expla-
nation for the sense of entitlement is that we are aware of maintaining a certain 
kind of justification for the beliefs: we can form these beliefs via the highly 
truth-conducive process of applying concepts that we are competent with and 
drawing simple inferences of a kind that we are competent with. 
I then considered some compatibilist contenders for simple incompatibilism. 
These were Socratic compatibilism, indifference compatibilism, and linguistic 
variance compatibilism. The first two are in tension with the sense of entitle-
ment and the sense of destabilization. According to Socratic compatibilism, we 
have believed revisionary ontologists’ theses, for example that there are no 
tables, all along; their arguments only make us aware of the belief. The problem 
with this view is that the objects of the sense of entitlement and the sense of 
destabilization are beliefs like the belief that there are tables – so it is hard to 
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see how we could have believed the opposite all along. According to 
indifference compatibilism, we did not have beliefs about whether tables and 
the like exist, until revisionary ontologists came along. This is again in tension 
with the sense of entitlement and the sense destabilization, in a way that is 
similar to the way that Socratic compatibilism is in tension with these pheno-
mena. Finally, linguistic variance compatibilism can explain the sense of 
entitlement (it can adopt the “best explanation” I have suggested above), but 
faces trouble when explaining the sense of destabilization and the epistemic 
significance of revisionary ontology. 
I then considered what I called “Siderian incompatibilism”. The central idea 
here is that revisionary ontology alerts the audience to problems with their 
concepts, rather than false beliefs. Further, the theoretical problems with the 
concepts (e.g. licensing inconsistent judgments), on this view, indicate that the 
concepts are not “joint-carving”, i.e. they do not reflect the objective structure 
of the world. Hence, they should not be used in belief formation. The 
assumption there is that the concepts used in forming beliefs should be joint-
carving – and Sider indeed explicitly affirms this assumption, basing this 
assumption on the idea that beliefs are supposed to conform to reality, and joint-
carving concepts (rather than mere truth) are needed for perfect conformity. 
The problem with the Siderian account is the implausible assumption about 
what beliefs are supposed to do. Plausibly, beliefs (or at any rate, many of our 
beliefs) are supposed to help us survive and prosper (non-epistemically), and 
joint-carving concepts might not be the best concepts for that. However, 
arguably we do sometimes form beliefs just for the sake of epistemic excel-
lence; and the case of forming metaphysical beliefs plausibly falls into this 
category. In light of this, I amended Sider’s suggested account as follows: the 
aim of revisionary ontology is to improve the concepts that we use to improve 
our theoretical beliefs, but not those that we use to form our practical beliefs. 
This is the explanation for the epistemic significance of revisionary ontology, 
then. It is a limited kind of epistemic significance, unless one can show that it is 
objectively good for the audience to form good theoretical beliefs – that 
regardless of whether or not they happen to be interested in forming good 
theoretical beliefs, they should be. 
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5. APPLYING THE ACCOUNT TO  
THE METAPHYSICS OF GENDER 
5.1. Chapter introduction 
The previous chapters are bound to raise questions about how broadly the 
theoretical metalinguistic account applies. In this chapter I will show how this 
account can be applied to interpret what is sometimes called the “feminist 
metaphysics of gender” and what might also be called “feminist revisionary 
ontology of gender”, in an extended sense of “revisionary ontology”. This 
feminist project has at least some superficial similarity to the kind of revisio-
nary ontology previously considered. Some philosophers, such as Barnes (2014, 
2017) and Mikkola (2015, 2017), think that the similarity is not merely 
superficial. This chapter, however, rather servers to undermine the appearance 
of similarity. “Metaphysics has spent a lot of time asking whether there are 
tables, rather less time asking whether there are genders,” remarks Barnes 
(2014, 335). But is it really the same “metaphysics” that has been asking each 
question? And are these the same kind of question about what there is? I aim to 
undermine the view that these are the same kind of question, as well as to show 
how my general approach to interpreting ontology (as a project of improving 
concepts to improve beliefs) applies in this case. I will argue that social 
constructivist claims about gender, such as Haslanger’s claim that women are 
those who are oppressed in virtue of their real or imagined biological features, 
should be understood not as claims (exclusively) about facts. Instead, these 
claims should be understood as claims about how we should revise our concepts 
in order to improve our practical beliefs, as opposed to the theoretical beliefs 
targeted by mainstream revisionary ontology. 
So I will defend an account of feminist metaphysics of gender and main-
stream revisionary ontology as distinct projects of conceptual engineering. The 
consensus that has emerged in the debate between Barnes (2014, 2017), 
Mikkola (2015, 2017), Sider (2017), and Schaffer (2017) seems to be that the 
inquiries into the existence of tables and into that of genders belong to the same 
bigger project of investigating reality in a philosophical manner. Defending this 
view, feminist philosophers like Barnes and Mikkola have also found that there 
are too few fruitful interactions between the metaphysicians concerned with 
things like tables and those concerned with genders. A factor in this, they have 
suggested, is that mainstream metaphysicians, such as Sider (2011) or Schaffer 
(2009), exclude or marginalize feminist metaphysics in their characterizations 
of what metaphysics is and does. In his response, Sider (2017) agreed that 
feminist metaphysics is an important kind of metaphysics and this is not well 
enough recognized. He insisted, however, that his account of metaphysics (as 
the study of the fundamental structure of reality) can actually accommodate 
feminist metaphysics. Similarly, in his response, Schaffer (2017) argued that his 
conception of metaphysics (as the study of what grounds what) is hospitable to 
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feminist metaphysics. Barnes, Mikkola, Sider, and Schaffer all focus on 
constructivist metaphysics of gender as the central example of “feminist 
metaphysics”; this will also be the focus of the current chapter. 
Leaving aside the disagreement about what Sider’s and Schaffer’s accounts 
of metaphysics imply for feminist metaphysics, I will take issue with the 
consensus that has emerged between Sider and Schaffer, on the one hand, and 
Barnes and Mikkola, on the other. Barnes, Mikkola, Sider, and Schaffer all 
seem to agree that feminist metaphysics of gender is just as much in the 
business of investigating reality as mainstream metaphysics. All four seem to 
hold that feminist philosophers providing constructivist analyses of gender, 
such as Haslanger (2000) and Sveinsdóttir (2013), are investigating reality, i.e. 
worldly facts, just as much as mainstream metaphysicians like Unger (1979), 
van Inwagen (1990), or Merricks (2001). I will call this view the Factual Inter-
pretation. I will criticize the Factual Interpretation and provide an alternative 
account of feminist metaphysics of gender and its relationship to mainstream 
metaphysics. Central to that alternative account is the view that mainstream 
revisionary ontology and feminist metaphysics of gender both seek to improve 
the ordinary conceptual scheme that we employ when we form beliefs about the 
world. However, the two projects target concepts used in forming different 
kinds of beliefs. The feminist project mainly targets the beliefs that we 
unreflectively form upon perception and that are meant to inform much of our 
behaviour. The mainstream project exclusively targets the beliefs that we form 
when we reflect on the world from a practically detached point of view, in 
pursuit of epistemic excellence for its own sake. The upshot is that the two 
projects do not belong to the same bigger project of investigating reality. 
I will proceed as follows. I will begin, in section 5.2, by criticizing the 
Factual Interpretation. Then, in section 5.3, I will provide an initial alternative 
to it: in contrast to mainstream metaphysics, feminist metaphysics does not 
investigate reality, but instead seeks to revise our gender concepts in line with 
feminist ethical and political goals. It would seem, then, that mainstream and 
feminist metaphysics are not in the same intellectual business. I will raise a 
problem for this assessment of matters, in section 5.4: much of mainstream 
metaphysics is also plausibly viewed as a project of conceptual engineering. 
Perhaps the two projects are in the same business, after all – although as 
competitors rather than allies. In section 5.5, I will reject this view as well, 
arguing that we should recognize different kinds of beliefs, targeted by the two 
projects of conceptual engineering. The ultimate conclusion, then, is that the 
two projects do not belong to the same intellectual business and it is not 
particularly problematic that they are pursued in relative isolation from one 
another. 
 
5.2. Against the Factual Interpretation 
While a remarkable body of literature has accumulated on feminist metho-
dology in philosophy and science more generally, not much has been said 
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specifically about the relationship between feminist and mainstream meta-
physics, before the recent discussion between Barnes, Mikkola, Sider, and 
Schaffer. I propose my account as an alternative to the consensus between these 
four. This consensus is the Factual Interpretation of feminist metaphysics: the 
view that mainstream and feminist metaphysics both investigate reality, that is, 
worldly facts (as opposed to, say, facts about our concepts). In this section, I 
will pose a problem for the Factual Interpretation: it is in tension with a certain 
plausible assumption, which I will call the Relevance thesis. The Relevance 
thesis says that appeals to certain kinds of ethical considerations are relevant in 
feminist metaphysics; for example, Jenkins’ (2016) objection to Haslanger 
(2000) is a relevant one. I will further argue, in this section, that if I am right 
that the Factual Interpretation (or more precisely, the variant that I call Strong 
Factual Interpretation) is incorrect for at least some variety of feminist 
metaphysics, then it is prima facie problematic to call that variety of feminist 
metaphysics by the name “metaphysics”. And terminology aside, it is then in 
any case problematic to consider that variety of feminist metaphysics a part of 
the intellectual project also involving mainstream metaphysics. 
 
 
5.2.1. Background: the debate between  
Barnes, Mikkola, Sider, and Schaffer 
I cannot, at this point, give a substantive characterization of “feminist” and 
“mainstream” metaphysics: what, if anything, distinguishes them (be it subject 
matter, method, or something else) is at issue in what follows. So I define the 
relevant kind of feminist and mainstream metaphysics, the interpretation of 
which I will be concerned with, by reference to paradigmatic examples. Femi-
nist metaphysics involves, centrally, discussion of the existence and nature of 
genders (or sexes), as conducted, for example, by Haslanger (2000) and 
Sveinsdóttir (2013). Mainstream metaphysics is not limited to a characteristic 
subject matter; authors and works exemplifying this project include Unger 
(1979), van Inwagen (1990), Merricks (2001) – the “mainstream revisionary 
ontology” I have considered so far in this thesis. Others may mean something 
else by “mainstream metaphysics” and “feminist metaphysics”. I am charac-
terizing the projects like this because these are the projects that I am concerned 
with and the projects that Barnes and others seem to have in mind when they 
talk about the metaphysicians who study the existence of tables and those who 
study the existence and nature of genders. 
Now, to put my interpretive proposal into the context of the discussion 
between Barnes, Mikkola, Sider, and Schaffer (focusing on Barnes and Sider), 
let us begin with Sider’s account of metaphysics and Barnes’ criticism thereof. 
Central to Sider’s (2011) account is the idea that the world has an objective 
structure that can be “reflected” or “captured” to different extents by different 
conceptual schemes. The aim of metaphysics is to capture that objective 
structure, or to “carve nature at its joints”, by seeking the most structure-
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reflecting, joint-carving conceptual scheme. We find the most joint-carving 
conceptual scheme by looking for the most theoretically virtuous one – the most 
consistent, simple, elegant, explanatorily powerful one. 
Sider also calls the joint-carving or structure-reflecting concepts “funda-
mental” concepts and the structure that they capture the “fundamental” structure 
of reality. For example: “Metaphysics, at bottom, is about the fundamental 
structure of reality” (Sider 2011, 1). This has caused some confusion, leading to 
the criticism that he does not consider the study of non-fundamental aspects of 
reality “metaphysics” (Barnes 2014). And since feminist metaphysics is preci-
sely concerned with such non-fundamental aspects, Sider appears to exclude 
feminist metaphysics from “metaphysics” in his sense (ibid.). However, as Sider 
explains in his response (Sider 2017), the “fundamental” structure studied by 
metaphysics is not necessarily the bottom-most level of reality. Sider allows 
concepts to be joint-carving, and thus “fundamental”, without being, say, the 
concepts of fundamental physics. What matters is rather that the concept must 
play an indispensable role in an explanatory causal theory of the world; and 
such theories can be about non-basic aspects of the world. Explanatory causal 
theories are provided, for example, by economists and psychologists, and not 
just physicists; and feminist theories about gender can be considered such 
explanatory causal theories as well. For example, Sider (2017, 2472–2473) 
suggests that drawing a distinction between sex and gender might be required 
by the world’s causal or explanatory structure, and hence sex and gender can be 
joint-carving (“fundamental”) notions. 
Let us now leave aside the question of whether Sider’s account, with its 
emphasis on fundamentality and natural joints, threatens to exclude feminist 
metaphysics from “proper” metaphysics. I will focus instead on the consensus 
that emerges between Sider and Barnes: the Factual Interpretation of feminist 
metaphysics. According to the Factual Interpretation, metaphysics is the study 
of reality and feminist metaphysics studies certain non-fundamental aspects of 
reality. Sider is apologetic about having suggested that feminist metaphysics is 
not a part of metaphysics: “Metaphysics certainly includes many questions 
other than those about fundamental reality, questions about the nature of race 
and gender among them, and I wish I hadn’t suggested otherwise” (Sider 2017, 
2468). Further, a description of the world “in and of itself” – the description 
pursued by metaphysics – may include “facts about socially constructed gender 
and race” (Sider 2017, 2477). Barnes assents to the Factual Interpretation when 
she writes that social metaphysics, including feminist metaphysics, studies 
“social kinds which can be real and objective, but are not part of ‘the basic 
furniture of the universe’” (Barnes 2014, 347). Mikkola (2015, 2017), whose 
more specific views I will not discuss at length here, is likewise concerned with 
the marginalization of feminist metaphysics, and likewise seems to support the 
Factual Interpretation. Schaffer (2017) argues that his conception of meta-
physics as the study of what grounds what is a helpful framework for 
constructivist metaphysics of gender, allowing to integrate “social construction 
into a systematic account of how reality is structured” (Schaffer 2017, 2456). 
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Schaffer’s acceptance of the Factual Interpretation is also clear, at least in so far 
as social constructivism about gender is concerned. 
 
 
5.2.2. The argument against the Factual Interpretation 
I am dissatisfied with the Factual Interpretation because, as I will argue, it is 
tension with the plausible thesis that I will call Relevance. 
 
Relevance: Arguments like Jenkins’ (2016) are relevant in feminist metaphysics, 
for objecting to social constructivist claims about gender. 
 
Let us also explicitly define the Factual Interpretation. 
 
Factual Interpretation: The central aim of feminist metaphysics, just like that of 
mainstream metaphysics, is to investigate reality, i.e. worldly facts. Accordingly, 
the central claims in feminist metaphysics are claims about reality, i.e. worldly 
facts. 
 
One may apply the Factual Interpretation only to some subdomain of feminist 
metaphysics. Here, I will be primarily concerned with whether the Factual 
Interpretation applies to the feminist social constructivist analyses of gender, 
such as Haslanger (2000) and Sveinsdóttir (2013). 
In order to understand the Relevance thesis and the Factual Interpretation 
better, we need to look at social constructivist accounts of gender and Jenkins’ 
objection. For now, I will use Haslanger’s view as an example of social 
constructivist accounts, since this is the one that Jenkins directly objects to. I 
will then show how the objection generalizes. According to Haslanger (2000, 
235), then, S is a woman if and only if S, for the most part, functions as a 
woman; and S functions as a woman if and only if she is oppressed because of 
her real or imagined physical features that are associated with femaleness. 
Jenkins objected that this analysis is unfair to trans women, excluding them 
unjustly from the extension of “woman”: “Failure to respect the gender 
identifications of trans people is a serious harm and is conceptually linked to 
forms of transphobic oppression and even violence” (Jenkins 2016, 296). Why 
and how is this exclusion of trans women unjust, exactly? My construal differs 
from Barnes’ (2017), in this regard. Barnes, commenting on arguments like 
Jenkins’, writes as follows: 
 
A successful account of gender ought to say that trans women are women; it 
would be unjust not to classify trans women as women. But at least part of that 
injustice, on most accounts, consists in failing to treat trans women as what they 
are. That is, it’s unjust to say that trans women aren’t women because trans 
women really are women. (Barnes 2017, 2420) 
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However, I do not see Jenkins arguing that the injustice consists partly or 
wholly in failing to acknowledge the fact that trans women are women. Perhaps 
one might construe the objection like this because one cannot see what else 
could be unjust about not treating trans women as women, if not that they are 
women. Indeed, not being treated as what one (really) is can constitute an 
injustice. However, there are other reasons why it might be unjust not to classify 
trans women as women. One could hold that it is a general imperative to respect 
certain self-categorizations that have emotional significance, where there is no 
overriding reason to deny the self-categorization. The reason further underlying 
the imperative might simply be that we should not inflict needless psychological 
harm that would arise for trans women from others believing that they are not 
women and acting accordingly. 
There are alternative reasons, then, to include trans women among “women”, 
other than the fact that they are women. Note that the idea here is not that trans 
women are not really women, but we should pretend that they are, because 
otherwise it will cause unnecessary psychological harm. The idea is rather that 
there might be no relevant deep fact of the matter as to whether trans women are 
really women (apart from shallow facts like who counts as a woman in ordinary 
language); but we should in any case categorize them as women because 
otherwise we would cause unnecessary psychological harm. Now, suppose that 
Jenkins (against appearances) was not appealing to such unnecessary harm and, 
as Barnes suggests, she was indeed appealing to what she thought was a fact 
about trans women: that they are women. A reason to doubt this interpretive 
claim is that Jenkins gives no arguments that support the contentious claim that 
trans women are women – a claim that, on Barnes’ construal, would be a 
crucial premise in her case against Haslanger’s account. Instead, Jenkins em-
phasizes that “trans people in general are a severely disadvantaged and 
marginalized group in society, suffering oppression and injustice in multiple 
respects” (Jenkins 2016, 396). If the issue, for Jenkins, was simply that trans 
people are the gender they identify as and Haslanger misclassifies them, it is 
hard to see how the disadvantage and marginalization of trans people would be 
relevant to the argument. 
However, let us suppose that this is indeed how Jenkins reasoned: trans 
women should be treated as women because they are women; and Haslanger’s 
account is unjust to trans women because it does not treat them as what they 
are. But now imagine another possible opponent to Haslanger, let us call her 
Jenkins*. Jenkins*, let us suppose, explicitly says that she is not appealing to 
the fact that trans women are women. Further, she explicitly says that failing to 
categorize trans women as women would bring unnecessary harm and that is 
why we should categorize them as women. She also says that there might be no 
relevant deep metaphysical fact about whether trans women are women. There 
might only be shallow facts about whom current ordinary English categorizes 
and fails to categorize as women (but quite possibly, there is enough divergence 
in this regard among ordinary speakers, so that even such shallow facts are hard 
to establish). It would seem that feminist metaphysicians should not dismiss the 
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objection from Jenkins*. To dismiss it would be to simply ignore needless 
psychological harm that they might cause to trans women. If Barnes’ construal 
of Jenkins’ objection was correct, I would modify the Relevance thesis as 
follows: 
 
Relevance*: Arguments like that of Jenkins* are relevant in feminist meta-
physics, for objecting to constructivist accounts of gender. 
 
I would then argue that the Factual Interpretation must be rejected because it is 
in tension with the plausible Relevance* thesis. However, I will continue to 
speak of Jenkins, not of Jenkins*, and of Relevance, not of Relevance*, since I 
consider my interpretation of Jenkins’ argument the stronger version of her case 
and thus, I hope, I do not do her injustice by attributing the argument to her 
name. But it should make no difference to my argument whether anyone has 
actually put forth an argument like that of Jenkins*. What is important is that 
feminist metaphysicians need to affirm the relevance of such an argument for 
objecting to constructivist analyses of gender. 
I take Relevance to be a highly plausible claim that is in tension with the 
Factual Interpretation, a less plausible claim. On this basis, I suggest that the 
Factual Interpretation should be rejected. What is the tension, then, between 
Relevance and the Factual Interpretation of the constructivist accounts of 
gender? According to the Factual Interpretation, Haslanger, for example, would 
be claiming that the following fact F1 (roughly) obtains. 
 
F1: Women are those who are oppressed because of their real or imagined 
physical features associated with femaleness. 
 
To take another example, Sveinsdóttir (2013) would be claiming that the 
following fact F2 (roughly) obtains. 
 
F2: Women are those who are conferred the property of womanhood by the sub-
jects in the context (e.g. party guests) who perceive them to have a relevant 
grounding property. 
 
According to my construal of Jenkins’ objection, she appeals to ethical conside-
rations – in particular, needless harm – and not metaphysical facts, to object to 
social constructivist claims about gender (Haslanger’s, in particular; but her 
objection seems to generalize). So combining my construal of Jenkins’ objec-
tion and the Factual Interpretation’s construal of the constructivist claims about 
gender, Jenkins’ reasoning would have to go along the following lines.  
 
Reasoning 1: Does F1 or F2 (or some similar constructivist account, factually 
interpreted) obtain? If it does, then we will needlessly harm trans women. But we 
should not needlessly harm trans women. Therefore, F1 or F2 (or some similar 
constructivist account, factually interpreted) does not obtain. 
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One must admit that this is a rather strange way to reason: the reasoning appa-
rently presupposes that the ethically objectionable consequences of a purported 
fact can be evidence that the fact does not obtain. I believe that feminist 
metaphysicians, when they give an account of what they are doing, should 
avoid this commitment, unless they can further defend it. Of course, I am not 
attributing Reasoning 1 to Jenkins (since I do not think that she accepts the 
Factual Interpretation). I am objecting to the Factual Interpretation, by pointing 
out an unacceptable implication that results from combining the Factual 
Interpretation with the plausible Relevance thesis. The unacceptable implication 
is that Reasoning 1 is an appropriate way to reason in feminist metaphysics. 
This implication is unacceptable because Reasoning 1 does not seem rationally 
compelling at all. It seems to fall into a broader category of reasoning that does 
not make much sense, namely citing the undesirable consequences of a pur-
ported fact as evidence that the fact does not obtain. Such reasoning is also 
known as “wishful thinking”. Reasoning 1 is structurally analogous to the 
following instance of wishful thinking, for example: “Hunger in Africa would 
be ethically objectionable, bringing about death and suffering for innocents. So 
there is no hunger in Africa.” This is abhorrently bad reasoning. Why should we 
think, then, that such reasoning is legitimate when it comes to investigating 
social reality? 
I do not rule it out that feminist metaphysicians or somebody else might be 
able to explain why such reasoning is appropriate in the study of social reality, 
as opposed to the study of other kinds of facts, or perhaps even in the study of 
all facts. To the best of my knowledge, however, no such explanation has been 
provided so far. Needless to say, it will not suffice to say something to the effect 
that non-evidential values do and should play a role in investigating facts. This 
is uncontroversial in so far as it concerns, for example, the choice of what areas 
of reality to study in the first place and which research methods to use. For 
example, respecting the autonomy of research subjects is not an evidential 
value, and yet it is a relevant consideration when investigating facts. But these 
uncontroversial claims are a long way from showing that the undesirable 
consequences of a purported fact can be evidence against the fact’s obtaining. 
One may respond that Jenkins’ objection need not be construed as pointing 
to potential harm as evidence against the purported fact, even when we construe 
the claim that she is objecting to as a factual claim. Perhaps factual claims can 
be to a certain extent under-determined by evidence. If so, then feminist 
metaphysicians can mostly be guided by evidential considerations, like the 
explanatory value of their claims, and hence these claims can be considered 
factual; but there can still be room for objecting to the claims by appeal to harm, 
in so far as evidence under-determines some issues, for example, the issue of 
whether trans women are women. We could thus recognize the possibility that 
feminist metaphysicians are concerned with factual claims, but at the same time 
they are liable to take into account objections from harm, in so far as evidence 
under-determines the issue. 
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It would indeed make the worry about wishful thinking less pressing for the 
Factual Interpretation, if we could concede that factual claims can be partly 
under-determined by evidence and objections from harm are then appropriate. 
However, that would still mean that there are important qualifications to be 
made in any warranted acceptance of the Factual Interpretation. Feminist 
metaphysicians’ evaluation criteria for their central claims would then still not 
only involve the question of whether these claims get the facts right. Other, not 
purely epistemic considerations (such as avoiding harm) would be relevant in 
evaluating the claims. That makes the sense in which the claims are “factual” 
different from the sense in which mainstream revisionary ontologists’ claims 
are “factual”. Although broadly speaking, both might be concerned with 
investigating reality responsively to evidence (looking for the most explanatory 
hypotheses, etc.), the feminist metaphysicians would not be concerned only with 
that. So they would at least have to reject what I will call the Strong Factual 
Interpretation. 
 
Strong Factual Interpretation: The only guiding aim of feminist metaphysics, 
just like that of mainstream metaphysics, is to investigate reality, i.e. worldly 
facts. Accordingly, the central claims in feminist metaphysics are claims that are 
responsive only to reality, i.e. worldly facts. 
 
I suppose that feminist metaphysicians would not and should not reject 
Relevance, i.e. the thesis that objections like that of Jenkins’ (or Jenkins*) are 
relevant; and that they would be more open to rejecting, and indeed should 
reject, the Strong Factual Interpretation, i.e. the view that feminist meta-
physicians like Haslanger or Sveinsdóttir should be taken to be exclusively 
concerned with investigating reality, in providing their constructivist analyses. 
And that already seems to drive a wedge between the character of mainstream 
revisionary ontologists’ central claims (e.g. that there are no tables) and the 
feminist metaphysicians’ central claims. 
 
 
5.2.3. How far does the point extend? 
How far into feminist metaphysics does this point extend? The “point”, again, is 
that the Strong Factual Interpretation must be rejected. The point is certainly 
likely to cover constructivist accounts of “woman” that place the status of 
someone as a woman in the hands of other people and/or institutions, rather 
than something like the person’s own lived identity or experience. The latter 
kind of account is apparently needed, to include trans women. The point 
extends further, however. One could also object to accounts of “woman” that 
are based on lived identity by appeal to ethically undesirable consequences, 
such as allowing privileged persons to unfairly assume a victimized role. If the 
objection is relevant (which is not to say that it is decisive, but that it should be 
taken seriously by feminist metaphysicians and given a response) and the 
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identity-based accounts in question are interpreted (strongly) factually, then 
wishful thinking again appears to come out as an appropriate mode of reasoning 
in feminist metaphysics. 
Further, the whole project of giving some analysis of “woman”, for femi-
nists, is often motivated by the need to identify the “women” whose interests 
feminists are to defend. For example, Jenkins (2016, 394) writes: “Leaving the 
concept [of woman] undefined, however, calls into question the project of 
feminism – supposedly a movement to end the oppression of ’wo-
men’.” Suppose that we take this to be an argument to the conclusion that there 
are women, as a matter of a (metaphysical) fact. The reasoning would go as 
follows: “If there were no women, then feminists would not be able to pursue 
their aim of defending the interests of women. This would be a bad result for 
feminists. Therefore, there are women.” It is the same prima facie unacceptable 
pattern of wishful thinking again, and again it arises from accepting both the 
Factual Interpretation of the feminist metaphysicians’ central claims and the 
relevance of desirable/undesirable consequences for defending or objecting to 
these claims. 
I have argued so far that feminist metaphysicians of gender should reject the 
(Strong) Factual Interpretation of their central claims. This is because (1) they 
should recognize the relevance of arguments from unethical consequences in 
favour and against such claims and (2) they should reject the idea that wishful 
thinking is an appropriate way to reason in their area (or any area), unless they 
can make better sense of the method, as applied to the instances of reasoning 
considered here. Now, if feminist metaphysicians do reject the (Strong) Factual 
Interpretation, then they need an alternative account of what feminist meta-
physics does and how it relates to mainstream metaphysics. I will provide such 
an alternative in what follows. (I will also look into what remains of the idea 
that feminist metaphysics is metaphysics.) 
 
 
5.3. The initial solution: feminist metaphysics as  
a project of conceptual engineering 
We need not look far for an alternative account of feminist metaphysics. 
Haslanger and Jenkins have provided it themselves, in (some of) their charac-
terizations of what they are doing: their question is not a theoretical one about 
the facts that obtain, but a practical one about the concepts that we should use. 
And indeed, it makes perfect sense to appeal to good or bad consequences when 
the question is about what we should do. Suppose that I ask: “Should we do 
X?”. My interlocutor can very well answer that (1) if we do X, then we must do 
Y (or are likely to do Y), and (2) since it is not alright to do Y, we should not do 
X. For example, if we get drunk, we might act recklessly. Behaving recklessly 
is bad; so we should not get drunk. But suppose that I asked instead: “Are we 
drunk?”. Now, it is not alright to answer: “If we are drunk, then we might act 
recklessly. But we should not act recklessly. So we are not drunk.” 
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Again, the practical question that I take Haslanger and Jenkins to be asking 
is: which concepts should we use? More specifically, the question is about 
which concept, if any, we shall pair with the existing term “woman” that 
already has a certain role in our practices and brings about certain associations 
in human minds. So instead of the strange Reasoning 1 above, Jenkins’ 
objection would go as follows. 
 
Reasoning 2: Who should we classify as ‘women’? If we use Haslanger’s crite-
rion, then we will unnecessarily harm trans women. We should not unnecessarily 
harm trans women. Therefore, we should not use Haslanger’s criterion. 
 
Haslanger (2000) explicitly frames her question as one about how to improve 
our concept of woman; and Jenkins explicitly follows suit. However, not all 
feminist metaphysicians frame the question like this; indeed, Haslanger herself 
has sometimes given a metaphysical gloss to her analysis. Nevertheless, the 
issue is what feminist metaphysicians would do well to maintain about their 
project, not what they have maintained so far. They would do well to maintain 
that theirs is a project of conceptual engineering, because then they can admit 
the relevance of arguments from (un)ethical consequences for and against their 
central claims, while not admitting the appropriateness of wishful thinking in 
feminist metaphysics. Can they then also maintain that theirs is a project of 
metaphysics? And should they be interested in maintaining this? 
It is a fairly uncontroversial view that the aim of investigating reality is a 
necessary feature of any metaphysical project; and on my suggested account, 
feminist metaphysics (of gender) is not a project (exclusively) aimed at inves-
tigating reality. This is not because a project of conceptual engineering cannot 
be a project of investigating reality. I think it can; the account of mainstream 
revisionary ontology provided in the previous chapters involves precisely the 
claim that mainstream revisionary ontology is both a project of conceptual 
engineering and a project aimed at investigating reality. It is possible, I suppose, 
to investigate reality by discussing what concepts would best reflect the 
structure of reality. However, my suggested account of feminist metaphysics as 
a project of conceptual engineering rejects the Factual Interpretation of feminist 
metaphysics (or at least the Strong Factual Interpretation). The very motivation 
for interpreting feminist metaphysics as a project of conceptual engineering is 
the rejection of the Factual Interpretation of it. Because of that, I would rather 
say that feminist metaphysics (at least the part including the instances I have 
discussed and relevantly similar instances of it) is not metaphysics; but I do not 
think that this particular question of terminology is terribly important (although 
questions of terminology, of course, can be important). 
A few clarifications are in order. First, it is not entirely uncontroversial that 
metaphysics must be centrally or exclusively concerned with the study of 
reality. Some may want to call the mere study of our concepts “metaphysics”; 
Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics (Strawson 1959) is a case in point. 
However, it is still as close to uncontroversial as one can get, when charac-
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terizing metaphysics. Second, it must be emphasized that “studying reality” can 
only be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for something being meta-
physics: various non-metaphysical sciences (such as physics, biology, che-
mistry, and psychology) also study reality, it would seem. Third, it is not quite 
enough to say that metaphysics must “study reality”. What else is there to 
study? The relevant specification seems to be that metaphysics has its eye 
turned outward, not inward: it does not study (just) our concepts or thoughts, 
but the world beyond us. Studying our concepts is also the study of reality, the 
way things really are (with our concepts), but it is not the study of outside 
reality. Fourth, it is important to emphasize that studying outside reality must be 
the aim of the project. I do not mean to suggest that feminist metaphysicians are 
not at all concerned with establishing facts that obtain in the world, in defending 
their central claims like “Women are those who…” or “Women exist” or 
“Women do not exist”. Finally, it is important to focus not just on “reality”, but 
also “studies” (or “investigates”), to distinguish metaphysics from practically 
oriented projects of conceptual engineering, such as feminist metaphysics. Not 
just any kind of concern with reality is relevant. 
To explain this last point: as Thomasson (2017) observes, practically 
oriented projects of conceptual engineering are “worldly” in their orientation, as 
opposed to being just about our concepts. The concepts have a function in the 
society. Therefore, how we shape our concepts shapes our lives in the society. 
Whether we count waterboarding as torture, for example, is not just a linguistic 
matter, because it affects whether waterboarding is considered acceptable or 
not. Practically oriented projects of conceptual engineering, then, are concerned 
with the world. However, this is a different kind of concern with the world, not 
the kind of concern that we have with the world when we “study” or 
“investigate” it. It has a different direction of fit. Metaphysics aims to fit our 
representations to reality, not to fit the world to our representations. This 
assumption about metaphysics captures the self-conception and ambitions of 
most, but not all of mainstream metaphysics. If we take this assumption on 
board, then feminist metaphysics, understood as a project of practically oriented 
conceptual engineering, is not metaphysics. Instead of trying to fit our 
representations to reality as it is, the feminist metaphysicians’ aim is rather to 
transform reality for the better, by shaping the concepts that we use to represent 
reality. 
If feminist philosophers have good reasons, unknown to me so far, to insist 
on the label “metaphysics”, then I do not mind much. The concept paired with 
the term “metaphysics”, just as the concepts paired with other terms, is open to 
revision as the need may be. A more important question, for current purposes, 
concerns the relationship between feminist metaphysics, understood as a project 
of conceptual engineering, and mainstream metaphysics of the sort I have been 
concerned with in this thesis. In light of the discussion in this chapter so far, it 
might seem like mainstream metaphysicians and feminist metaphysicians are 
doing rather different things, and so there is no particular reason to expect much 
intellectual interaction between them. The mainstream project studies what 
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reality is like, whereas the feminist project (or at least a central part of it) is 
primarily concerned with improving concepts to make reality better. These 
seem like compatible projects that can be pursued relatively independently from 
one another. 
Things are not so simple, however. The problem is that it makes good sense 
to understand much of mainstream metaphysics as conceptual engineering as 
well. This is indeed what I have argued in the previous chapters, specifically 
about revisionary ontology. In the next section, I show how this suggests that 
mainstream metaphysics and feminist metaphysics share the same subject 
matter, after all: both are about how we should improve the ordinary conceptual 
scheme that we employ in forming beliefs about the world. 
 
 
5.4. But what if mainstream metaphysics is  
also a project of conceptual engineering?  
The hypothesis that emerged in the previous section was that mainstream meta-
physics studies reality and feminist metaphysics seeks to revise our ordinary 
concepts. Now, the problem with this view is that mainstream metaphysics is 
also plausibly seeking to revise our ordinary concepts. In particular, this applies 
to the sort of project with which Barnes compares the metaphysics of gender in 
the quotation at the beginning of the chapter. I have defended and elaborated 
upon this conceptual engineering view of mainstream revisionary ontology in 
the previous chapters. Again, this approach can be traced back at least to Carnap 
(1950b). 
Carnap emphasized that ontological questions, understood as questions about 
concept revision, are “practical”, not “theoretical” ones. But in supposing that 
dichotomy, he seemed to miss an option: perhaps ontologists are asking how to 
revise our language so that it would reflect the objective structure of the world? 
If this is indeed a question that can be sensibly asked, then it seems like a good 
candidate for the question that ontologists might be asking. Further, it seems 
like a theoretical enough question, being about the structure of the world, while 
it is also a practical question about what we ought to do with our concepts, so as 
to reflect that structure. This view of mainstream metaphysics as a project of 
conceptual engineering rejects not just the dichotomy between theoretical 
questions and practical questions, but also the dichotomy that Barnes suggests 
when she says that metaphysical realists “think disputes in metaphysics are 
disputes about the world, not about our concepts” (Barnes 2017, 2418). A 
metaphysical realist who thinks of metaphysics as the project of finding the 
most joint-carving conceptual scheme can allow that disputes in metaphysics 
are about the world as well as our concepts: not about what our concepts are 
like, but how we should revise them, so as to reflect the objective structure of 
the world. 
An account along these lines, I suppose, is the best way to think about 
mainstream metaphysics, at least when it comes to issues like the existence of 
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tables. (It might not be the best way to think about mainstream metaphysics 
when it comes to issues like the existence of free will; I will have a few words 
to say about this at the very end of this chapter.) Again, this also seems to be 
more or less how Sider (2011) views ontological questions: ontology is about 
finding the best language for describing the objective structure of the world.21 
The central desiderata in such language revision are theoretical virtues, such as 
coherence, elegance, and simplicity. For example, the language revision should 
avoid the typical puzzles raised by revisionary ontologists, such as the Ship of 
Theseus or the sorites paradoxes – puzzles that reveal the well-hidden 
theoretical imperfections of the ordinary conceptual scheme. The hope is that 
the pursuit of theoretical virtues will lead to a conceptual scheme that better 
captures the objective structure of the world (“carves at the joints”).  
Assuming that this account of mainstream metaphysics as conceptual 
engineering is a good one, I ask: if mainstream metaphysics and feminist 
metaphysics are both projects of conceptual engineering, then perhaps they are 
part of the same bigger project, after all? This would not be the project of 
investigating reality (that is a concern only for mainstream metaphysics), but 
the project of revising the ordinary conceptual scheme that we employ in belief 
formation. Further, it would seem that mainstream metaphysicians and feminist 
metaphysicians are not allies but competitors in this business of improving the 
ordinary conceptual scheme. This is because the camps have different ideas of 
what the scheme should be improved for. The demands that mainstream 
metaphysicians appeal to, as they make prescriptions on our conceptual scheme, 
are the “demands of reason”, or (presumably) “evidential” considerations, such 
as consistency, elegance, and simplicity. It is all in the name of carving at the 
joints; ethics has no place here. And, as I am supposing (by insisting on the 
Relevance thesis), ethical considerations are relevant for feminist metaphysics, 
in defending and objecting to their central claims, which on my interpretation 
are about which concepts we should use. 
This contrast in assumptions about the relevant desiderata for concepts 
would not be a problem if feminist metaphysics and mainstream metaphysics 
were developing conceptual schemes for distinct areas of discourse. However, 
this does not appear to be the case. On the face of it, both projects, if they are 
indeed projects of conceptual engineering, are developing an alternative to the 
ordinary conceptual scheme that people employ to form beliefs about the world. 
‘Man’ and ‘woman’, like ‘chair’ and ‘table’, are in the folk conceptual reper-
toire. It does not seem that the philosophers’ concern, in either case, is only with 
how these ordinary concepts should be employed in a specific specialized 
context. 
                                                 
21 Matters are complicated by the fact that Sider is also sympathetic to Lewis’s idea of 
reference magnetism, so he thinks that in natural language there is a certain pull towards 
objective joints. But he also accepts the possibility that this pull can be intentionally can-
celled or weakened by language users. 
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The last claim might not be entirely obvious. Both camps sometimes leave 
the impression that they are concerned with a specific area of discourse: 
feminist discourse, in the case of feminist metaphysics; or how we think and 
speak in the “ontology room”, in the case of mainstream metaphysics. However, 
it does not actually make much sense to construe the project of conceptual 
engineering as intended for such limited contexts, in either case. First, let us 
look at the possibility that feminist engineering of concepts like ‘woman’ is 
intended just for feminist discourse. Haslanger suggests this when she says that 
her “analysis is intended to capture a meaningful political category for critical 
feminist efforts” (Haslanger 2000, 46). She also warns that “[t]he point is not to 
legislate what terms to use in all contexts, but to offer resources that should be 
used judiciously” (ibid., 48). However, the general ethos of feminist re-thinking 
of gender concepts is that this re-thinking affects us all, since we all have these 
concepts and employ them to categorize the persons that we ordinarily 
encounter and interact with, and even ourselves. Indeed, Haslanger acknow-
ledges in the same article that “the terminological shift calls us to reconsider 
who we think we are” (Haslanger 2000, 47) and that “we should refuse to be 
gendered man or woman, refuse to be raced. This goes beyond denying 
essentialist claims about one’s embodiment and involves an active political 
commitment to live one’s life differently” (Haslanger 2000, 48). 
Just as it is implausible that feminist conceptual engineering only targets the 
concepts to be employed in feminist theorizing, it is also implausible that the 
conceptual engineering of mainstream metaphysics only targets the concepts to 
be employed in the ontology room. If the problems with ordinary concepts, 
revealed by metaphysicians’ clever puzzles, are indeed problems, and it is an 
epistemic advantage to overcome then, then why is it not an advantage for 
everyone, regardless of whether they happen to be academic metaphysicians or 
currently in the business of discussing metaphysics? Unlike feminist metaphysi-
cians, mainstream metaphysicians would presumably say that we need not 
worry too much about employing the metaphysically best conceptual scheme in 
everyday contexts (and this difference will prove significant and will be further 
explored shortly). But still, it is not just the metaphysicians as they do meta-
physics, but also the rest of us, all the time, who are not supposed to really 
believe that there are tables, according to the eliminativist. 
It seems, then, that both feminist metaphysicians and mainstream metaphysi-
cians make demands on our beliefs – and the “us” is not just fellow feminists or 
fellow mainstream metaphysicians. The feminists and the mainstreamers seem 
to be involved in the same project, after all, although they start off from quite 
different assumptions about how to pursue this project. Whose advice should 
we follow, then? Should we seek a conceptual scheme that respects the 
demands of reason and reflects the objective structure of the world or one that 
avoids unnecessary harm? One might respond that we may not need to choose; 
perhaps the most theoretically virtuous and joint-carving conceptual scheme is 
also the most fair one. But I do not see why this should be so. Indeed, there are 
reasons to think it is not so. 
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For example, Unger (1979) has argued, by appeal to the sort of sorites 
argument that is typical of mainstream metaphysics, that there are no people, 
i.e. persons. On my construal of mainstream metaphysics, he has argued that we 
should not employ the concept ‘person’ when we form beliefs about the world. 
One might make a very similar argument against the concepts of man and 
woman, bringing to light the inconsistent or incomplete application conditions 
of the words “man” and “woman” in ordinary language. Consider these two 
claims: (1) We can remove a particle from any man and he would still be a man; 
and (2) Ten particles do not make up a man. These claims are inconsistent, 
since we can get down to ten particles by removing one at a time; and if we 
remove just one particle from a man, we should always end up with a man. But 
the two inconsistent claims seem to be warranted by our competence with the 
concept ‘man’. A possible conclusion, then, is that a theoretically unacceptable 
inconsistency is built into the application conditions for “man”. And the same 
story could be told for “woman”. 
Now, the question is: do feminist philosophers need to take on challenges 
like this? Do they need to show that ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are not inconsistent 
concepts, after all, or that they can be made consistent, while serving their 
current useful purposes? To some extent, feminists might find such arguments 
appealing. They might want to cite them as one more reason against dividing 
people into men and women, if they are already against the division, for ethical 
and political reasons. But those who want to keep gender categories – for 
example, to identify an oppressed group whose interests are to be defended – 
will have little patience for metaphysical riddles that work against the existence 
of chairs and tables just as well as they work against the existence of men and 
women. Likewise, mainstream metaphysicians offering sorites paradoxes 
against the existence of persons, men, or women, will have little patience for 
ethical and pragmatic arguments for preserving the concepts. And the lack of 
patience seems right. Such ethical or pragmatic arguments just seem to miss the 
point, if the point is to develop the epistemically best theory of the world. 
My judgment (that I expect to be shared by at least some others, although not 
by everyone), then, is that philosophers like Unger need not worry about the 
important social purposes of the concept ‘person’ when they discuss its 
theoretical vices. And likewise, philosophers like Haslanger need not worry 
about the purely theoretical problems with concepts like ‘man’ and ‘woman’. If 
this judgement is correct, then this suggests that the demands of reason and the 
demands of ethics are not all in the same pool of relevant reasons when we 
think about how to revise our ordinary conceptual scheme. In a certain respect, 
the two projects are still different projects, and can ignore certain kinds of 
arguments characteristic of the other project, arguments that have only illusory 
relevance. But how can this be, when both projects are about how to revise 




5.5. Not the same project, after all: two kinds of belief 
I have argued that both feminist metaphysicians and mainstream metaphysicians 
seek to improve the ordinary conceptual scheme that people employ in belief 
formation. On the other hand, I have pointed out that feminist metaphysicians 
may apparently ignore mainstream metaphysicians’ appeals to reason, and 
mainstream metaphysicians may ignore the feminist metaphysicians’ appeals to 
ethics, even as they are considering the virtues and vices of the very same 
concepts (e.g. ‘man’ and ‘woman’). So how can the two projects of conceptual 
engineering run in independent tracks like this, while they are both concerned 
with improving the ordinary conceptual scheme for the purpose of forming 
beliefs about the world? I will suggest that there is an ambiguity in the 
expression “beliefs about the world”. Feminist and mainstream metaphysicians 
target different kinds of belief-like states. So the two projects are not in the 
same business (neither as allies nor as competitors), after all. 
I mentioned above that mainstream metaphysicians are generally forgiving 
when it comes to the folk temporarily forgetting about metaphysical truths, in 
the midst of everyday life. Everything is alright as long as we employ the right 
concepts at the moments when we take particular care to get things right, to 
describe the world as it really is. On the other hand, for feminist metaphysi-
cians, it is important that we constantly live by the conclusions they argue for. 
Recall again Haslanger saying that “we should refuse to be gendered man or 
woman, refuse to be raced. This goes beyond denying essentialist claims about 
one’s embodiment and involves an active political commitment to live one’s life 
differently” (Haslanger 2000, 48). She refers to John Stoltenberg, from whom 
the words “refusing to be a man” originate. It is worth looking at how Stolten-
berg puts the idea: 
 
Sexual identity – the belief that there is maleness and femaleness and that 
therefore one is either man or woman – is among the most fundamental ideas 
with which we interpret our experience. … With the idea of sexual identity in 
our head, we see things and feel things and learn things in terms of it. 
(Stoltenberg 2000, 2) 
 
Stoltenberg, like Haslanger, wants these ways of seeing and thinking and 
feeling to be changed. For Stoltenberg, this is because he relates these ways of 
seeing and thinking and feeling to problematic behaviours and attitudes, ranging 
from rape and objectification to war. For mainstream metaphysics, again, it is 
not a problem if we cannot change how we perceive the world in ordinary day-
to-day situations. It is alright if we intellectually acknowledge that there are 
only particles arranged table-wise, even though every time we look at a 
collection of particles arranged table-wise, what we immediately see is a table. 
Consider again Dorr and Rosen’s paragraph about the mariner who believes that 
Copernicus was right about astronomy and Ptolemy was wrong: 
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Consider the mariner who knows full well that Copernicus was right. When he is 
navigating he speaks and thinks in Ptolemaic terms. In the midst of a storm, 
when things are urgent, he may have no conscious reservations about what he 
says or thinks. Nonetheless, when he says ‘If Venus has crossed the moon, we’re 
off course’ he is not committed to its truth. His official view, his genuine view, is 
that Copernicus was right and that his Ptolemaic remark is a useful fiction. (Dorr 
and Rosen 2002, 171) 
 
For Dorr and Rosen, like most other mainstream metaphysicians, it is no 
problem if, in the midst of the daily hassle, we talk and think of table-wise 
arranged particles as tables, just as the mariner thinks and talks of the Venus as 
crossing the moon. It is alright, as long as we correct ourselves when asked 
about our “official, genuine view”. By contrast, when feminists talk about 
changing our gender concepts, it is crucial to change who strikes us as a woman 
or a man, and what it is that they strike us as when they strike us as a man or a 
woman. For example, it is crucial for the gender eliminativists that whenever 
we encounter a person, we would not categorize them as a man or a woman; 
and it is crucial for someone who wants to include trans women among women 
that we do not habitually refer to trans women by the male pronoun. Having the 
correct “official, genuine view” is not enough for feminist metaphysicians. It 
would not satisfy Jenkins, for example, if people immediately thought of a trans 
woman as a man when they encountered her, and spoke and behaved according-
ly, yet gladly classified trans women as women when asked about their official, 
genuine views. 
As one may guess already, I am again trying to get at the distinction between 
theoretical and practical beliefs. Here, the emphasis is not on the purpose for 
which the beliefs are formed (although this is still the ultimate basis for the 
distinction), but the different kind of endorsement of the relevant represen-
tations that the two kinds of beliefs involve. The beliefs that primarily concern 
feminist “metaphysicians” like Haslanger and Jenkins are those that we 
unreflectively form when we encounter or think about other people and that we 
likewise unreflectively act upon. These beliefs concern feminists because they 
inform much of our behaviour (rather than merely those actions that I have 
described as “research actions” in the previous chapter). The mainstream 
metaphysicians, on the other hand, do not care about these sorts of unreflective 
beliefs. They care about the beliefs that we endorse on reflection and that we 
can call our “ultimate theory of the world”. They sometimes call these our 
genuine, real beliefs; but again, I do not find it fruitful to designate either kind 
of belief as our “real” belief. 
To make matters a bit less obscure, let me say again what I mean by 
“beliefs” in general. Roughly, when we believe that p, we represent the world in 
a certain way, and we take the world to be as represented. One may represent 
the world in a certain way without taking it to be as represented, for example, 
when one imagines or dreams; but not when one believes. What matters for 
both mainstream metaphysicians and feminist metaphysicians is how people 
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represent the world when they take it to be as represented. In that sense, they 
both target our beliefs. However, there are (at least) two ways of taking the 
world to be as represented. One way is to perceive the world as represented and 
to act on the basis of this perception; another is to reflectively endorse that the 
world is as represented. Feminist metaphysicians have reason to care about the 
first sort of belief (because it informs action); mainstream metaphysicians, 
however, care about the second kind of belief, because that is the kind of belief 
that presumably matters for intrinsically worthwhile epistemic excellence. 
Mainstream metaphysicians, like feminist metaphysicians, then, care about 
how people represent the world when they take it to be as represented. But for 
mainstream metaphysicians, the reason to care about such representations is not 
that people are likely to act on them. Instead, the reason is that it is an 
intrinsically worthy goal, an epistemic achievement, to take the world to be a 
certain way if and only if it indeed is that way. Now, these different reasons for 
caring about what people believe also plausibly warrant different standards for 
the beliefs and, accordingly, the concepts used to form beliefs. For the 
mainstream metaphysicians, who only care about the intrinsically valuable 
epistemic achievement, getting it right is all that matters; and so it is natural that 
they want the conceptual scheme to get it maximally right. For the feminist 
metaphysicians, getting it right matters primarily in so far as it facilitates the 
right action. Accordingly, they are completely within their rights to ignore the 
sorts of considerations that mainstream metaphysicians routinely bring up, such 
as deeply hidden, practically irrelevant inconsistencies in our conceptual 
scheme. We need not worry about these when we choose the right concepts for 
forming practical beliefs. 
Of course, one and the same person may form both sorts of beliefs: those 
that are meant to inform action in pursuit of ultimately non-epistemic aims and 
those that are meant to represent the world accurately merely for the sake of the 
epistemic achievement. The person might then also host two different 
conceptual schemes, one for forming “practical beliefs” and one for forming 
“theoretical beliefs”. One might believe, then, that there are no macroscopic 
objects, and no persons, no women and men, in one sense of “belief”; and 
believe that there are women (an oppressed group whose interests must be 
defended) in another sense of “belief”. Neither sort of belief would be a mere 
pretenseful acceptance: one would really take the world to be such that there are 
men and women, and one would really take the world to be such that there are 
no men and women. Again, these are two different senses of “taking the world 
to be as represented”: taking the representation as basis for action, and 
endorsing the representation on reflection, as a part of one’s ultimate theory of 
the world. But there need not and should not be any pretence involved in either 
case. 
A possible objection is that on my account, it is still the mainstream meta-
physicians who investigate what there really, ultimately is, while the practical 
beliefs targeted by feminist metaphysicians have only a second-rate status, 
informing our day-to-day decisions, but not how we ultimately think about the 
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world. My account would marginalize feminist metaphysics, then. Feminist 
metaphysicians want their claims to be taken as seriously as the claims of main-
stream metaphysics. But on my account, it may turn out that the recognition that 
“trans women are really women” is like “the sun is rising”: a statement to be 
affirmed in the hurry of everyday life, but possibly to be retracted at a moment 
of serious reflection. My response is that I do not intend there to be a hierarchy 
between the two sorts of beliefs. Informing action is an important role for 
beliefs to play. Representing reality accurately merely for the sake of the 
epistemic achievement is also an important role. 
Another possible objection is that my account does not hold up when we 
consider a more diverse variety of examples either from feminist metaphysics or 
mainstream metaphysics or both. For example, the discussions of free will and 
personal identity, which are surely debates in mainstream metaphysics, do not 
seem to be mere attempts to reflect the joints of reality by developing the most 
theoretically virtuous conceptual scheme. Instead, they seem to concern how we 
think of ourselves, how we act every day, and how we organize our institutions, 
quite similarly with the metaphysics of gender.22 In response, I grant that some 
debates in what we would be inclined to call “mainstream metaphysics” may 
turn out to be concerned with shaping the concepts that we use to form our 
practically oriented beliefs and not exclusively concerned with the study of 
reality, or more broadly, epistemic excellence for its own sake. I would then 
find it prima facie problematic to call these debates “metaphysics”, for the 
reasons outlined previously (essentially, because metaphysics must be centrally 
or even exclusively aimed at studying reality). If someone insists that 
“mainstream metaphysics” would still be a good label for some projects of (at 
least partly) practically oriented conceptual engineering, then, again, I am fairly 
flexible with labels. My main intention has been to motivate and flesh out an 
important distinction in what may look like a uniform cluster of metaphysical 
projects, against the consensus that has emerged in the discussion between 
Barnes, Mikkola, Sider, and Schaffer. Which issues and authors fall on each 
side of my proposed division and which labels best describe each camp is 
something I cannot hope to discuss fully here. 
 
 
5.6. Chapter summary 
On my view, the metaphysicians who discuss the existence of tables and those 
who discuss the existence and nature of genders are involved in importantly 
distinct projects. They do have something in common: both camps try to 
improve the ordinary conceptual scheme that we all use in forming beliefs about 
the world. But according to the view proposed here, each project targets a 
different kind of belief. Feminist metaphysicians target the sort of beliefs that 
                                                 
22 These are the sorts of debates that Thomasson analyses as practically oriented projects of 
conceptual engineering, or “metalinguistic negotiations”, in her (Thomasson 2017). 
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we unreflectively form on the basis of perception and that we act upon. Main-
stream metaphysicians target beliefs that we endorse at rare moments of deep 
reflection and that are formed merely for the sake of the epistemic achievement 
of representing reality as it is. These categories appear to correspond to the 
distinction between theoretical and practical beliefs that I have defended in the 
previous chapter. So we can say that mainstream metaphysicians target theore-
tical beliefs and feminist metaphysicians target practical beliefs. (Again, the 
generalizations intended by the labels “feminist” and “mainstream” meta-
physics, here, are not as sweeping as they may seem.) 
Ultimately, the conclusion is a conciliatory one, undermining the appearance 
of conflict between mainstream and feminist metaphysics – the appearance that 
arises when we view both projects as projects of conceptual engineering. 
However, while I have argued that the two camps of “metaphysicians” need not 





This thesis has addressed the interpretation question about revisionary ontology: 
what are revisionary ontologists really doing, what is revisionary ontology 
about? I distinguished this metaontological interpretation question from the 
evaluation question (is ontology worthwhile, is it a valuable enterprise?) and the 
recommendation question (whether and how should ontology proceed?). As an 
answer to the interpretation question, I defended a “theoretical” metalinguistic 
account of revisionary ontology, according to which revisionary ontology is 
about how to improve ordinary concepts in order to improve beliefs. In contrast 
to “practical” metalinguistic accounts (e.g. Thomasson 2017), my account 
allows that revisionary ontology is still about investigating what the world is 
really like. However, this issue – of what the world is really like – is discussed 
by discussing the best concepts for describing the world, i.e. the concepts that 
would reflect the structure of the world, or “carve nature at its joints”. The 
general idea of ontology as the search for a joint-carving conceptual scheme 
draws on Sider (2011), although he puts this idea forth as a response to the 
recommendation question, rather than the interpretation question; and his 
recommendation is for the ontologists to actually speak a joint-carving language 
(by stipulation), rather than speaking about what that language would be like. 
I first defended this theoretical metalinguistic account of revisionary 
ontology from the point of view of the “quizzical observer”, and then from the 
revisionary ontologists’ own point of view. Methodologically, I strived to put 
forth clear and well-motivated central adequacy conditions for the account 
sought, keeping in mind the interpreters’ interests and the data available. I 
assessed how various candidate accounts fare in light of these adequacy 
conditions, arguing that my proposed account fares better than the alternatives. 
While I focused on a limited range of examples of revisionary ontology in 
chapters 2, 3, and 4, I showed how my approach is also fruitful for under-
standing what might be called “feminist revisionary ontology”, in chapter 5. 
 
Main contributions 
The main contributions of this thesis are the following. 
(1) I have provided a systematic defence of the “theoretical metalinguistic 
view”, i.e. the account of revisionary ontology as a project of engineering 
concepts for theoretical purposes. The systematicity is achieved by departing 
from clearly specified and motivated adequacy conditions for the account and 
considering how my account fares against the alternatives, in meeting these 
adequacy conditions. 
 
(2) I have provided a novel account of the epistemic significance of revisionary 
ontology, given the theoretical metalinguistic view. According to my account, 
revisionary ontology can potentially improve our theoretical beliefs (as opposed 
to our practical beliefs), by improving the concepts used to form those beliefs. 
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Theoretical beliefs are formed for the sake of intrinsically valuable epistemic 
excellence and practical beliefs are formed to serve the belief-bearers’ and/or 
other people’s non-epistemic interests. 
 
(3) I have shown how this conception of revisionary ontology (and the 
distinction between theoretical and practical beliefs that the conception 
involves) can illuminate the relationship between feminist metaphysics of 
gender and mainstream metaphysics. I defended the view that what is 
sometimes called “feminist metaphysics of gender” (for example, as practiced 
by Haslanger (2000) and Svensdóttir (2013)) should be seen as a project of 
improving concepts in order to improve practical beliefs, whereas mainstream 
revisionary ontology should be seen as a project of improving concepts in order 
to improve theoretical beliefs. This is a contribution to the emerging debate 
about the relationship between feminist and mainstream metaphysics (Barnes 
2014, 2017, Mikkola 2015, 2017, Sider 2017, Schaffer 2017). 
In the rest of the conclusion, I will provide a more detailed overview of the 
contents of the thesis (excluding the introduction and the conclusion), before I 
end with thoughts about further research that this thesis calls for. 
 
Chapter 2, “Interpreting revisionary ontology from the quizzical observer’s 
point of view” 
In chapter 2, I found the interpretation question itself to be in need of 
interpretation. First, there are different ways in which one might fix the object 
of interpretation and occasionally, the referent of “ontology” or “revisionary 
ontology” is left obscure. Sometimes, the object of interpretation, evaluation 
and recommendation in metaontology is characterized as involving “existence 
questions” and sometimes it is characterized as involving “ontological dispu-
tes”. I found that neither characterization is adequate, as it stands. Metaontology 
is not and should not be concerned simply with what existence questions mean, 
whether they can be answered and how they should be answered. When we 
observe discussions in the field known as “metaontology”, we mostly do not see 
the discussion of such very general questions. And this is for good reason: there 
is insufficient overlap between all kinds of existence questions that one might 
ask in various contexts, for us to give a single informative account (involving 
interpretation, evaluation, and recommendation) for all of them. It is not the 
metaontologists’ concern, for example, to interpret and evaluate the practice of 
naïve tourists asking questions like “Are there really bigfoots?” and to make 
recommendations on how tourist information centres should go about addres-
sing such questions. Instead, the proper object of metaontological concern, I 
suggested, concerns the practice of asking existence questions in a certain kind 
of context, which involves certain kinds of assumptions about the nature of 
these questions and the proper method for addressing them. I characterized 
these assumptions in chapter 2.  
It is also unsatisfactory to specify the object of interpretation as involving 
only “ontological disputes”. This gets a bit closer to a satisfactory description 
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than “existence questions”, because this specification correctly suggests that 
metaontology concerns discussions among philosophers, namely ontologists, 
rather than just any discussions of existence questions. However, it is mistaken 
to limit the object of interpretation to disputes, as opposed to ontological 
discussions more generally. In chapter 3 in my thesis, I do focus on disputes, 
rather than discussions more generally, partly because I address some argu-
ments and positions there that only pertain to disputes (e.g. Hirsch 2009). 
However, other arguments and positions such as Thomasson’s (2015) and 
Chalmers’ (2009) apply also to discussions that are not disputes, and thus such 
discussions should not be left out of the purview of metaontology. 
I further restricted the main object of interpretation in this thesis to 
paradigmatic discussions of revisionary ontology: works where the authors 
seem to argue for surprising claims about what exists or what there is. I 
discussed the ramifications involved in this specification. For example, I drew 
the distinction between the assumption that these works in revisionary ontology 
are really in conflict with what most people believe (an assumption that I want 
to avoid, when I characterize revisionary ontology to fix the object of inter-
pretation) and the assumption that these works in revisionary ontology appear 
to be in conflict with what most people believe (an assumption that I do adopt at 
the outset). I then reconstructed some of the more famous arguments in 
revisionary ontology, in order to fix the object of interpretation. These were the 
arguments by Unger (1979, 1980), Merricks (2001), van Inwagen (1990) and 
Horgan and Potrč (2008). 
Having thus specified the object of interpretation, I then went on, in the 
remainder of chapter 2, to clarify what it means to interpret revisionary 
ontology. I take this to mean asking what revisionary ontologists are really 
doing, as opposed to what they appear to be doing. But this still leaves room for 
interpretation. On the one hand, our interest could be in what the revisionary 
ontologists are really trying to do, or what their conscious intentions are. On the 
other hand, it is possible to (really) do something without trying to do it. For 
some purposes, it might be more relevant to ask what the ontologists are trying 
to do. However, I argued that given the interpretive points of view in question, 
reported conscious intentions may need to be discounted. For example, the 
quizzical observer might need to discount the ontologists’ conscious intentions, 
when respecting these intentions would require attributing a severely inferior 
rational or linguistic capacity to the participants. Further, the revisionary 
ontologists themselves may need to discount their conscious intentions so far, to 
best serve their aim of showing why their practice deserves to be esteemed and 
continued (and continued by themselves, rather than by somebody else, such as 
semanticists, who might be better qualified to fulfil their conscious intentions). 
 
Chapter 3, “Interpreting revisionary ontology from the ontologists’ point of 
view” 
Having thus laid the groundwork in chapter 2, I continued to address the inter-
pretation question from the “outsiders’” and “insiders’” point of view. More 
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precisely, in chapter 3, I took up the point of view of a particular kind of out-
sider, whom I called a “quizzical observer”. Quizzical observers find them-
selves in a situation that calls for explanation: they feel what I called a “sense of 
pointlessness” regarding disputes between their peers. I found that the quizzical 
observer’s interpretive situation dictates two central adequacy conditions for the 
account sought: (1) it should explain the quizzical observer’s sense of pointless-
ness, upon observing or thinking about the disputes; and (2) it should respect 
the presumption of peerhood, i.e. the presumption that the disputants are 
roughly equal to the quizzical observer in terms of their rational, linguistic, and 
reflective capacities. 
I first considered three deflationist accounts: the verbalist account (Hirsch 
2009), the easy-ontological account (Thomasson 2015), and the deflationist 
primitivist account (Chalmers 2009). I found these all to suffer from the same 
general flaw: while they are tailored to explain the sense of pointlessness, they 
fail to respect the presumption of peerhood. Further, I found that in all three 
cases, the failure to recognize the presumption of peerhood can be seen to 
consist in attributing severe shortcomings in rational capacities, in comparison 
with the quizzical observer herself; and these rational deficits, in all three 
accounts, appear to be grounded in linguistic deficits. On the verbalist account, 
the parties inexplicably continue to engage in an activity (a dispute) that has a 
characteristic aim (agreement by convergence on truth or the right course of 
action), while that aim is already achieved. The mistake is apparently grounded 
in a linguistic deficit: the failure to interpret charitably, while charity (on 
Hirsch’s account as well as more generally) is thought to be a foundational 
linguistic capacity. On the easy-ontological account, the disputants address their 
issues (ordinary-language existence questions) by strikingly inadequate means 
(appealing to theoretical virtues and the like, instead of engaging in conceptual 
analysis and straightforward empirical observation). This deficit in rationality – 
choosing inadequate means to one’s ends – is again apparently grounded in a 
linguistic failure, namely misinterpreting the existence questions. Finally, on the 
deflationist primitivist account, the disputants use a semantically empty 
existence-concept and fail to make truth-apt claims. Here, the rational failure is 
directing one’s efforts at an ill-defined, non-existent goal; and this failure is 
grounded in the linguistic failure involved in using the empty existence concept. 
While these three deflationist accounts disrespect the presumption of peer-
hood by attributing inferior capacities to the disputants, the realist primitivist 
account, instead, disrespects the presumption of peerhood by attributing a 
surplus of the relevant capacities. In particular, the account attributes a superior 
linguistic capacity to the disputants, who are supposed to have acquired the 
primitive metaphysical existence concept that the quizzical observer is unable to 
acquire by exposure to the same kind of environment (metaphysics books and 
conversations and so on). 
Next, I proposed that a metalinguistic account, on which the discussants 
argue about how to use or revise language (in a context), could meet both 
adequacy conditions. However, here we need to consider carefully which kind 
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of metalinguistic account to recommend for the quizzical observer. Thomasson 
(2017) and Belleri (2017) both have proposed metalinguistic accounts of 
ontological disputes (or more broadly, metaphysical disputes), but their 
accounts emphasize practical (or pragmatic or aesthetic) considerations as the 
motivating concerns for the disputants. I found that these “practical” meta-
linguistic accounts disrespect the presumption of peerhood by attributing an 
inferior reflective capacity to the disputants. I suggested instead a “theoretical” 
metalinguistic account, according to which the disputants argue about which 
concepts are the best for reflecting the objective structure of the world. I argued 
that this account meets both adequacy conditions. On this account, the dis-
putants really disagree, namely, about which concepts are the best for the 
purpose described. Further, on this account, the disputants pursue their issues by 
appropriate methods, or at least methods that could be thought to be appropriate 
by rational, reasonable persons – assuming that theoretical virtues are indicative 
of joint-carving, or at least can be thought to be so by persons who are not 
severely inferior in their cognitive capacities. Finally, even if the quizzical 
observer finds that the disputants’ aim (joint-carving conceptualization of the 
world) is in principle unachievable, because there are no relevant facts of the 
matter, then the mistake that the disputants make, in this regard, is again one 
that reasonable persons can make. 
My account may be suspected of attributing a superior linguistic ability to 
the disputants, if the quizzical observer finds herself unable to understand terms 
like “structure” and “joint-carving”. I conceded that such a quizzical observer 
may indeed not find the best solution in my account, but I do not expect the 
failure to understand these terms to be a universal disposition among quizzical 
observers. Further, I proposed that the introduction of these terms constitutes an 
advance in intelligibility, over primitivist accounts, and should help quizzical 
observers to alleviate the worry of having to attribute a superior linguistic 
capacity to the disputants. 
My account may also be suspected of attributing inferior reflective capacities 
(i.e. an inferior ability to understand and adequately describe what one is doing) 
to the disputants. The disputants take themselves to be talking about what the 
world is really like, while on the proposed view, they are actually talking about 
which concepts to use. I responded that the disputants’ self-conception is in fact 
not thoroughly mistaken: they are ultimately talking about what the world is 
like, but they discuss this issue by discussing the best concepts for describing 
the world. 
These were my main considerations for supposing that my account respects 
the presumption of peerhood, at least more so than the competing accounts. 
There might be different ways to explain the sense of pointlessness, on the 
theoretical metalinguistic account, but the option that I focused on is that 
according to which the quizzical observer’s sense of pointlessness is invoked by 
her epistemicist judgments. “Epistemicism”, as a metaontological position, was 
introduced by Bennett (2009). The idea is that for certain ontological disputes, 
the correct option among the competing theories cannot be established – not 
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because there is no fact of the matter, but because we are not in a position to 
choose between the theories, which all seem to meet the relevant desiderata 
equally well. Such epistemicist judgments about a dispute do not require one to 
attribute inferior capacities to the disputants – whether the theories are indeed 
on a par or not is an issue that rational persons can reasonably disagree upon. 
 
Chapter 4, “Interpreting revisionary ontology from the ontologists’ point of 
view” 
In chapter 4, I took up the interpretation question from the “inside”: how should 
the revisionary ontologists themselves explain what they are doing? I proposed 
and motivated the following adequacy conditions for such an account. First, the 
account should explain the sense of destabilization, that is, the audience’s 
feeling that the arguments show that there is something wrong with their beliefs. 
Second, the account should explain the sense of entitlement that remains, 
despite the sense of destabilization. The sense of entitlement is the audience’s 
feeling that they remain entitled to their relevant beliefs, such as the belief that 
there are tables, and that this entitlement has something to do with what they 
can perceive. Third, the account should explain the epistemic significance of 
revisionary ontology, or in other words, how the revisionary ontologists’ 
arguments can improve the audience’s beliefs. 
First, I considered the account that I called “simple incompatibilism”. 
According to simple incompatibilism, most people believe, for example, that 
tables exist, and revisionary ontologists argue that (in the very same, literal 
ordinary-language sense of all the words) tables do not exist, i.e. they argue that 
the ordinary belief is false. On this account, revisionary ontologists would 
improve the audience’s beliefs by identifying false beliefs and replacing them 
with true beliefs on the same subject matter. This is an improvement of beliefs 
because, of course, beliefs are good when they are true and bad when they are 
false. 
The problem with simple incompatibilism, I argued, is the failure to properly 
account for the sense of entitlement. The best explanation for the sense of 
entitlement, I proposed, is that we are aware of our competence in applying the 
relevant terms in perceptual judgments, such as “There is exactly one table in 
this situation”, and of our competence to make inferences from such perceptual 
judgments to judgments like “There are tables and there are not millions of 
them in each situation where there is at least one”. So we can form the relevant 
beliefs (such as the belief that there are tables and there are not millions of them 
in each situation where there is at least one) by a highly truth-conducive 
method: applying concepts that we are competent with, to make perceptual 
judgments. and drawing further inferences of a kind that we are competent with. 
Simple incompatibilism, as it stands, does not seem to accommodate this expla-
nation for the sense of entitlement, nor does it provide an alternative expla-
nation. 
I then looked at the kinds of compatibilist accounts that are usually adopted 
by those revisionary ontologists who reject simple incompatibilism. According 
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to “Socratic compatibilism”, most people have believed the revisionary onto-
logists’ theses (for example, that there are no tables) all along; and, accordingly, 
they have not believed the negations of these theses (for example, that there are 
tables). On this account, one can explain the epistemic significance of revisio-
nary ontology, for example, by appeal to the idea that people are not aware of 
what their beliefs on this subject matter are, before encountering the arguments, 
and a consciously endorsed true belief is better than a mere true belief that is not 
so endorsed. However, Socratic compatibilism is prima facie incompatible with 
the sense of entitlement and the sense of destabilization, which present the 
relevant beliefs that Socratic compatibilism denies that we have (such as the 
belief that there are tables) as the objects of entitlement and destabilization. 
According to “indifference compatibilism”, most people do not have beliefs 
about whether there are tables and the like: they are indifferent on the subject. 
On this view, the epistemic significance of revisionary ontology can consist in 
providing the audience with new true beliefs on a subject matter on which they 
were previously neutral. Van Inwagen (1990) appears to present a case for the 
conclusion that in their everyday speech (in saying things like “There are two 
chairs in the next room”) people are indifferent about matters like whether there 
are chairs – their talk is ontologically non-committing. Further, he apparently 
takes this view about everyday discourse – the view that Eklund (2005) calls 
“hermeneutic indifferentism” – to support indifference compatibilism. How-
ever, the latter is a view about beliefs, not about the commitments inherent in 
everyday speech. And we seem to have independent evidence for the presence 
of beliefs like the belief that there are tables. If not elsewhere, then evidence can 
be found, again, in the sense of entitlement and destabilization, which presents 
the audience with these beliefs as the objects of entitlement and destabilization. 
The third kind of compatibilism that I considered was “linguistic variance 
compatibilism”. According to this view, which van Inwagen apparently adopts 
in (van Inwagen 2014), most people do believe that there are, for example, 
tables and chairs; but revisionary ontologists discuss whether there are tables 
and chairs in a different sense of “There are tables and chairs”; and in that sense 
of “There are tables and chairs”, most people do not have beliefs about the 
matter. This view explains the sense of entitlement: we remain entitled to the 
ordinary-language belief, and this entitlement can be explained in accordance 
with my proposed “best explanation”. However, linguistic variance compa-
tibilism is in trouble with respect to its capacity to account for the sense of 
destabilization and the epistemic significance of revisionary ontology. The 
ontologists’ arguments seem to show that there is something wrong with ordi-
nary beliefs (hence the sense of destabilization), but it is not clear how the 
arguments can show this, if they are directed at a subject matter that most 
people do not have beliefs about. Further, it is unclear what the epistemic signi-
ficance of revisionary ontology would be, on this account. The arguments 
would provide us with new true beliefs; but on the other hand, these true beliefs 
would be about parts of the world that we already had true beliefs about. 
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I then turned to what I called “Siderian incompatibilism”. On this view, 
rather than revealing false beliefs, the arguments show that there are theoretical 
problems with the concepts that we use to form beliefs. A central one, among 
such problems, is that the concepts license inconsistent judgments. This account 
can explain both the sense of entitlement and the sense of destabilization: we 
feel entitled to the ordinary beliefs about what there is because we can form 
them by correctly applying our concepts; and the beliefs are destabilized be-
cause the arguments show problems with the concepts. The epistemic signifi-
cance of revisionary ontology, on this account, is explained by appeal to Sider’s 
idea that the aim of beliefs is to conform to reality and hence they should not 
just be true, but cast in joint-carving concepts. The concepts without theoretical 
problems (like licensing inconsistent judgments), on this view, are more likely 
to be joint-carving. 
The problem with Siderian incompatibilism is that it assumes, implausibly, 
that all beliefs aim to conform to reality, as perfectly as possible, and there are 
no relevant considerations that might trump this desideratum of conformity. 
However, as I argued, most of the time we form beliefs for ultimately non-
epistemic purposes. I called the beliefs formed (at least in part) for such non-
epistemic purposes “practical beliefs” and those formed solely for the sake of 
epistemic excellence “theoretical beliefs”. Perfect conformity with reality is one 
way to understand epistemic excellence. I did not dispute this assumption about 
epistemic excellence, in the thesis. (I point to an alternative way of under-
standing epistemic excellence, as also involving understanding the connections 
between the facts known to the agent, in my (Kitsik 2018b). There, I develop a 
different kind of criticism of Sider’s views from the one considered here.) 
Based on this distinction between practical and theoretical beliefs, I developed 
my account of revisionary ontology as a project of improving concepts to 
improve theoretical beliefs. On that account, revisionary ontology has a limited 
kind of epistemic significance: it can potentially improve the audience’s 
theoretical beliefs, but even then only on the assumption that the audience has 
theoretical beliefs or is interested in having them.  
 
Chapter 5, “Applying the account to the metaphysics of gender” 
In chapter 5, I showed how my approach to interpreting revisionary ontology 
can contribute to the recent discussion about the relationship between feminist 
and mainstream metaphysics (Barnes 2014, 2017, Mikkola 2015, 2017, Sider 
2017, Schaffer 2017). I argued that constructivist analyses of the term “woman” 
(such as Haslanger 2000, Sveinsdóttir 2013) can be seen as aimed at improving 
concepts to improve practical beliefs, whereas the mainstream revisionary 
ontology that I analysed in the previous chapters is aimed at improving concepts 
to improve theoretical beliefs. 
I began by arguing against the Factual Interpretation of the constructivist 
analyses of “woman”, according to which these are attempts to discover the 
metaphysical nature of women, or in other words, the analyses are taken to be 
statements about worldly facts. I argued that in combination with the plausible 
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Relevance thesis, the Factual Interpretation (or at least its strong form) has the 
unacceptable implication that a certain variety of wishful thinking is appropriate 
in feminist metaphysics. According to the Relevance thesis, arguments like that 
of Jenkins (2016) – arguments that I take to appeal to harm, as an objection to 
the feminist metaphysicians’ central theses – are relevant. Such arguments may 
not be decisive, but they need to be taken seriously, according to the Relevance 
thesis. However, when the Factual Interpretation of the constructivist theses 
about “woman” is combined with the plausible Relevance thesis, it seems to 
follow that one can appropriately object to a factual claim by pointing to the 
undesirable consequences of the purported fact. This is an implication that 
feminist metaphysicians would presumably want to avoid, and because of that, 
they should reject the Factual Interpretation (assuming that they will not reject 
the Relevance thesis). 
I suggested that instead of the Factual Interpretation, the relevant claims 
about “woman” should be understood as claims about how we should revise the 
concept associated with “woman”. Since, as I have previously argued, (main-
stream) revisionary ontology should be seen as a project of conceptual 
engineering as well, it might now seem like the revisionary ontologists and 
feminist metaphysicians are both trying to improve concepts to improve beliefs, 
and further, they have different ideas about the relevant desiderata for the 
concepts. However, this is inconsistent with the plausible idea that the main-
streamers and the feminists can legitimately ignore certain kinds of arguments 
that would be relevant for the other camp. For example, feminist meta-
physicians can ignore sorites arguments to the conclusion that there are no 
women, and mainstream revisionary ontologists who provide such arguments 
need not recognize the practical importance of the concept ‘woman’ as a 
legitimate objection to their reasoning. In order to make sense of this apparent 
independence of the two projects from one another, I again invoked the 
distinction between theoretical and practical beliefs, suggesting that the 
“feminist metaphysicians” in question target the concepts used to form practical 
beliefs and the “mainstream metaphysicians” (or in any case, the revisionary 
ontologists of the kind discussed in the previous chapters) target the concepts 
used to form theoretical beliefs. This suggestion is further supported by the 
observation that we can analyse “belief” as representing the world in a certain 
way and taking the world to be as represented; and that while “mainstream” 
revisionary ontologists have reason to care about “how we take the world to be” 
in the sense of “what we endorse on conscious reflection, in isolation from 
practical concerns”, “feminist” revisionary ontologists have more reason to care 
about “how we take the world to be” in the sense of “how we experience the 
world and how we are disposed to act based on what we perceive”. 
 
Prospects for future research 
Firstly and most importantly, further research is needed into the roles and kinds 
of belief, in order to better understand and pursue various projects of conceptual 
engineering, including that of revisionary ontology. The distinction that I have 
176 
drawn between theoretical beliefs (those formed for the sake of epistemic 
excellence) and practical beliefs (those formed ultimately for non-epistemic 
purposes), while not without appeal, is bound to raise to questions. Does each 
belief or each project of belief formation fall into one of these categories? For 
example, it is unclear whether moral philosophers are concerned with forming 
good practical or theoretical beliefs about morality, or both. Further, distinctions 
within what I have called “practical beliefs” deserve to be examined more 
closely. On the one hand, such beliefs may be formed to serve the belief-
bearer’s non-epistemic aims, such as survival and (non-epistemic) well-being. 
On the other hand, we may have (ultimately non-epistemic) reason to care about 
what other people believe, and we may be able to make legitimate conceptual 
prescriptions for other people’s belief formation. I have only suggested this in 
my analysis of feminist metaphysics of gender, but the issue deserves further 
consideration. 
Secondly, as I stated in the introduction, the investigation into the inter-
pretation question is motivated by interest in the evaluation and recommen-
dation questions about revisionary ontology; but the thesis remains largely 
silent on what the implications of the proposed account for evaluation and 
recommendation precisely are. This depends on various further issues that are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. For example, this involves questions about 
whether there is any principled way of measuring how well the competing 
theories embody theoretical virtues and meet any other relevant desiderata. 
Further, even if the theoretical virtues can be compared, one may question 
whether this really tells us anything about the extent to which the competing 
theories reflect the objective structure of the world. These are, of course, not 
new questions raised by the thesis: they are rather the big and perennial 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Revideeriv ontoloogia: mõistete parandamine  
uskumuste parandamiseks 
Doktoritöö käsitleb küsimust, kuidas revideerivat ontoloogiagat tõlgendada: 
mida revideerivad ontoloogid tegelikult teevad, millest nad räägivad? Revidee-
rivad ontoloogid (nende seas Peter van Inwagen, Trenton Merricks, Peter 
Unger, Terence Horgan ja Matjaž Potrc) paistavad kaitsvat tavamõtlemisega 
sobimatuid väiteid selle kohta, mis on olemas – näiteks väidet, et toole ja laudu 
pole olemas. Eristasin metaontoloogilise tõlgendamisküsimuse hindamisküsi-
musest (kas ontoloogia on mõttekas, väärtuslik ettevõtmine?) ja soovitamis-
küsimusest (kas ja kuidas peaks ontoloogid oma tegevust jätkama?). Revidee-
riva ontoloogia kohta käivale tõlgendamisküsimusele vastates kaitsesin “teo-
reetilist” metalingvistilist vaadet, mille järgi on revideeriv ontoloogia tavamõis-
tete parandamine uskumuste parandamiseks. Erinevalt „praktilistest“ metaling-
vistilistest vaadetest (nagu Amie Thomassoni vaade artiklis „Metaphysical 
Disputes and Metalinguistic Negotiation” (2017)), on minu vaate kohaselt revi-
deeriva ontoloogia eesmärgiks siiski uurida, milline maailm tegelikult on. Seda 
teemat – milline maailm tegelikult on – uuritakse aga, arutledes selle üle, 
millised on parimad mõisted maailma kirjeldamiseks, s.t mõisted, mis peegel-
davad maailma objektiivset struktuuri või „lõikavad maailma liigestest“. Üldine 
idee ontoloogiast kui liigestest lõikava mõisteskeemi otsingust toetub Theodore 
Siderile, kes esitas selle idee aga pigem vastusena metaontoloogilisele 
soovitamisküsimusele (kas ja kuidas peaks ontoloogid oma tegevust jätkama?), 
mitte tõlgendamisküsimusele (mida revideerivad ontoloogid tegelikult teevad, 
millest nad räägivad?); ja tema soovitus on, et ontoloogid peaksid liigestest lõi-
kavat keelt kõnelema (stipulatsiooni teel), selmet arutada, milline see keel oleks. 
Kaitsesin kirjeldatud teoreetilist metalingvistilist vaadet revideeriva onto-
loogia kohta kõigepealt „kahtleva vaatleja“ vaatepunktist ja seejärel revideeri-
vate ontoloogide endi vaatepunktist. Püüdsin esitada otsitavale tõlgendusele sel-
ged ja põhjendatud adekvaatsustingimused, pidades silmas tõlgendajate ees-
märke ja nende kasutuses olevaid andmeid. Hindasin võistlevaid vaateid nende 
adekvaatsustingimuste valguses, põhjendades oma vaate paremust alternatiivide 
ees. Teises, kolmandas ja neljandas peatükis keskendusin piiratud hulgale 
näidetele nn peavoolu revideerivast ontoloogiast ning viiendas näitasin, kuidas 
mu lähenemisest on kasu ka nn feministliku revideeriva ontoloogia mõistmisel.  
Doktoritöö originaalne panus seisneb eelkõige järgnevas. 
(1) Kaitsesin süstemaatilisel moel teoreetilist metalingvistilist vaadet, mille järgi 
revideeriv ontoloogia on teoreetilistel eesmärkidel mõistete parandamise pro-
jekt. Süstemaatilisuse saavutamiseks lähtusin selgelt määratletud ja põhjendatud 
adekvaatsustingimustest ja kaalusin, kuidas minu vaade võrreldes alternatiivi-
dega nendele adekvaatsustingimustele vastab. 
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(2) Kirjeldatud teoreetilise metalingvistilise vaate raames kaitsesin uudset teesi 
revideeriva ontoloogia episteemilise tähtsuse kohta. Minu vaate järgi võib revi-
deeriv ontoloogia parandada meie teoreetilisi uskumusi (mitte meie praktilisi 
uskumusi), parandades mõisteid, mida nende uskumuste moodustamisel kasuta-
takse. Teoreetilised uskumused on need, mida moodustatakse pelgalt epistee-
milise täiuse nimel, samas kui praktilisi uskumusi moodustatakse uskumuse 
kandja ja/või teiste inimeste mitte-episteemiliste eesmärkide teenimiseks. 
(3) Näitasin, kuidas see arusaam revideerivast ontoloogiast ning teoreetiliste ja 
praktiliste uskumuste eristus valgustab ka feministliku soometafüüsika ja 
peavoolumetafüüsika suhet. Kaitsesin vaadet, et vahel „feministlikuks soometa-
füüsikaks“ nimetatut (näiteks Sally Haslangeri ja Asta Sveinsdottiri selleteema-
lisi kirjutisi) peaks nägema projektina, mille eesmärk on parandada mõisteid 
praktiliste uskumuste parandamiseks. Sellega andsin sisendi hiljuti hoogu 
saanud feministliku ja peavoolu metafüüsika suhte teemalisse debatti, mille pea-
osalised on Elizabeth Barnes, Mari Mikkola, Theodore Sider ja Jonathan 
Schaffer. 
Kokkuvõtte järelejäänud osas esitan täielikuma ülevaate doktoritöö sisust ja 
lõpetan mõtetega edasisest uurimistööst. 
Töö sissejuhatuses avasin töö põhiküsimuse ja -väited ning oma peamise 
panuse uurimisteema käsitlusse. Põhiküsimus on revideeriva ontoloogia kohta 
käiv tõlgendamisküsimus ja põhiväited on järgnevad. 
 
(1)  Paljud kesksed arutelud nii „peavoolu“ kui ka „feministlikus“ revideerivas 
ontoloogias käivad selle kohta, kuidas parandada uskumuste moodus-
tamisel kasutatavaid mõisteid. 
(2)  Kui revideerivat ontoloogiat tuleks tõesti nii mõista, siis oleks sellest 
projektist (või nendest projektidest) aru saamiseks vaja uurida uskumuste 
rolle ja liike. 
(3)  Relevantne eristus seejuures on eristus teoreetiliste ja praktiliste uskumuste 
vahel. 
(4)  Peavoolu revideeriva ontoloogia eesmärk on parandada mõisteid, mida 
kasutatakse teoreetiliste uskumuste moodustamisel. 
(5)  Arvestades teesi (4), on peavoolu revideerival ontoloogial piiratud epis-
teemiline tähtsus: see võib parandada publiku teoreetilisi uskumusi, aga 
mitte nende praktilisi uskumusi. 
(6)  Feministliku revideeriva ontoloogia eesmärk on parandada praktiliste 
uskumuste moodustamisel kasutatavaid mõisteid. 
(7)  Arvestades teese (4) ja (6), on peavoolu ja feministlik revideeriv onto-
loogia üksteisest märkimisväärselt sõltumatud. 
 
Teises peatükis määratlesin lähemalt tõlgendamisküsimuse sisu, vaadeldes, mis 
konkreetsemalt on selle doktoritöö puhul tõlgendamisobjekt, kuidas mõistan 
„tõlgendamist“ ning miks seejuures on oluline lähtuda kindlast tõlgendaja 
vaatepunktist. Seejärel kaitsesin kolmandas ja neljandas peatükis oma teoree-
tilist metalingvistilist vaadet (väide 1). Tegin seda kõigepealt „kahtleva vaat-
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leja“ vaatepunktist (kahtlev vaatleja on revideerivate ontoloogide vaidlustega 
hästi tuttav, ent tunneb neid vaadeldes siiski teatud „mõttetustunnet“) ja seejärel 
revideerivate ontoloogide endi vaatepunktist. Neljandas peatükis kaitsesin ka 
väiteid (2), (3), (4) ja (5). Viiendas peatükis vaatlesin oma teoreetilise meta-
lingvistilise vaate ning teoreetiliste ja praktiliste uskumuste eristuse valguses 
peavoolu revideeriva ontoloogia ja feministliku soometafüüsika suhet, kaitstes 
väiteid (6) ja (7). 
Järgnevalt esitan põhjalikuma ülevaate peatükkide sisust (jättes välja sisse-
juhatuse ja kokkuvõtte). 
 
2. peatükk, „Tõlgendamisküsimuse tõlgendamine“ 
Leidsin, et metaontoloogiline tõlgendamisküsimus ise vajab tõlgendamist. On 
erinevaid viise tõlgendamisobjekti määratleda ning samuti pole selge, mida 
tähendab „tõlgendamine“ ja kuidas seda teha. Vaatlesin kõigepealt tõlgendamis-
objekti ja seejärel tõlgendamist ennast puudutavat küsimust. 
 Metaontoloogilise tõlgendamise, hindamise ja soovitamise objektina räägi-
takse mõnikord „olemasoluküsimustest“ ja mõnikord „ontoloogilistest vaid-
lustest“. Leidsin, et sellisel kujul ei sobi kumbki iseloomustus. Metaontoloogia 
ei huvitu ega peaks huvituma lihtsalt sellest, mida olemasoluküsimused tähen-
davad, kas neile on võimalik ja vajalik vastata ning kuidas seda teha. „Meta-
ontoloogiana“ tuntud arutelusid vaadeldes ei näe me tavaliselt, et keskendutaks 
seesugustele väga üldistele küsimustele. Ja see on nii hea põhjusega: kõigil 
olemasoluküsimustel, mida võidakse erinevates kontekstides küsida, on liiga 
vähe ühisosa, et nende kohta (tõlgenduse, hindamise ja soovituse osas) ühtset 
seisukohta otsida. Näiteks pole metaontoloogi asi tõlgendada ja hinnata naiivse 
turist küsimust „Kas lumeinimesed on päriselt olemas?“ ja anda soovitusi, 
kuidas turistiinfopunktid peaksid sellistele küsimustele vastama. Metaontolooge 
huvitab olemasoluküsimuste küsimine teatud kontekstis, mis hõlmab eeldusi 
nende küsimuste ja neile vastamise viisi kohta. Iseloomustasin neid eeldusi 
lähemalt 2. peatükis. 
Samuti ei saa määratleda tõlgendamise, hindamise ja soovitamise objektina 
ainult „ontoloogilisi vaidlusi“. See on uurimisobjekti rahuldavale kirjeldusele 
veidi lähemal kui „olemasoluküsimused“, sest terminist „ontoloogilised vaid-
lused“ võib välja lugeda, et metaontoloogia puudutab filosoofide, täpsemalt 
ontoloogide arutlusi, mitte mis tahes olemasoluküsimuste teemalisi arutlusi. 
Kuid ei paista olevat põhjust piirata metaontoloogia uurimisala vaid vaidlus-
tega, kuna mitmed asjakohased argumendid puudutavad olemasoluküsimuste 
(teatud eeldustega) arutlusi laiemalt. Doktoritöö 3. peatükis keskendun siiski 
vaidlustele, kuna käsitlen seal osalt argumente ja seisukohti, mis puudutavad 
vaid vaidlusi (näiteks Hirschi seisukoht, et mõned ontoloogide vahelised vaid-
lused on „pelgalt terminoloogilised“). 
Piirasin doktoritöö tõlgendamisobjekti veelgi täpsemalt teatud kesksetele 
aruteludele nn revideerivas ontoloogias, nimelt argumentidele, mille autorid 
paistavad kaitsvat tavaarusaamadega sobimatuid väiteid selle kohta, mis on 
olemas või eksisteerib. Arutasin selle piiranguga seotud komplikatsioone, näi-
184 
teks eristasin eeldust, et need revideeriva ontoloogia teosed on tegelikult tava-
uskumustega sobimatud (eeldus, mida soovin vältida, kui kirjeldan revideerivat 
ontoloogiat tõlgendamisobjekti fikseerimiseks), pelgast eeldusest, et revideeriva 
ontoloogia teosed paistavad olevat tavauskumustega sobimatud (viimane on 
eeldus, mille algusest peale omaks võtan). Seejärel jätkasin tõlgendamisobjekti 
fikseerimist, rekonstrueerides mõned kuulsamad argumendid revideerivast onto-
loogiast (Peter Ungeri, Trenton Merricksi, Peter van Inwageni ning Terence 
Horgani ja Matjaž Potrči argumenid). 
Olles nõnda tõlgendamisobjekti määratlenud, jätkasin 2. peatükki, selgitades, 
mida tähendab revideeriva ontoloogia tõlgendamine. Mõistan tõlgendamis-
küsimust küsimusena selle kohta, mida revideerivad ontoloogid päriselt teevad 
(vastandades seda küsimusele, mida nad pelgalt näivad tegevat). Kuid see jätab 
siiski tõlgendamisruumi. Ühest küljest võiks meid huvitada küsimus, mida 
ontoloogid päriselt proovivad teha ehk mis on nende teadlik kavatsus. Teisalt on 
võimalik midagi (päriselt) teha ka kavatsemata seda teha. Mõnes olukorras võib 
tegutseja vaatepunktist relevantne viis mõista küsimust „Mida ta teeb?“ kui 
küsimust selle kohta, mida ta proovib teha (näiteks kui tegutseja on valmis oma 
meetodeid täielikult muutma, et soovitud eesmärki saavutada). Doktoritöös 
kõne all olevate vaatepunktide seisukohalt ei peaks aga teadvustatud kavat-
sustele otsustavat rolli andma. Näiteks võib olla kahtleval vaatlejal vaja 
omistada revideerivatele ontoloogidele tegevus, mis ei vasta nende teadvustatud 
kavatsusele, kui kavatsusest lähtumisel peaks tõlgendaja ontoloogidele omis-
tama tõsiselt puudulikke ratsionaalseid või keelelisi võimeid. Revideerivatel 
ontoloogidel endil võib aga olla vaja oma senistele kavatsustele mitte otsustavat 
rolli anda, teenimaks eesmärki näidata, miks nende tegevust peaks hinnatama ja 
jätkatama (ning miks seda peaks jätkama nemad ise, mitte keegi teine, näiteks 
mõni semantik, kes võiks olla paremini kvalifitseeritud nende teadvustatud 
kavatsusi täide viima). Peatüki lõpus kirjeldasin peamisi viise tõlgendamis-
küsimusele vastamiseks. 
 
3. peatükk, „Revideeriva ontoloogia tõlgendamine kahtleva vaatleja vaate-
punktist“ 
Olles loonud teises peatükis tõlgendamisküsimuse käsitlemiseks vajaliku raa-
mistiku, jätkasin tõlgendamisküsimuse käsitlemist kolmandas peatükis kõrval-
seisja (täpsemalt „kahtleva vaatleja“) ja seejärel neljandas peatükis osalejate ehk 
revideerivate ontoloogide endi perspektiivist. Kahtlevad vaatlejad leiavad end 
seletust nõudvat olukorrast: nad tunnevad, et nendega episteemiliselt umbes 
samaväärsete inimeste vahelised vaidlused on iseäralikult mõttetud. Leidsin, et 
kahtleva vaatleja olukord seab otsitud tõlgendusele kaks keskset tingimust: (1) 
tõlgendus peaks seletama kahtleva vaatleja mõttetustunnet seoses vaadeldud 
vaidlustega ja (2) tõlgendus peaks austama lähtekohana samaväärsuse eeldust 
(presumption of peerhood), s.t eeldust, et vaidlejad on oma ratsionaalsete, 
keeleliste ja reflektiivsete võimete poolest kahtleva vaatlejaga enam-vähem 
samal tasemel. 
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Kaalusin nende adekvaatsustingimuste valguses kõigepealt kolme deflat-
sionistlikku vaadet: verbalismi (Eli Hirsch), „lihtsat ontoloogiat“ (Amie Tho-
masson) ja primitivismi deflatsionistlikku versiooni (David Chalmers). Leidsin, 
et neil kõigil on üks viga: nad on loodud seletama vaatleja mõttetustunnet, kuid 
nad ei austa samaväärsuse eeldust. Leidsin ka, et kõigil kolmel juhul võib näha 
samaväärsuse eeldusest möödavaatamist selles, et tõlgendaja omistab tõlgenda-
tuile enesega võrreldes suured ratsionaalsuse puudujäägid, mis omakorda näi-
vad põhinevat keeleliste võimete puudujäägil. Verbalistliku vaate järgi jätkavad 
osapooled seletamatult teatud tegevust (vaidlust), millel on oma iseloomulik 
eesmärk (üksmeel tõe või õige teguviisi osas), kuid see iseloomulik eesmärk on 
tegevusest hoolimata juba saavutatud. See osapoolte irratsionaalsus omakorda 
põhineb nähtavasti nende keelelisel suutmatusel, nimelt oskamatusel hea-
tahtlikult tõlgendada – samas kui heatahtlikku tõlgendamist peetakse fundamen-
taalseks keeleliseks võimeks. Lihtontoloogilise vaate järgi käsitlevad vaidlejad 
oma küsimusi (tavakeelseid olemasoluküsimusi) täiesti ebaadekvaatsel moel, 
nimelt toetudes „teoreetilistele voorustele“ ja muule säärasele, selle asemel et 
teha mõisteanalüüsi ja tavalisi empiirilisi vaatlusi. See ratsionaalsuse puudu-
jääk – ebasobivate vahendite valimine oma eesmärkide täitmiseks – põhineb 
omakorda jälle ilmselt keelelisel suutmatusel, nimelt emakeelsete olemasolu-
küsimuste valesti tõlgendamisel. Viimaks, primitivismi deflatsionistliku ver-
siooni järgi kasutavad vaidlejad semantiliselt tühja olemasolumõistet ja seetõttu 
ei õnnestu neil esitada tõeväärtusega väiteid. Siin seisneb ratsionaalne eksimus 
püüdluses ebapiisavalt määratletud, olematu eesmärgi poole; ja see viga rajaneb 
taas keelelisel veal, milleks seekord on tühja olemasolumõiste kasutamine. 
Eelnevalt kirjeldatud kolm deflatsionistlikku vaadet eiravad kõik sama-
väärsuse eeldust, omistades vaidlejatele tõlgendajast endast oluliselt madala-
maid ratsionaalseid ja keelelisi võimeid; „realistlik primitivism“ seevastu eirab 
samaväärsuse eeldust, omistades vaidlejatele tõlgendajast oluliselt kõrgemaid 
võimeid. Täpsemalt omistab realistlik primitivism vaidlejatele kõrgema keele-
lise võimekuse: vaidlejad on selle vaate kohaselt omandanud primitiivse meta-
füüsilise olemasolu mõiste, samas kui kahtlev vaatleja, kes on puutunud kokku 
samasuguste relevantsete oludega (lugenud metafüüsikaraamatuid, kuulnud 
pealt metafüüsikute vestlusi jne), pole suutnud seda primitiivset olemasolu-
mõistet omandada. 
Seejärel esitasin alternatiivina metalingvistilise vaate, mille järgi ontoloogid 
vaidlevad selle üle, kuidas keelt (teatud konteksti puhul) kasutada või revi-
deerida. Väitsin, et see vaade (õigemini, teatud versioon sellest: „teoreetiline“ 
metalingvistiline vaade) rahuldab mõlemat keskset adekvaatsustingimust: see 
seletab kahtleva vaatleja mõttetustunnet ja austab samaväärsuse eeldust. Ka 
Amie Thomasson ja Delia Belleri on ontoloogiliste (või laiemalt metafüüsiliste) 
vaidluste osas metalingvistilist vaadet kaitsnud, kuid nemad toovad vaidlejaid 
motiveerivate kaalutlustena esile praktilisi (või pragmaatilisi või esteetilisi) 
kaalutlusi. Leidsin, et need „praktilised“ metalingvistilised vaated ei austa 
samaväärsuse eeldust, kuna omistavad vaidlejatele alaväärse reflektiivse 
võimekuse ehk võimekuse õigesti mõista ja kirjeldada, mida nad teevad. Soo-
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vitasin alternatiivina niisiis „teoreetilist“ metalingvistilist vaadet, mille järgi 
vaidlevad osalised selle üle, millised mõisted peegeldavad kõige paremini 
maailma objektiivset struktuuri. Väitsin, et see teoreetiline metalingvistiline 
vaade rahuldab mõlemat adekvaatsustingimust. Selle vaate järgi on vaidlejate 
vahel tõeline lahkarvamus, nimelt selle üle, missugused mõisted on maailma 
objektiivse struktuuri peegeldamiseks kõige paremad. Lisaks käsitlevad vaid-
lejad selle vaate järgi oma küsimusi kohaste meetoditega, või vähemalt meeto-
ditega, mida ratsionaalsed, mõistlikud inimesed võiks kohaseks pidada – eel-
dades, et teoreetilised voorused on tõendiks selle kohta, et teooria „lõikab maa-
ilma liigestest“, või vähemalt võivad nii arvata inimesed, kes pole tõsiselt 
puudulike kognitiivsete võimetega. Isegi kui kahtlev vaatleja leiab, et vaidlejate 
eesmärk (maailma liigestest lõikav mõisteskeem) on põhimõtteliselt kätte-
saamatu, sest pole lihtsalt asjakohaseid fakte, siis on vaidlejate selles osas 
tehtud viga taas selline, mida mõistlikud inimesed võiksid teha.  
Minu vaate puhul võidakse aga kahtlustada, et ka see (sarnaselt realistliku 
primitivismiga) omistab vaidlejatele tõlgendajast oluliselt suurema keelelise 
võimekuse – seda juhul, kui kahtlev vaatleja ei suuda mõista termineid nagu 
„objektiivne struktuur“ ja „liigestest lõikamine“. Nõustusin, et sellisele kaht-
levale vaatlejale ei pruugi minu pakutav vaade tõesti parim lahendus olla, kuid 
eeldan, et mitte kõik kahtlevad vaatlejad pole võimetud neid termineid mõistma. 
Leian, et nende terminite mängu toomine edendab arusaadavust, võrreldes 
primitivistliku vaatega, ja peaks seega aitama kahtlevatel vaadeldajatel vähen-
dada muret, et peavad vaidlejatele erilisi keelelisi võimeid omistama. 
Need olid peamised põhjused, miks pean oma vaadet kirjeldatud alternatii-
videga võrreldes enam samaväärsuse eeldust austavaks. Leidsin, et kaitstav 
vaade võimaldab seletada ka kahtleva vaatleja mõttetustunnet. Seda mõttetus-
tunnet võib teoreetilise metalingvistilise vaate raames mitmeti seletada, kuid 
keskendusin võimalusele, et kahtleva vaatleja mõttetustunde kutsuvad esile 
tema täielikult teadvustamata epistemitsistlikud otsustused. „Epistemitsismi“ 
metaontoloogilise seisukohana on kaitsnud Karen Bennett. Epistemitsismi 
keskne idee on, et teatud ontoloogiliste vaidluste puhul ei saa õiget teooriat 
alternatiivide seast kindlaks teha – mitte seetõttu, et pole asjakohast fakti, vaid 
kuna meil pole võimalik teooriate vahel valida, sest nad kõik näivad olulisi 
kriteeriume sama hästi täitvat. Seesugune epistemitsistlik otsustus ei nõua vaid-
lejatele madalamate võimete omistamist: küsimus, kas teooriad on tõesti 
võrdväärsed või mitte, on miski, mille osas ratsionaalsed inimesed võivad 
eriarvamusel olla. 
 
4. peatükk, „Revideeriva ontoloogia tõlgendamine ontoloogide vaate-
punktist“ 
Neljandas peatükis vaatlesin tõlgendamisküsimust „seestpoolt“, tõlgendatute 
endi vaatepunktist: kuidas peaksid revideerivad ontoloogid ise seletama, mida 
nad teevad? Seadsin otsitavale seletusele järgmised adekvaatsustingimused. 
Esiteks peaks see seletama destabiliseerimistunnet, s.t publiku tunnet, et argu-
mendid näitavad, et nende uskumustega on midagi valesti. Teiseks on vaja 
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seletada „õigustustunnet“ (sense of entitlement), mis hoolimata destabiliseeru-
mistundest säilib. See on publiku tunne, et neil on endiselt õigus oma asja-
kohastele uskumustele, näiteks uskumusele, et on olemas lauad, ja et sellel 
õigustusel on midagi pistmist sellega, mida publik näeb (või laiemalt, tajub). 
Kolmandaks on vaja seletada revideeriva ontoloogia episteemilist tähtsust ehk 
seda, kuidas see projekt võiks õnnestumise korral publiku uskumusi parandada. 
Kõigepealt kaalusin nn lihtsat inkompatibilismi. Selle vaate järgi usub 
enamik inimesi (näiteks) laudade olemasolu ning revideerivad ontoloogid 
kaitsevad väidet, et (kõigi sõnade samas, otseses tavakeelses tähenduses) pole 
laudu olemas, s.t tavauskumus on väär. Lihtsa inkompatibilismi järgi parandab 
revideeriv ontoloogia publiku uskumusi, tehes kindlaks valed uskumused ja 
asendades need sama teema kohta käivate tõeste uskumustega. See tähendab 
uskumuste parandamist, sest uskumused on head, kui nad on tõesed, ja halvad, 
kui nad on väärad. Leidsin, et lihtsa inkompatibilismi probleem on suutmatus 
seletada õigustustunnet. Pakkusin, et õigustustunde parim seletus on see, et 
oleme teadlikud oma pädevusest asjakohaste terminite rakendamisel tajutotsus-
tustes, nagu „Selles olukorras on täpselt üks laud“, ning oma pädevusest sel-
listest tajuotsustustest järeldada otsustusi nagu „Lauad on olemas“. Niisiis 
saame asjakohaseid uskumusi (nagu uskumus, et lauad on olemas) moodustada 
äärmiselt hästi tõeni jõudmist soodustava meetodi abil: rakendades mõisteid, 
mille kasutamisel oleme pädevad, tajuotsustuste tegemiseks, ja tehes täien-
davaid järeldusi, millesuguste tegemisel oleme samuti pädevad. Lihtne inkom-
patibilism kirjeldatud kujul ei näi olevat kooskõlas selle seletusega õigus-
tustundele, samuti ei paku see alternatiivset seletust. 
Seejärel vaatlesin neid kompatibilistlikke vaateid, mille revideerivad onto-
loogid tavaliselt omaks võtavad, kui nad lihtsa inkompatibilismi tagasi lükka-
vad. „Sokraatilise kompatibilismi“ järgi on enamik inimesi kogu aeg revi-
deerivate ontoloogide teese (näiteks, et laudu pole olemas) uskunud; ja seega 
pole nad seni uskunud nende teeside eitusi (näiteks, et lauad on olemas). Selle 
vaate järgi saab revideeriva ontoloogia episteemilist tähtsust seletada näiteks 
sellega, et inimesed pole enne argumentidega tutvumist oma asjakohastest 
uskumustest teadlikud ning teadvustatult heaks kiidetud tõene uskumus on 
parem kui pelk tõene uskumus, mida uskumuse omaja teadvustatult heaks ei 
kiida. Sokraatiline kompatibilism on aga vähemalt esmapilgul vastuolus õigus-
tustunde ja destabilisteerumistundega: need tunded esitavad kõnealuseid usku-
musi, mida meil sokraatilise kompatibilismi järgi pole, õigustuse ja destabili-
seerimise objektina. 
„Ükskõiksuskompatibilismi“ järgi seevastu pole enamikul inimestel üldse 
uskumusi küsimuses, kas lauad ja muud sarnased asjad on olemas: nad on selle 
teema suhtes ükskõiksed. Selle vaate järgi võib revideeriva ontoloogia epis-
teemiline tähtsus seisneda publikule uute tõeste uskumuste pakkumises teemal, 
mille osas nad olid varem neutraalsed. Selle vaate omistasin Peter van Inwa-
genile. Ta näib argumenteerivat, et oma igapäevakõnes (öeldes näiteks, et „Tei-
ses toas on kaks tooli“) on inimesed ükskõiksed küsimustes nagu küsimus, kas 
on olemas toolid – nende kõne pole ontoloogiliselt siduv. Van Inwagen näib 
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arvavat, et see vaade – mida Matti Eklund nimetab „hermeneutiliseks üks-
kõiksuseks“ (hermeneutic indifferentism) – toetab ükskõiksuskompatibilismi. 
Viimane on aga vaade uskumuste kohta, mitte igapäevase kõne sidumuste 
kohta. Meil näib olevat igapäevakõne tõlgendamisest sõltumatut tõendmaterjali, 
mis kinnitab, et meil tõesti on uskumused nagu uskumus, et toolid on olemas. 
Kui mitte mujalt, siis leiame tõendmaterjali õigustus- ja destabiliseerumis-
tundes, mis esitavad neid uskumusi publikule nende õigustustunde ja destabi-
liseerumistunde objektidena. 
Kolmandat liiki kompatibilism, mida kaalusin, oli „keelelise varieerumise 
kompatibilism“. Selle vaate järgi, mida näib van Inwagen pooldavat oma 
hiljutisemas kirjutises, usub enamik inimesi näiteks seda, et on olemas lauad ja 
toolid; revideerivad ontoloogid aga arutavad, kas on olemas lauad ja toolid 
lause „Lauad ja toolid on olemas“ mingis muus, metafüüsilises tähenduses. Ja 
lause metafüüsilises tähenduses pole inimestel selleteemalisi uskumusi. See 
vaade seletab õigustustunnet: meil on endiselt õigus oma tavakeelsele usku-
musele ja seda õigustust saab seletada kooskõlas minu pakutud „parima sele-
tusega“ õigustustundele. Kuid keelelise varieeruvuse kompatibilismil on raskusi 
destabiliseerumistunde ja revideeriva ontoloogia episteemilise tähtsuse seleta-
misega. Ontoloogide argumendid paistavad näitavat, et tavauskumustega on 
midagi valesti (sellest destabiliseerumistunne), kuid pole selge, kuidas need 
argumendid saavad seda näidata, kui nad käivad teema kohta, mille osas ena-
mikul inimestel uskumusi pole. Samuti on ebaselge, mis oleks keelelise variee-
rumise kompatibilismi kohaselt revideeriva ontoloogia episteemiline tähtsus. 
Tõsi, argumendid pakuksid meile uusi tõeseid uskumusi; kuid teisalt käiks need 
tõesed uskumused maailma osade kohta, mille kohta meil juba on tõesed 
uskumused. Paistab, et õpime vaid maailma teises keeles kirjeldama. 
Pöördusin seejärel „Sideri inkompatibilismi“ juurde. Selle vaate järgi ei 
paljasta argumendid mitte vääri uskumusi, vaid näitavad, et meie uskumuste 
moodustamiseks kasutatavatel mõistetel on teatud teoreetilised probleemid. 
Keskne probleem seisneb selles, et kõnealused mõisted lubavad vasturääkivaid 
otsustusi. Sideri inkompatibilism suudab seletada nii õigustustunnet kui ka 
destabiliseerumistunnet: tunneme, et meil on uskumustele õigus, sest saame 
neid moodustada, rakendades mõisteid, mille kasutamisel oleme pädevad; ja 
uskumused on destabiliseeritud, sest argumendid näitavad probleeme seoses 
nende mõistetega, mille abil uskumused on moodustatud. Revideeriva onto-
loogia episteemilist tähtsust seletab see vaade, apelleerides Sideri mõttele, et 
uskumuste eesmärk on olla vastavuses maailmaga ja seetõttu ei peaks usku-
mused olema mitte ainult tõesed, vaid vormitud maailma objektiivset struktuuri 
peegeldavate mõistete abil. Kui mõistetel on aga sedalaadi teoreetilised prob-
leemid, mida ontoloogid paljastavad, siis pole tegemist teoreetiliselt voorusliku 
mõisteskeemiga, mis omakorda annab alust arvata, et tegemist pole maailma 
„liigestest lõikava“ mõisteskeemiga. 
Sideri inkompatibilismi viga on, et see eeldab – ebausutavalt – et kõigi 
uskumuste eesmärk on olla vastavuses reaalsusega, nii täiuslikult kui võimalik, 
ja puuduvad muud asjakohased kaalutlused, mis võiks selle vastavuseesmärgi 
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üles kaaluda. Leidsin, et enamasti moodustame uskumusi (lõpuks) mitte-epis-
teemilistel eesmärkidel. Nimetasin mitte-episteemilistel eesmärkidel moodus-
tatud uskumusi „praktilisteks uskumusteks“ ja pelgalt episteemilise täiuse nimel 
moodustatud uskumusi „teoreetilisteks uskumusteks“. Täiuslik vastavus reaal-
susele on üks viis episteemilist täiust mõista (ma ei vaidlusta doktoritöös seda 
eeldust episteemilise täiuse kohta, aga pean seda siiski vaid üheks viisiks epis-
teemilist täiust mõista). Tuginedes kirjeldatud eristusele praktiliste ja teoreeti-
liste uskumuste vahel, arendasin välja oma vaate revideerivast ontoloogiast kui 
mõistete parandamisest teoreetiliste uskumuste parandamiseks. Selle vaate järgi 
on revideerival ontoloogial vaid piiratud episteemiline tähtsus: revideeriv onto-
loogia võib parandada ainult publiku teoreetilisi uskumusi ja sedagi vaid eel-
dusel, et publikul on teoreetilised uskumused või nad on huvitatud nende 
omandamisest. 
 
5. peatükk, „Kaitstud vaate rakendamine soometafüüsikale“  
Viiendas peatükis näitasin, kuidas mu lähenemine revideeriva ontoloogia tõl-
gendamisele võib panustada hiljuti hoogu saanud arutellu feministliku ja pea-
voolu metafüüsika vahelise suhte kohta. Nimetatud arutelu on toimunud eel-
kõige Elizabeth Barnesi, Mari Mikkola, Ted Sideri ja Jonathan Schafferi vahel. 
Kaitsesin vaadet, et sõna „naine“ konstruktivistlikud analüüsid (näiteks Sally 
Haslangeri ja Asta Sveinsdóttiri omad) on käsitletavad püüdlusena parandada 
mõisteid praktiliste uskumuste parandamiseks, samas kui eelnevates pea-
tükkides analüüsitud revideeriva ontoloogia eesmärk on parandada mõisteid, et 
parandada teoreetilisi uskumusi. 
Kritiseerisin kõigepealt „naise“ konstruktivistlike analüüside „faktilist tõl-
gendust“, mille kohaselt need analüüsid on katse avastada naiste metafüüsiline 
loomus, s.t analüüse nähakse väidetena maailma faktide kohta. Argumentee-
risin, et koos usutava „relevantsusteesiga“ on faktilisel tõlgendusel mitteaktsep-
teeritav implikatsioon, et teatud laadi soovmõtlemine on feministlikus meta-
füüsikas aktsepteeritav. Relevantsusteesi järgi on argumendid nagu Katharine 
Jenkinsi oma – argumendid, mis mu tõlgenduse järgi apelleerivad kahjule, 
vastuväitena feministlike metafüüsikute kesksetele teesidele – feministlikus 
metafüüsikas relevantsed. Jenkinsi stiilis argumendid võivad mitte olla otsus-
tavad, kuid relevantsusteesi järgi peab neid tõsiselt võtma. Kuid kui konstruk-
tivistlikud teesid „naise“ kohta kombineerida usutava relevantsusteesiga, näib 
järelduvat, et faktiväitele on kohane vastu vaielda, osutades väidetava fakti 
soovimatutele tagajärgedele. Feministlikud metafüüsikud tahaksid seda impli-
katsiooni eeldatavasti vältida ning seetõttu peaksid nad faktilise tõlgenduse (või 
vähemalt teatud tugeva versiooni faktilisest tõlgendusest) tagasi lükkama – eel-
dades, et nad ei lükka tagasi relevantsusteesi. 
Seejärel pakkusin, et faktilise tõlgenduse asemel võiks väiteid „naise“ kohta 
mõista väidetena selle kohta, kuidas peaksime muutma selle sõnaga seotud 
mõistet. Kuna eelnevates peatükkides kaitsesin vaadet, et ka peavoolu revidee-
rivat ontoloogiat ontoloogiat peaks käsitlema mõisteparandusprojektina, võib 
nüüd paista, nagu püüaks nii peavoolu revideerivad ontoloogid kui ka femi-
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nistlikud metafüüsikud ühtviisi uskumuste moodustamiseks kasutatavaid mõis-
teid parandada, pidades seejuures relevantseks erinevaid kriteeriume. Nimelt 
peavad peavoolu revideerivad ontoloogid oluliseks vaid teoreetilisi voorusi, 
mida peavad omakorda tõendmaterjaliks, et mõisteskeem peegeldab maailma 
objektiivset struktuuri. Samas feministlike metafüüsikute jaoks on olulised ka 
eetilised kaalutlused. See vaade, mille järgi on feministlikud ja peavoolumeta-
füüsikud konkureerivad osapooled samas laiemas projektis (mõistete paran-
damine uskumuste parandamiseks), on aga vastuolus usutava ideega, et pea-
vooluontoloogid ja feministlikud metafüüsikud võivad õigupäraselt eirata teatud 
argumente, mis teisele osapoolele oleksid relevantsed. Näiteks võivad femi-
nistlikud metafüüsikud eirata nn kuhja-argumente, mille järeldus on, et naisi 
pole olemas, ja peavoolu revideerivad ontoloogid, kes selliseid argumente 
esitavad, ei pea tunnistama ’naise’ mõiste praktilist tähtsust kui asjakohast 
vastuväidet nende argumentidele. 
Et kahe projekti üksteisest sõltumatust mõista, kasutasin jälle eristust teoree-
tiliste ja praktiliste uskumuste vahel. Leidsin, et kõnealused „feministlikud 
metafüüsikud“ püüavad parandada praktiliste uskumuste moodustamisel kasuta-
tavaid mõisteid ja „peavoolu metafüüsikud“ (või igatahes revideerivad onto-
loogid, keda käsitlesin eelmistes peatükkides) püüavad parandada teoreetiliste 
uskumuste moodustamisel kasutatavaid mõisteid. Seda vaadet toetab ka 
tähelepanek, et „uskumust“ saab analüüsida maailma representeerimisena teatud 
viisil ja maailma pidamisena representeeritud viisil olevaks. „Peavoolu“ revi-
deerivatel ontoloogidel on põhjust hoolida, kuidas me „peame maailma repre-
senteeritud viisil olevaks“ tähenduses „mida me teadlikul reflekteerimisel tõe-
seks tunnistame“, samas kui feministlikel metafüüsikutel on põhjust hoolida, 
kuidas me maailma representeerime, kui „peame maailma representeeritud viisil 
olevaks“ tähenduses „kuidas me maailma kogeme ja kuidas kaldume tajutu 
põhjal käituma“. 
 
Võimalusi edasiseks uurimistööks 
Eelkõige on vaja uurida põhjalikumalt uskumuste rolle ja liike, mõistmaks ja 
edendamaks erinevaid mõisteparanduse projekte, sealhulgas revideerivat onto-
loogiat. Teoreetiliste uskumuste (ehk puhtalt episteemilise täiuse nimel moodus-
tatud uskumuste) ja praktiliste uskumuste (ehk uskumuste, mille moodustamise 
lõppeesmärk pole episteemiline) eristus näib küll midagi olulist tabavat, ent 
tekitab samas küsimusi. Mis ikkagi on „episteemiline täius“ kui uskumuse ees-
märk? Ja mis on kõnealused mitte-episteemilised eesmärgid? Kas iga uskumus 
või uskumuste moodustamise projekt kuulub ühte neist kategooritest? Näiteks 
pole selge, kas moraalifilosoofid püüavad moodustada häid teoreetilisi või 
praktilisi uskumusi moraali kohta või mõlemaid. Samuti peaks lähemalt uurima 
eristusi „praktiliste uskumuste“ sees. Ühest küljest moodustatakse need usku-
mused uskumuse kandja mitte-episteemiliste eesmärkide tarvis, nagu ellu-
jäämine ja (mitte-episteemiline) heaolu. Teisalt võib meil olla (viimaks mitte-
episteemilisi) aluseid hoolida mitte üksnes sellest, mis mõisted on uskumuse 
kandja huvide seisukohast kõige tõhusamad: meil võib olla võimalik teha oma 
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huvidest lähtuvalt õigustatud ettekirjutusi mõistete osas, mida teised inimesed 
oma praktiliste uskumuste moodustamisel kasutavad. Olen sellele võimalusele 
oma feministliku soometafüüsika analüüsis ainult osutanud, ent seda peaks 
edasi uurima, kaaludes näiteks võimalikke eesmärgikonflikte, mis tekivad, kui 
uskumuse kandja huvidest lähtuvalt oleksid õigustatud ühed mõisted, aga teiste 
inimeste huvidest lähtuvalt peaks ta kasutama teisi mõisteid. 
Teine teemadering, mis edasist uurimist vajab, on otsesemalt seotud meta-
ontoloogiaga, täpsemalt sellega, kuidas revideerivat ontoloogiat kui intellek-
tuaalset projekti hinnata, kui on omaks võetud siin kaitstud tõlgendus. Põhjen-
dasin tõlgendamisküsimuse uurimist just nimelt huviga hindamis- ja soovita-
misküsimuste osas, kuid doktoritöö suuresti vaikib ses osas, mis täpselt on 
kaitstud vaate vastavad implikatsioonid. See sõltub mitmetest küsimustest, mis 
jäävad doktoritöö haardest välja. Näiteks ei käsitle doktoritöö küsimust, kas on 
mingit viisi süstemaatiliselt mõõta, kuivõrd on võistlevad teooriad teoreetiliselt 
vooruslikud ja täidavad teisi asjakohaseid kriteeriume. Isegi kui teoreetilisi 
voorusi saab võrrelda, võiks siis ikkagi küsida, kas see võrdlus ütleks meile 
midagi selle kohta, mil määral võistlevad teooriad peegeldavad maailma objek-
tiivset struktuuri. Lahtiseks on siin jäetud ka küsimus, kas maailmal üldse on 
objektiivne struktuur. Need pole aga muidugi uued küsimused, mis seoses selle 
doktoritööga tekivad: need on pigem ulatuslikud (ja ehk võiks isegi öelda, et 
igavesed) taustaprobleemid, mille olen pidanud siin kõrvale jätma. 
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